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I．Crisis reinforces need for stronger trade and financial
integration in Asia and the Pacific
By Mia Mikic and Ravi Ratnayake
Introduction
The Asian economies have become an epitome of “trade as an engine of growth”
during  the past several  decades as  they have  been expanding  economic  and  human
development,  using  trade  as  a  ladder.   Most  of the economies have  become highly
integrated  into  the  world  economy,  either  through  direct  export  and  import  or  by
becoming an important link in the global supply chain. However, when demand for their
production and exports plunged suddenly and sharply in the last quarter of 2008, a sharp
contraction in trade flows put their growth and social security under serious threat. On
such occasions, issues  of  dependency  on  external  markets,  foreign  exchange, foreign
direct investment  (FDI)  and technology rise  to  the  surface  and  chosen  development
strategies get reviewed. In Asia and the Pacific, this is accompanied by the concerns
about  the  inability  of  the  region’s  economies to enhance and  deepen their  regional
integration. Expectedly, the latest crisis has accentuated the concerns about low levels of
existing intraregional  trade  and  investments as  well  as underdeveloped  financial
integration in Asia and the Pacific.
This e-book brings together chapters that explore various aspects of trade and
financial integration in Asia and the Pacific, the reasons for the lack of it, and potential
benefits  of  strengthening  such  integration.  The book focuses  on the exploration  of
challenges  and  opportunities  that  exist  in  intraregional trade in  goods, integration  in
services trade, availability of trade finance as well as inflows of portfolio investments.
The papers have been written by researchers who have applied their extensive expertise
and  analytical  skills  to studying  the impacts  of regional trade  liberalization  and
motivations for financial flows.
A. Asia and the Pacific: A highly heterogeneous region…
For the purpose of this e-book, the Asian and Pacific region comprises 58 regional
members and associate members of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and
the Pacific (ESCAP).
1 Ranging from Turkey in the west to Pacific island States in the
east, and from the Russian Federation in the north to New Zealand in the south, it can be
expected that the region includes extremes on all ends. In terms of population size, the
three most populous nations (China, India and Indonesia) share the concerns of regional
integration with Niue, Nauru and Tuvalu that together have less than 25,000 inhabitants.
1 For the full list of economies included see the ESCAP website at www.unescap.org/about/member.asp.2
The region encompasses the nations that belong to the “rich club” with a gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita of more than US$ 50,000
2 as well as nations whose
per capita GDP hardly reaches US$ 200. In terms of size of trade, there are mini-sized
trading nations with less than US$ 10 million of merchandise exports and nations that are
contributing sizeable shares to world exports, e.g., China at 9.3 per cent, Japan at 5 per
cent and the Russian Federation at 3 per cent (table 1). In terms of import and export
dependence, Asia-Pacific averages 27.5 per cent for merchandise import dependence and
29.5 per cent for export dependence, making the region more trade dependent than the
world average. This average hides the very high values of merchandise trade dependence
for small open economies such as Maldives (only on the import side), Nauru, Singapore
and  Hong  Kong,  China,  or  relatively  low  values  for  economies  with  large  domestic
markets, such as Australia, Indonesia, Japan and the Russian Federation (table 2).







Top five economies (percentage share in world)
1 China 7.10 1 China 9.23
2 Japan 4.78 2 Japan 5.05
3 Republic of Korea 2.73 3 Russian Federation 3.02
4 Hong Kong, China 2.46 4 Republic of Korea 2.73
5 Singapore 2.01 5 Hong Kong, China 2.39
Bottom five economies (percentage share in world)
44 Micronesia (F.S.)* 0.00056 42 Palau 0.00019
45 Palau 0.00037 43 Vanuatu 0.00019
46 Nauru 0.00027 44 Micronesia (F.S.)* 0.00018
47 Niue 0.00019 45 Niue 0.00006
48 Tuvalu 0.00017 46 Tonga 0.00005
Memo items
Asia and the














Pacific 1.51 Pacific 1.45
Source: Calculations by ESCAP, based on COMTRADE data.
* Federated States.
2 In 1990 constant United States dollars.3







Top five economies (percentage share in GDP)
1 Marshall Islands 2 571.29 1 Marshall Islands 748.69
2
Hong Kong, China 182.30 2 Singapore 185.87
3 Nauru 177.67 3 Hong Kong, China 171.76
4 Singapore 175.76 4 Nauru 160.07
5 Maldives 110.10 5 Azerbaijan 103.24
Bottom five economies (percentage share in GDP)
43
Iran (Islamic Rep.
of) 17.96 40 Armenia 8.84
44 Russian Federation 15.93 41 Vanuatu 5.89
45 Japan 15.53 42 Afghanistan 4.58
46 Azerbaijan 15.48
43 French Polynesia 4.37
47
Brunei Darussalam 14.61 44 Tonga 3.19
Memo items



















Source: Calculated by ESCAP, based on COMTRADE data.
B. …But most economies follow the ‘outward-oriented’ strategies
Notwithstanding  these  large  differences between  the  economies in  the  region,
most of them have, over a longer period, consistently relied on export (trade) to power
their growth; Japan was followed by newly-industrialized economies (Republic of Korea,
Singapore,  Hong  Kong,  China  and  Taiwan  Province  of  China)  and  newly  emerging
economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand).  Their economic vitality and
successes in maintaining high economic growth rates, together with improving levels of
inequalities  and  poverty  reduction,  have offered  an  excellent  argument  in  favour  of
outward-oriented development strategies based on liberal trade and investment regimes as
well as high reliance on trade and FDI (World Bank, 1993).
While the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98 brought some corrections in terms of
management of capital account openness, the ability of the then crisis-hit economies to4
“export themselves out of the crisis” only enforced the importance of trade and current
account  openness  for  their  development.  Despite  the  weakening  of the  Washington
consensus  conditionalities  after  the  Asian  financial  crisis,  most  Asian  and Pacific
economies continued to pursue outward-oriented strategies with two additional twists.
First, those affected by the financial crisis understood the value of sound current
accounts, robust foreign exchange reserves, and appropriate capital account controls and
foreign exchange rate management. In the decade after the Asian financial crisis, Asian
economies increased their holdings of foreign exchange reserves by five times, and some
of them became extremely important sources for financing the spending-savings gap in
the United States and some economies in the European Union. At the same time, pressure
on several Asian economies to appreciate their currencies in terms of the United States
dollar and the euro prior to 2008 did cause some movements in the exchange rates, but
relative competitiveness among the Asian economies has been preserved by managing
these  movements  carefully. Most  of  the  economies  maintain  de  facto  regimes  of
adjustable pegs and are not shy of using reserves to defend their currency values aligned
with their national goals.
Since the late 1990s, most economies, especially those that were hurt badly by the
financial  crisis, have reduced  their exposure  to  short-term  debt; nevertheless, some
economies did experience increased exposure just before the onset of the new global
crisis (e.g., Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation). However,
while  improvements have  been made  at the national  level,  the  lack  of  progress  in
financial market integration in Asia and the Pacific is still very obvious.
3 The key reasons
for  this  relative  failure  are (a)  the  absence  of  any  linkage  between  jurisdictions  of
financial infrastructure, and (b) very weak cooperation in financial market development,
including standards, supervision and intermediation (Bank of International Settlement,
2008).
Second,  most  economies  developed  strong enthusiasm for preferential  trade
agreements. Of 114 trade agreements that have been put into force and notified to the
World Trade Organization (WTO) since 2000, 51 had at least one party from the Asia-
Pacific  region  (figure  1).
4 The  region  also  has  11 plurilateral trade  agreements that
connect countries in the same geographical region; these agreements more or less overlap
with subregions such as Central Asia, South Asia, South-East Asia, the Pacific etc.
5 Most
of these bilateral and regional agreements seek improvement of market access over and
above the ones secured through multilateral trading agreements.
6  It is thus somewhat
disappointing  that  while  the  intraregional  trade by Asia-Pacific  economies  has  been
steadily increasing in United States dollar terms, as a share of their total trade it has been
lingering at around 50 per cent since the end of 2003, up from 45 per cent in 1998.
3 Hyun Suk and Jang Hong Bum (2008) provide a review of cooperation efforts for bond market development in the
region with the focus on the Asian Bond Market Initiative (supply side), Executives’ Meeting of East Asia Pacific
Central Banks (demand side) and the Chiang Mai Initiative (regional safety network).
4 The list of and details on each one of these agreements is available on the Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment
Agreement Database website at www.unescap.org/tid/aptiad.
5 Africa is home to seven regional trade and financial integrations.
6 Obviously, a number of agreements also pursue other economic and non-economic objectives.5
Compared with the 70-plus per cent achieved among the European Union economies, or
the 55-plus  per  cent  among  the North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement economies,
intraregional trade of Asia-Pacific would be considered as low if these economies had an
agreement similar to what has been linking European or North American economies.
Instead, the Asia-Pacific region economies form a “noodle bowl”.
7
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Source: Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Agreement Database.
C. Crisis and ‘revival’ of the efforts to reach regional integration
As stated above, exports and imports dwindled as the recession took hold in the
major importing developed markets in the latter part of 2008 and early 2009. Figure 2
tracks year-on-year changes of monthly values of imports by selected Asian economies
since 1996 in order to compare three episodes of import contraction: 1997/98, 2001 and
2008/09. The  recent  contraction  of  imports  (measured  by  the  year-on-year changes),
which happened suddenly, was synchronized over all economies.
8 The magnitude of the
imports contraction, at between 20 per cent and 40 per cent, in the current crisis is larger
than the contraction recorded in the Asian financial crisis in 1997/98 and certainly deeper
than in the dot.com crisis.
7 This term is frequently used in the Asia-Pacific context to describe the “spaghetti bowl” phenomenon of the tangle
of relationships created by multiple overlapping preferential trading arrangements. The term “spaghetti bowl” was
introduced by Jagdish Bhagwati in the early 1990s.
8 Exports behaved in the same way. See ESCAP, 2009 (part I).6
Since June 2009, there have been signs of a rebound of exports and imports as
well as a return to positive changes in real GDP and industrial production in a number of
countries in the region, including China and India. These positive changes should not,
however,  be taken as an indication of a return of dynamic economic and trade growth as
experienced during 2006-2008; it is more likely that the recovery of the global economy
will take a much slower route. Furthermore, there is a growing consensus that pre-crisis
trade and macroeconomic imbalances contributed to the crises and can cause another one
if not talked in a more systematic way. This means that the sources of growth for the
outward-oriented economies need to be modified and balanced instead of relying only on
the demand in the developed markets. Since some of the economies in the region have
really small internal markets, the only option for them is intraregional trade.
Figure 2. Import trends for selected Asian economies (monthly values, year-on-year
changes, February 1996 to June 2009
Source: ESCAP, 2009.
The fact that intraregional trade in the Asian and Pacific region is perceived as
low (given the efforts at liberalizing trade flows within the region), is seen by analysts
and policymakers both as a part of the problem and a part of the solution in this current
crisis. The low level of intraregional trade has been interpreted as a sign of high exposure
to external risks (i.e., a contraction of the aggregate in developed markets). To a large
degree, this is correct – trade contraction has indeed been caused by the disappearance of
external  demand  in  the  developed  markets  (Baldwin,  ed.,  2009). The  low share  of
intraregional  trade is also  seen  as  a  solution. Expansion  of  demand  for  products
originating in the region –  that is, an increase in intraregional trade – can substitute for
the lack of demand in the developed markets, which may take some time to recover after
the crisis. While at the start of the downward cycle in 2008 some analysts believed that7
Asia was “decoupled” from the developed country markets and would not be affected by
the financial crisis in the United States and Europe, a consensus has now (almost) been
reached that full “decoupling” is not possible, and is even undesirable, and that enhancing
intraregional trade and investment should play a complementary role in the integration of
the Asian and the Pacific region into the global economy (ESCAP, 2009).
D. Impacts of further trade liberalization on Asia and the Pacific
Among the obstacles that limit faster growth of the share of Asian and Pacific
region countries in intraregional trade are obviously the ones that matter in times of crisis
and which are linked to the man-made obstacles in terms of barriers to trade. Trade is
influenced by both demand behaviour and supply capacity, but these typically take longer
to correct. Therefore, the focus in the short term should be on boosting intraregional trade
by eliminating the barriers that still exist, despite numerous preferential trade agreements
among Asian economies.
Two chapters in this publication explore the impacts of liberalizing intraregional
trade. Strutt (chapter II) uses the Global Trade Analysis Project model to consider how
beneficial greater intraregional trade in Asia-Pacific would be. Several different trade
liberalization  scenarios  are  modelled,  including  a  pan-Asia-Pacific  tariff  elimination,
ASEAN+6 tariff elimination and multilateral WTO trade liberalization. The scenarios
have been designed to explore some of the potential gains of switching from the Asian
“noodle bowl” type of intraregional trade arrangements to one driven by a single tariff-
reducing/eliminating trade agreement. It was not surprising to discover that an increase in
exports is proportional to the level of ambition for liberalization among all economies in
the region. However, such an export increase does not boost the welfare of the largest
economies in the region by as much as the WTO level of liberalization does, due to the
terms of trade effects being more favourable for them when liberalization is global.
Wadhwa (chapter III) examines some of the important aspects of intraregional
trade in South Asia as countries of that subregion are members of multiple preferential
regional and bilateral trade agreements. The paper tracks the trends and patterns in South
Asian  intraregional  trade, the comparative  advantages  of  major countries  in  the
subregion, trade complementarity between those countries, and the levels and product
coverage  of  intra-industry  trade  over  the past decade.  The  paper  shows  that  trade
complementarities among the South Asian countries, although still low, have improved
over time. In addition, the levels of intra-industry trade in this subregion are not  yet
significant. Nonetheless, the analysis of marginal intra-industry trade indicates that there
are a few product categories that have contributed significantly to the new trade flows
over the past decade. The region does have the potential for enhancing intraregional trade
in at least some sectors through vertical intra-industry trade among the member countries,
with India taking the lead in this regard.
While trade  agreements focus  on the creation  of additional market  access  (in
addition  to  the  one  obtained  through  WTO  and  unilateral  preferential  schemes),  the
byproduct  is  also  generation  of trade  diversion  for  countries  not  involved  in  the8
agreements. Raihan (chapter IV) investigates the impact of trade liberalization between
India and the European Union on low-income countries that currently enjoy preferences
in the European Union market relative to India. All the low-income economies under
consideration would experience a loss in welfare, and the welfare losses for the South
Asian countries would be much higher than for the other low-income economies in Asia
and  Africa.  Bangladesh  appears  to  experience the largest  loss  in  welfare  in  absolute
value, whereas the rest of South Asia would incur the largest loss in terms of share in
GDP. The welfare losses of these low-income economies are mainly driven by the loss in
terms of trade. However, in general, the extent of welfare loss in terms of share in GDP
for most of these countries is not very high. Most of these low-income countries would
also experience losses in real GDP and exports. The policy issue to be considered here is
whether rules  of  origin  that  exist  in  agreements  between  India  and  (most  of  the
considered) low-income countries, and between India and the European Union, could be
designed in such a way as to prevent these adverse terms of trade shocks.
While most of the trade growth for dynamic Asian economies has occurred in the
merchandise and manufacturing sectors, services is an important sector; however, the
latter sector is often overlooked as the driver of growth. Traditionally, services have been
seen  as  a  low  productivity  growth  sector;  however,  with the  recent advancement  of
information and communication technology (ITC) as a medium for delivering services,
the services sector is playing a dominant role in increasing productivity of other sectors,
services and goods alike. Another special feature of services trade is the type of barriers
used. In contrast to trade in goods, services trade is regulated mostly by “behind the
border” measures  that  belong  to  regulatory  and  liberalization  frameworks  and  it is
complicated to implement these measures on a discriminatory basis.
Nevertheless, as an increasing number of bilateral and regional trade agreements
include concessions in the services sector, Dee (chapter V) explores what behind-the-
border reforms in services and investment are best done through trade agreements. One
way  to  answer  this  question  is  to  think  of  trade  agreements  as  being  exercises  in
piecemeal  reform,  in  the  sense  that  they  provide  opportunities  for  reform,  but  in  a
constrained,  partial  manner.  The  key  policy  question  is  whether  countries  should
unreservedly take advantage of these opportunities, despite the constraints, or whether the
nature  of  the  constraints  should  temper  the  way  in  which  the  countries  go  about  the
reforms. Chapter IV first compares trade agreements, as exercises in piecemeal reform,
with other modes of liberalization, and then considers which particular reforms should be
included  in  trade  agreements.  It  develops  two  key  principles  of  piecemeal  reform  in
services and investment. The first is to look for sectors where trade barriers tend to add to
real  resource  costs. The second is to take  a broader view than that of just removing
discrimination  against  foreign  providers.  The  paper  concludes  with  some  general
guidance for trade negotiators and trade ministers.
E. Some aspects of regional financial integration in Asia and the Pacific
In examining the key factors leading to the collapse of trade with the last crisis in
2008, Baldwin (ed., 2009) finds that “global trade finance has not had a major impact on
trade flows”. The freezing of trade finance did not happen in all regions and, in general,9
where it did occur it was only a “moderate freeze”, according to the  authors of that
volume. In contrast, Duval and Liu (chapter VII) found that the threat of the higher costs
and limited availability of trade finance to some economies in the Asia-Pacific region
was significant. In fact, in their other recent empirical analysis (Liu and Duval, 2009),
they suggested that a 10 per cent decline in trade finance could lead to a US$ 129 billion
drop in total trade in developing Asia, representing 3.6 per cent of their total trade. To
overcome  the  adverse  impact  of  the lack  of  trade  finance, the  authors  suggested
improvements in the establishment of related institutions in many of the less developed
countries of Asia, together with more serious consideration being given to the options for
regional cooperation in order to reduce the trade finance capacity gap between countries
of the region.
It has been argued that financial integration in Asia is probably the weakest of all
the components of regional integration (goods, services, labour and capital). While the
goods, services and labour components could be larger and tighter, there is no denying
that they have already strengthened. It is also true that data on those aspects of regional
integration  are  more  readily  available  than  data  on  financial  integration,  including
bilateral FDI flows.
ESCAP, 2009 (part I) discusses the intraregional flows of FDI based on available data.
FDI inflows to Asia are expected to recover quickly following the current global crisis (figure 3),
and  most  FDI  destined  for  Thailand  and  Viet  Nam  is  expected  to  come  from  other  Asian
countries. In turn, Thailand and Viet Nam, similar to China and Hong Kong, China are becoming
valuable  sources  of  FDI for neighbouring  countries  such  as the Lao  People’s  Democratic
Republic and Cambodia. FDI among Asian countries accounts for almost half of the region’s total
FDI  inflows, with intra-Association  of  Southeast  Asian  Nations  (ASEAN)  FDI  particularly
showing a rising trend. South-East Asia remains the main destination for Asian outward FDI
(UNCTAD,  2008).  Within  South-East  Asia,  Singapore  is  the  largest source  of outward FDI,
flowing mainly to other ASEAN countries, and particularly Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand.
Figure 3. FDI inflows from Asia to selected developing countries
Source: For 2009 onwards, projections by the Economist Intelligence Unit online database, as cited in ESCAP,
2009.
The intraregional FDI flows appear to be rising, but their absolute level is still
relatively low. This is even truer for the intraregional movements of portfolio capital (see,
for example, Garcia-Herrero, Yang and Wooldridge, 2008). Most of the private traders1
I．Crisis reinforces need for stronger trade and financial
integration in Asia and the Pacific
By Mia Mikic and Ravi Ratnayake
Introduction
The Asian economies have become an epitome of “trade as an engine of growth”
during  the past several  decades as  they have  been expanding  economic  and  human
development,  using  trade  as  a  ladder.   Most  of the economies have  become highly
integrated  into  the  world  economy,  either  through  direct  export  and  import  or  by
becoming an important link in the global supply chain. However, when demand for their
production and exports plunged suddenly and sharply in the last quarter of 2008, a sharp
contraction in trade flows put their growth and social security under serious threat. On
such occasions, issues  of  dependency  on  external  markets,  foreign  exchange, foreign
direct investment  (FDI)  and technology rise  to  the  surface  and  chosen  development
strategies get reviewed. In Asia and the Pacific, this is accompanied by the concerns
about  the  inability  of  the  region’s  economies to enhance and  deepen their  regional
integration. Expectedly, the latest crisis has accentuated the concerns about low levels of
existing intraregional  trade  and  investments as  well  as underdeveloped  financial
integration in Asia and the Pacific.
This e-book brings together chapters that explore various aspects of trade and
financial integration in Asia and the Pacific, the reasons for the lack of it, and potential
benefits  of  strengthening  such  integration.  The book focuses  on the exploration  of
challenges  and  opportunities  that  exist  in  intraregional trade in  goods, integration  in
services trade, availability of trade finance as well as inflows of portfolio investments.
The papers have been written by researchers who have applied their extensive expertise
and  analytical  skills  to studying  the impacts  of regional trade  liberalization  and
motivations for financial flows.
A. Asia and the Pacific: A highly heterogeneous region…
For the purpose of this e-book, the Asian and Pacific region comprises 58 regional
members and associate members of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and
the Pacific (ESCAP).
1 Ranging from Turkey in the west to Pacific island States in the
east, and from the Russian Federation in the north to New Zealand in the south, it can be
expected that the region includes extremes on all ends. In terms of population size, the
three most populous nations (China, India and Indonesia) share the concerns of regional
integration with Niue, Nauru and Tuvalu that together have less than 25,000 inhabitants.
1 For the full list of economies included see the ESCAP website at www.unescap.org/about/member.asp.2
The region encompasses the nations that belong to the “rich club” with a gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita of more than US$ 50,000
2 as well as nations whose
per capita GDP hardly reaches US$ 200. In terms of size of trade, there are mini-sized
trading nations with less than US$ 10 million of merchandise exports and nations that are
contributing sizeable shares to world exports, e.g., China at 9.3 per cent, Japan at 5 per
cent and the Russian Federation at 3 per cent (table 1). In terms of import and export
dependence, Asia-Pacific averages 27.5 per cent for merchandise import dependence and
29.5 per cent for export dependence, making the region more trade dependent than the
world average. This average hides the very high values of merchandise trade dependence
for small open economies such as Maldives (only on the import side), Nauru, Singapore
and  Hong  Kong,  China,  or  relatively  low  values  for  economies  with  large  domestic
markets, such as Australia, Indonesia, Japan and the Russian Federation (table 2).







Top five economies (percentage share in world)
1 China 7.10 1 China 9.23
2 Japan 4.78 2 Japan 5.05
3 Republic of Korea 2.73 3 Russian Federation 3.02
4 Hong Kong, China 2.46 4 Republic of Korea 2.73
5 Singapore 2.01 5 Hong Kong, China 2.39
Bottom five economies (percentage share in world)
44 Micronesia (F.S.)* 0.00056 42 Palau 0.00019
45 Palau 0.00037 43 Vanuatu 0.00019
46 Nauru 0.00027 44 Micronesia (F.S.)* 0.00018
47 Niue 0.00019 45 Niue 0.00006
48 Tuvalu 0.00017 46 Tonga 0.00005
Memo items
Asia and the














Pacific 1.51 Pacific 1.45
Source: Calculations by ESCAP, based on COMTRADE data.
* Federated States.
2 In 1990 constant United States dollars.3







Top five economies (percentage share in GDP)
1 Marshall Islands 2 571.29 1 Marshall Islands 748.69
2
Hong Kong, China 182.30 2 Singapore 185.87
3 Nauru 177.67 3 Hong Kong, China 171.76
4 Singapore 175.76 4 Nauru 160.07
5 Maldives 110.10 5 Azerbaijan 103.24
Bottom five economies (percentage share in GDP)
43
Iran (Islamic Rep.
of) 17.96 40 Armenia 8.84
44 Russian Federation 15.93 41 Vanuatu 5.89
45 Japan 15.53 42 Afghanistan 4.58
46 Azerbaijan 15.48
43 French Polynesia 4.37
47
Brunei Darussalam 14.61 44 Tonga 3.19
Memo items



















Source: Calculated by ESCAP, based on COMTRADE data.
B. …But most economies follow the ‘outward-oriented’ strategies
Notwithstanding  these  large  differences between  the  economies in  the  region,
most of them have, over a longer period, consistently relied on export (trade) to power
their growth; Japan was followed by newly-industrialized economies (Republic of Korea,
Singapore,  Hong  Kong,  China  and  Taiwan  Province  of  China)  and  newly  emerging
economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand).  Their economic vitality and
successes in maintaining high economic growth rates, together with improving levels of
inequalities  and  poverty  reduction,  have offered  an  excellent  argument  in  favour  of
outward-oriented development strategies based on liberal trade and investment regimes as
well as high reliance on trade and FDI (World Bank, 1993).
While the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98 brought some corrections in terms of
management of capital account openness, the ability of the then crisis-hit economies to4
“export themselves out of the crisis” only enforced the importance of trade and current
account  openness  for  their  development.  Despite  the  weakening  of the  Washington
consensus  conditionalities  after  the  Asian  financial  crisis,  most  Asian  and Pacific
economies continued to pursue outward-oriented strategies with two additional twists.
First, those affected by the financial crisis understood the value of sound current
accounts, robust foreign exchange reserves, and appropriate capital account controls and
foreign exchange rate management. In the decade after the Asian financial crisis, Asian
economies increased their holdings of foreign exchange reserves by five times, and some
of them became extremely important sources for financing the spending-savings gap in
the United States and some economies in the European Union. At the same time, pressure
on several Asian economies to appreciate their currencies in terms of the United States
dollar and the euro prior to 2008 did cause some movements in the exchange rates, but
relative competitiveness among the Asian economies has been preserved by managing
these  movements  carefully. Most  of  the  economies  maintain  de  facto  regimes  of
adjustable pegs and are not shy of using reserves to defend their currency values aligned
with their national goals.
Since the late 1990s, most economies, especially those that were hurt badly by the
financial  crisis, have reduced  their exposure  to  short-term  debt; nevertheless, some
economies did experience increased exposure just before the onset of the new global
crisis (e.g., Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation). However,
while  improvements have  been made  at the national  level,  the  lack  of  progress  in
financial market integration in Asia and the Pacific is still very obvious.
3 The key reasons
for  this  relative  failure  are (a)  the  absence  of  any  linkage  between  jurisdictions  of
financial infrastructure, and (b) very weak cooperation in financial market development,
including standards, supervision and intermediation (Bank of International Settlement,
2008).
Second,  most  economies  developed  strong enthusiasm for preferential  trade
agreements. Of 114 trade agreements that have been put into force and notified to the
World Trade Organization (WTO) since 2000, 51 had at least one party from the Asia-
Pacific  region  (figure  1).
4 The  region  also  has  11 plurilateral trade  agreements that
connect countries in the same geographical region; these agreements more or less overlap
with subregions such as Central Asia, South Asia, South-East Asia, the Pacific etc.
5 Most
of these bilateral and regional agreements seek improvement of market access over and
above the ones secured through multilateral trading agreements.
6  It is thus somewhat
disappointing  that  while  the  intraregional  trade by Asia-Pacific  economies  has  been
steadily increasing in United States dollar terms, as a share of their total trade it has been
lingering at around 50 per cent since the end of 2003, up from 45 per cent in 1998.
3 Hyun Suk and Jang Hong Bum (2008) provide a review of cooperation efforts for bond market development in the
region with the focus on the Asian Bond Market Initiative (supply side), Executives’ Meeting of East Asia Pacific
Central Banks (demand side) and the Chiang Mai Initiative (regional safety network).
4 The list of and details on each one of these agreements is available on the Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment
Agreement Database website at www.unescap.org/tid/aptiad.
5 Africa is home to seven regional trade and financial integrations.
6 Obviously, a number of agreements also pursue other economic and non-economic objectives.5
Compared with the 70-plus per cent achieved among the European Union economies, or
the 55-plus  per  cent  among  the North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement economies,
intraregional trade of Asia-Pacific would be considered as low if these economies had an
agreement similar to what has been linking European or North American economies.
Instead, the Asia-Pacific region economies form a “noodle bowl”.
7
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Source: Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Agreement Database.
C. Crisis and ‘revival’ of the efforts to reach regional integration
As stated above, exports and imports dwindled as the recession took hold in the
major importing developed markets in the latter part of 2008 and early 2009. Figure 2
tracks year-on-year changes of monthly values of imports by selected Asian economies
since 1996 in order to compare three episodes of import contraction: 1997/98, 2001 and
2008/09. The  recent  contraction  of  imports  (measured  by  the  year-on-year changes),
which happened suddenly, was synchronized over all economies.
8 The magnitude of the
imports contraction, at between 20 per cent and 40 per cent, in the current crisis is larger
than the contraction recorded in the Asian financial crisis in 1997/98 and certainly deeper
than in the dot.com crisis.
7 This term is frequently used in the Asia-Pacific context to describe the “spaghetti bowl” phenomenon of the tangle
of relationships created by multiple overlapping preferential trading arrangements. The term “spaghetti bowl” was
introduced by Jagdish Bhagwati in the early 1990s.
8 Exports behaved in the same way. See ESCAP, 2009 (part I).6
Since June 2009, there have been signs of a rebound of exports and imports as
well as a return to positive changes in real GDP and industrial production in a number of
countries in the region, including China and India. These positive changes should not,
however,  be taken as an indication of a return of dynamic economic and trade growth as
experienced during 2006-2008; it is more likely that the recovery of the global economy
will take a much slower route. Furthermore, there is a growing consensus that pre-crisis
trade and macroeconomic imbalances contributed to the crises and can cause another one
if not talked in a more systematic way. This means that the sources of growth for the
outward-oriented economies need to be modified and balanced instead of relying only on
the demand in the developed markets. Since some of the economies in the region have
really small internal markets, the only option for them is intraregional trade.
Figure 2. Import trends for selected Asian economies (monthly values, year-on-year
changes, February 1996 to June 2009
Source: ESCAP, 2009.
The fact that intraregional trade in the Asian and Pacific region is perceived as
low (given the efforts at liberalizing trade flows within the region), is seen by analysts
and policymakers both as a part of the problem and a part of the solution in this current
crisis. The low level of intraregional trade has been interpreted as a sign of high exposure
to external risks (i.e., a contraction of the aggregate in developed markets). To a large
degree, this is correct – trade contraction has indeed been caused by the disappearance of
external  demand  in  the  developed  markets  (Baldwin,  ed.,  2009). The  low share  of
intraregional  trade is also  seen  as  a  solution. Expansion  of  demand  for  products
originating in the region –  that is, an increase in intraregional trade – can substitute for
the lack of demand in the developed markets, which may take some time to recover after
the crisis. While at the start of the downward cycle in 2008 some analysts believed that7
Asia was “decoupled” from the developed country markets and would not be affected by
the financial crisis in the United States and Europe, a consensus has now (almost) been
reached that full “decoupling” is not possible, and is even undesirable, and that enhancing
intraregional trade and investment should play a complementary role in the integration of
the Asian and the Pacific region into the global economy (ESCAP, 2009).
D. Impacts of further trade liberalization on Asia and the Pacific
Among the obstacles that limit faster growth of the share of Asian and Pacific
region countries in intraregional trade are obviously the ones that matter in times of crisis
and which are linked to the man-made obstacles in terms of barriers to trade. Trade is
influenced by both demand behaviour and supply capacity, but these typically take longer
to correct. Therefore, the focus in the short term should be on boosting intraregional trade
by eliminating the barriers that still exist, despite numerous preferential trade agreements
among Asian economies.
Two chapters in this publication explore the impacts of liberalizing intraregional
trade. Strutt (chapter II) uses the Global Trade Analysis Project model to consider how
beneficial greater intraregional trade in Asia-Pacific would be. Several different trade
liberalization  scenarios  are  modelled,  including  a  pan-Asia-Pacific  tariff  elimination,
ASEAN+6 tariff elimination and multilateral WTO trade liberalization. The scenarios
have been designed to explore some of the potential gains of switching from the Asian
“noodle bowl” type of intraregional trade arrangements to one driven by a single tariff-
reducing/eliminating trade agreement. It was not surprising to discover that an increase in
exports is proportional to the level of ambition for liberalization among all economies in
the region. However, such an export increase does not boost the welfare of the largest
economies in the region by as much as the WTO level of liberalization does, due to the
terms of trade effects being more favourable for them when liberalization is global.
Wadhwa (chapter III) examines some of the important aspects of intraregional
trade in South Asia as countries of that subregion are members of multiple preferential
regional and bilateral trade agreements. The paper tracks the trends and patterns in South
Asian  intraregional  trade, the comparative  advantages  of  major countries  in  the
subregion, trade complementarity between those countries, and the levels and product
coverage  of  intra-industry  trade  over  the past decade.  The  paper  shows  that  trade
complementarities among the South Asian countries, although still low, have improved
over time. In addition, the levels of intra-industry trade in this subregion are not  yet
significant. Nonetheless, the analysis of marginal intra-industry trade indicates that there
are a few product categories that have contributed significantly to the new trade flows
over the past decade. The region does have the potential for enhancing intraregional trade
in at least some sectors through vertical intra-industry trade among the member countries,
with India taking the lead in this regard.
While trade  agreements focus  on the creation  of additional market  access  (in
addition  to  the  one  obtained  through  WTO  and  unilateral  preferential  schemes),  the
byproduct  is  also  generation  of trade  diversion  for  countries  not  involved  in  the8
agreements. Raihan (chapter IV) investigates the impact of trade liberalization between
India and the European Union on low-income countries that currently enjoy preferences
in the European Union market relative to India. All the low-income economies under
consideration would experience a loss in welfare, and the welfare losses for the South
Asian countries would be much higher than for the other low-income economies in Asia
and  Africa.  Bangladesh  appears  to  experience the largest  loss  in  welfare  in  absolute
value, whereas the rest of South Asia would incur the largest loss in terms of share in
GDP. The welfare losses of these low-income economies are mainly driven by the loss in
terms of trade. However, in general, the extent of welfare loss in terms of share in GDP
for most of these countries is not very high. Most of these low-income countries would
also experience losses in real GDP and exports. The policy issue to be considered here is
whether rules  of  origin  that  exist  in  agreements  between  India  and  (most  of  the
considered) low-income countries, and between India and the European Union, could be
designed in such a way as to prevent these adverse terms of trade shocks.
While most of the trade growth for dynamic Asian economies has occurred in the
merchandise and manufacturing sectors, services is an important sector; however, the
latter sector is often overlooked as the driver of growth. Traditionally, services have been
seen  as  a  low  productivity  growth  sector;  however,  with the  recent advancement  of
information and communication technology (ITC) as a medium for delivering services,
the services sector is playing a dominant role in increasing productivity of other sectors,
services and goods alike. Another special feature of services trade is the type of barriers
used. In contrast to trade in goods, services trade is regulated mostly by “behind the
border” measures  that  belong  to  regulatory  and  liberalization  frameworks  and  it is
complicated to implement these measures on a discriminatory basis.
Nevertheless, as an increasing number of bilateral and regional trade agreements
include concessions in the services sector, Dee (chapter V) explores what behind-the-
border reforms in services and investment are best done through trade agreements. One
way  to  answer  this  question  is  to  think  of  trade  agreements  as  being  exercises  in
piecemeal  reform,  in  the  sense  that  they  provide  opportunities  for  reform,  but  in  a
constrained,  partial  manner.  The  key  policy  question  is  whether  countries  should
unreservedly take advantage of these opportunities, despite the constraints, or whether the
nature  of  the  constraints  should  temper  the  way  in  which  the  countries  go  about  the
reforms. Chapter IV first compares trade agreements, as exercises in piecemeal reform,
with other modes of liberalization, and then considers which particular reforms should be
included  in  trade  agreements.  It  develops  two  key  principles  of  piecemeal  reform  in
services and investment. The first is to look for sectors where trade barriers tend to add to
real  resource  costs. The second is to take  a broader view than that of just removing
discrimination  against  foreign  providers.  The  paper  concludes  with  some  general
guidance for trade negotiators and trade ministers.
E. Some aspects of regional financial integration in Asia and the Pacific
In examining the key factors leading to the collapse of trade with the last crisis in
2008, Baldwin (ed., 2009) finds that “global trade finance has not had a major impact on
trade flows”. The freezing of trade finance did not happen in all regions and, in general,10
from the region tend to invest in markets outside Asia, and some commentators argue that
this weak linkage between financial markets in the United States/Europe and Asia has
saved Asia from the adverse effects of the sub-prime mortgage crisis. While the low level
of integration with the global financial markets might serve as insurance in circumstances
such as this latest crisis, economies in Asia and the Pacific still need to improve their
financial markets by connecting them both with the world and intraregionally.
Two chapters in this volume look at different aspects of portfolio investments.
Daly and Mishra (chapter VII) analyse the linkage between the geographical patterns of
trade and portfolio investment. They do so by studying the case of Australia. They use
the International Monetary Fund’s coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey dataset. After
finding that the pattern of Australia’s capital flows does not match that of its trade flows,
they  investigate  the  possible  reasons  for  the  mismatch,  including  the  role  of  cultural
informational factors as well as the role of regulatory and legal variables. Their results
suggest that the major determinants of Australia’s geographical allocation of portfolio
investment  indicate  a  broad  correspondence  between  stock  market  capitalization  of
destination countries and the allocation of Australian financial investments – although
with  some  deviations  from  the  baseline,  where  the  deviations  are  correlated  with
Australian  trade  patterns.  Australia’s  disproportionate investment flows  with their
concentration on a few countries, in contrast to that country’s pattern of trade flows, can
be attributable to an extension of the home bias puzzle that has been observed by many
researchers.
Donnelly and Tower (chapter VIII) attempt to see which practices might have
acted, or remain, as additional barriers to enhancing intra-Asian financial integration as
well as integration between Asia and the most developed markets of United States and
Europe. Historically, United States mutual funds have often calculated their asset values
for international mutual funds using stale prices, because some fund components finish
trading before the market close, thus causing daily fund returns to be predictable. This, in
turn, allows an arbitrage opportunity for investors who move their money at the end of
the  trading  day in  the  United  States to  capture  the  next-day  change  in  Asian  and
European equities.  This acts as a tax on other investors in mutual funds that hold non-
United  States  assets.  The  paper quantitatively  traces  the  history  of  this  phenomenon,
known  as  time-zone  arbitrage,  in  various  mutual  funds,  both  before  and  after  the
phenomenon  became  well  known.  The  opportunity  for time-zone  arbitrage  has
diminished but not disappeared. This shrinkage, together with the advent of Exchange-
Traded Funds, which are not subject to time-zone arbitrage, make investment in Asia and
Europe more profitable for American mutual fund investors. This should increase United
States investment in Asia and Europe and enhance the integration of these markets.11
F.Implications
It appears that after the initial dramatic reaction to the recent crisis, trade flows of
Asia-Pacific economies have stabilized and turned towards recovery. While the recovery
of  trade has  been  faster  than initially predicted, policymakers  should  not become
complacent about the situation.  It is obvious that corrections need to be made in the
global  imbalances  in  trade,  savings  and  investments.  This,  in  turn,  will require
repositioning  by the Asia-Pacific region in terms of growth strategies. A complementary
source of growth to demand in the developed country markets must be found; for many
countries,  domestic  aggregate  demand  will  not  be  strong  enough  to  support the
continuation of high growth rates over the longer period needed for a sustained fight
against poverty.
From the analysis provided in this volume’s chapters, efforts to improve trade and
financial  liberalization  in  the  Asian  and  Pacific  region  must  be  strengthened.  Trade
liberalization, so far pursued through multiple preferential trade agreements, should be
tackled in a more systematic way in order to prevent adverse “noodle bowl” effects. Even
so, not all countries in the region will necessarily benefit if trade integration is just left to
the  elimination  of  tariffs.  Deeper  integration  that enables  formation  of  regional
production  networks  is  necessary.  This will not be possible  without  improving the
mobility of capital and labour in the region and creating greater transparency of “behind
the  border”  barriers. Integration  in  real  sectors  must  be  balanced  with  financial
integration. While movements in FDI have become more synchronized with trade flows,
portfolio  capital  movements  and  development  of  bond  markets  are  lagging  behind.
Improving  the  flow  of  goods,  services,  capital  and  people  within  the  Asian  and  the
Pacific region will produce benefits but should not be done at the cost of severing links
between Asia-Pacific and the rest of the world.12
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II. Exploring the impacts of trade liberalization in
Asia and the Pacific
By Anna Strutt and Mia Mikic
Introduction
While it is commonly accepted that multilateral liberalization will bring the greatest
global gains from liberalization, regional agreements may be much more feasible in the short
term. The dictum from the traditional trade theory on the superiority of unilaterally applied
free trade for a small economy under perfect competition is universally accepted but rarely
applied to policymaking. Reasons for this are many, ranging from using trade policy for non-
economic objectives (e.g., employment), to circumstances in an actual economy and markets
being different from those of the economic model (e.g., existence of economies of scale,
imperfect competition  or  imperfect  information).  Nevertheless  many  countries have
embraced the advantages of open trade regimes and have pursued liberal trade unilaterally or
more often through membership in the multilateral trading system, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). On the other hand,
both  trade  theory  and  the  international  trading  rules  allow  for  the  discriminatory  trade
policies in the forms of preferential or regional trade agreements.
In practice, of the economies in Asia and the Pacific that are members of WTO, only
Mongolia  does  not  belong  to  any  preferential  trade  agreement, while most  countries  are
implementing multiple agreements, often with same partners. This phenomenon of tangled
relationships, created by multiple overlapping trading arrangements, is known as the “noodle
bowl”. It  increases  the  transaction  and  implementation  costs  of  trade  agreements,  and
adversely affects potential benefits to the members of the agreement.
A large body of literature already exists that explores the reason for proliferation and
stylized evidence of the preferential trade agreements in Asia and the Pacific.
1 Major findings
of that literature with regard to characteristics of the process and contents of agreements
already in place in the region are that:
(a) Most agreements are bilateral, with partners belonging to a different geographical
regions, and only rarely do agreements link economies that share borders. Figure
1 reflects that 43 per cent of all BTAs in force are among members in different
regions, and only 19 per cent are among the countries sharing the borders;
(b) With respect to regional trade agreements (RTAs), the average number of partners
is almost 8 per RTA. However, the only RTA in the Asian and Pacific region
connects countries that belongs to different Asian subregions is the Asia-Pacific
Trade  Agreement  (APTA) while only  one comprises  countries  on  different
continents  (Trans  Pacific  Strategic  Economic  Partnership).  Ten  RTAs  overlap
1 For example, see ESCAP, 2009, Asian Development Bank, 2008, and Bonapace and Mikic, 2007, and the
references therein. Note also in this chapter that the terms “preferential trade agreements” and “regional trade
agreements” are used interchangeably and as synonyms.14
with the geographical subregions in Asia and the Pacific, for example, the South
Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) for South Asia; the ASEAN Free Trade
Area  (AFTA)  for  South-East  Asia;  and  the  Pacific  Island  Country  Trade
Agreement (PICTA) for the Pacific Island States;
(c) In many cases, agreements are shallow in coverage and they do not seriously cut
the barriers in mutual trade. In many cases, agreements just list areas of possible
concessions (e.g., non-tariff protectionism, WTO plus areas etc.) without really
providing better market access or national treatment for the goods from partner
countries. Instead, the shallow trade concessions are used as a kind of reward for
countries accepting regional cooperation in non-trade or non-economic areas;
(d) Often  agreements  focus  on  border  measures,  typically  tariffs,  allowing  for
“behind-the-border” measures to be maintained as well as obstructing potential
beneficial effects  of  the  agreement  on  the  level  of  competition,  transfer  of
technology, trade in services and development of the services sector, which are
instrumental in increasing an economy’s overall efficiency (see table 1 for more
details);
(e) Only a few agreements specifically look into the issues of tariff revenue loss and
suggest possible compensation for such loss;
(f) Despite the Asian  and Pacific  region  in  general  comprising  relatively  open
economies, only a few RTAs explicitly mention the possibility of enlargement of
the agreement.


























Between countries in different regions Between countries sharing borders
Source: Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Database (APTIAD), 200915
Table 1. Trade agreements beyond the commitments in trade in goods
RTA NTMs Investment Services Competition IPR TF
ASEAN-Australia-New
Zealand FTA (AANZFTA)
   -***  
ANZCERTA

























BIMSTEC-FTA -** -** -** - - -**
India-Singapore BTA
1     -
***

PICTA  - -  - -***
SAFTA - -** - -** - -**
TRANS-PACIFIC SEP
1  In progress    
Source: Compiled from APTIAD, September 2009
1: notified under GATT Art. XXIV (and under GATS Art.V where applicable)
2: notified under Enabling Clause
: commitments exist
-: no commitments exist
*: limited to quantitative restrictions; standards covered with different arrangements
**: expressed commitments to negotiate
***: limited to one article in the Agreement and /or to cooperation
From the comparison of the features of Asia-Pacific regionalism with the accepted
rule of thumb on policymaking on RTAs (Schiff and Winters, 2003), it can be seen that the
Asia-Pacific approach to RTAs does not necessarily create the largest benefits to members;
however, it is also true that it does not generate large losses for non-members.
To increase the benefits, policy actions would need to be taken to correct/manage the
noodle bowl phenomenon; coverage of the type of barriers and use of trade concessions for
non-trade objectives (i.e., to enhance regional cooperation in other areas etc.). In other words,
existing trade agreements need to be merged and transformed into one under the common
rules of origin. This consolidation process meets the strongest objections from many different
stakeholders who may see RTAs as providing each one with an essential gain. Since this
process of consolidation is a difficult political and legal process, it would be useful to better
understand the benefits of an agreement that covers most of one huge geographical area. The
European Union constitutes a living example of a consolidated RTA; however, since the16
types of regional integration pursued by the European Union and, potentially, by the Asian
and Pacific  region  are  very  different,  it  is  not  possible  to  directly  use the European
experience.
It  is  however  possible  to  use a simple comparative  static computable  general
equilibrium (CGE)  model  to  simulate  scenarios  that  are  similar  to  the  processes  of
consolidation/ integration in the real world. In this chapter, a global trade model is used to
consider a range of alternative trade liberalization scenarios for Asia-Pacific economies. The
implications for production, trade flows and welfare impacts of a complete and a shallow
tariff-based liberalization are explored across the whole region (a form of disentangling the
noodle  bowl). Asia-Pacific  liberalization scenarios  are  compared to the  two  processes of
liberalization that are already evolving – the integration among the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations plus 6 (ASEAN+6) countries
2 and WTO- Doha Development Agenda (DDA)
driven liberalization.
3
A. Modelling framework and data
Economic modelling is undertaken using the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP)
model and database.
4 This model is comparative static, with interactions between regions and
sectors  captured  within  a  consistent  framework (Hertel,  1997). The  behaviour  of  private
individuals,  firms  and  governments, together with their responses  to  changing  market
conditions, are modelled. Consumers maximize welfare, subject to their budget limitations,
while firms maximize profits using the limited resources available in the economy. When the
various  trade  liberalization  scenarios  are  simulated, changes  in  welfare,  real  GDP, trade
flows, prices and output of commodities are all endogenously determined.
5
The modelling is based on data from version 7 of the GTAP database, covering 113
countries/regions
6 and 57 sectors, with a base year of 2004 (Narayanan and Walmsley, 2008).
The full database is aggregated to 24 sectors and 40 regions, with a particular focus on Asia-
Pacific countries,
7 as  detailed in annex tables 2  and 3.  Regions  and  sectors  are  further
aggregated for reporting results.
1. Baseline
The  GTAP  version  7  database  has  a  benchmark  year  of  2004.  However,  before
considering  trade  liberalization  scenarios, the  database  is projected to 2010. To  do  this,
assumptions are  made about  a  small  number  of  macroeconomic  variables,  following  the
innovative path commenced by Hertel and others (1996). In particular, exogenous projections
2 ASEAN comprises 10 members: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic,
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam, and the “six” comprise Australia, China,
India, Japan, New Zealand and Republic of Korea.
3 Due to the need to keep this paper simple, the ASEAN+6 liberalization scenarios does not take into account
the removal of barriers other than tariffs, and WTO-DDA is represented through a simple uniform tariff cut.
4  See www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu for detailed information on the model and database.
5 The model is solved using GEMPACK software (Harrison and Pearson, 1996), using the RunGTAP interface.
6 The GTAP database uses term “region” for both a single economy and a group of economies for which no
separate national data are available, or which are aggregated into a group for modelling purposes. For example,
both India and rest of South Asia are called “regions”. Therefore, in this paper “region” and country/economy
are used as synonymous.
7 In particular, those economies which are members of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the
Pacific (ESCAP). More details on the membership are available from www.unescap.org/about/member.asp.17
of each region’s GDP growth, as well as endowments of population, skilled and unskilled
labour, and physical capital are applied.
8 Annex table 3 provides details of the macroeconomic
assumptions. Changes in the structure of production for each region are driven by growth
encompassing differences in the relative rates of factor accumulation in combination with the
relative factor intensities in each sector as well as price and income elasticities. While not
intended to be a forecast of the global economy, the projection aims to give a better picture of
how the  structure  of  economies  and  the  trade  flows  may  look at  the  time  of potential
liberalization.
The 2010 baseline modelled here includes the removal of remaining Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing quotas from the GTAP v7 database.
9 The average tariffs imposed and
faced by each region are provided in annex tables 4 and 5, which give an indication of the
sectors and regions where protection remains relatively high. Particularly  high tariffs are
found in the crops and other food sectors; for each of these sectors, average world tariffs are
approximately 10 per cent. The textile, clothing and leather products sector also has relatively
high average tariffs of approximately 8.5 per cent globally. While average global tariffs are
lower for other sectors modelled, there can be significant variation at the regional level. For
example, average motor vehicle tariffs are below 4 per cent; however, with the exception of
Japan, Asian economies tend to impose substantial tariffs (see annex table 4).
2. Scenarios modelled
Four alternative liberalization scenarios are modelled here, including variations of
south-south  trade  liberalization  between Asia-Pacific  economies,  ASEAN+6  liberalization
and multilateral WTO liberalization. These scenarios are designed to allow exploration of
some of the potential gains from more or less inclusive preferential agreements for Asia-
Pacific economies. The scenarios are summarized in Table  and detailed below.
Table 2. Summary of scenarios modelled
Name Details
Scenario 1a 25 per cent intra-Asia-Pacific tariff reductions
Scenario 1b 100 per cent intra-Asia-Pacific tariff reductions
Scenario 2 100 per cent intra-ASEAN+6 tariff reductions
Scenario 3 25 per cent WTO tariff reductions
(a) Scenario 1: Pan-Asia-Pacific liberalization
In this first set of scenarios, we consider liberalization of South-South trade between
Asia-Pacific economies.  These  liberalizations  include  all Asia-Pacific  economies  that  are
regional members of ESCAP (full details are provided in annex table 1). Two variations of
this region-wide  liberalization scenario  are  modelled  here,  the  first  with  a  25  per  cent
8 Based on Walmsley, 2006. Updated macroeconomic projections were kindly provided by Terrie Walmsley,
and augmented with additional data (World Bank, 2009).
9 For further analysis of the ATC quotas that remain for China, see Whalley, 2008.18
reduction in all intra-Asia-Pacific tariffs and the second with full removal of all intra-Asia-
Pacific tariffs.
(b) Scenario 2: ASEAN+6 liberalization
The second scenario models ASEAN+6 liberalization. In particular, it models the full
removal of intra-ASEAN+6 tariffs.
(c) Scenario 3: Multilateral liberalization
The  third  scenario  models most-favour-nation  (MFN)  multilateral  liberalization
through a 25 per cent reduction in all tariffs between WTO member economies. (See annex
table 1 for full inclusion details.)
B. Results and discussion
The discussion of the results begins with a summary of aggregate output and welfare
results, including decomposition of the key factors driving regional changes in welfare. It is
followed  by  an analysis  of impacts  on  regional  exports, and  examination  of sectoral
implications of the liberalization scenarios.
Aggregate output and welfare results
All  regions  participating  in  the  various  liberalization  scenarios  are  projected  to
experience increased real GDP, as indicated in figure 2. However, regions excluded from the
trade  liberalizing  agreements  are  expected  to  suffer  a  reduction  in their real  GDP. For
example, the United States and 27 members of the European Union (EU27) are not included
in  the above  defined  trade  liberalization scenarios  and Figure 2 indicates  that  as  a
consequence they experience reduced real GDP levels in these scenarios (scenario 1a, 1b and
2)  but enjoy  increased  real  GDP  when  included  in  the  liberalization  scheme  (i.e.,  WTO
liberalization in scenario 3).
Not  surprisingly,  regions  included  in  the Asia-Pacific  region-wide liberalization
perform particularly strongly in terms of real GDP gains with full removal of intraregional
tariffs. The more moderate 25 per cent tariff reduction naturally leads to smaller real output
gains. Also considered is liberalization without including agriculture, broadly following the
WTO non-agriculture market access sectors.
10 As the results tend to be similar in pattern to
the liberalization of all products, they are not reported in detail here. However, it is notable
that  the  impact  of  excluding  agricultural  products  from  the  liberalization  has  a  negative
impact  on  the  real  output  gains  for  all  regions, and with  particularly  large  proportional
impacts on Japan, other high-income Asian countries as well as India. Since these are the
countries with a particularly strong interest in maintaining protection for their agriculture
sectors in the current DDA, it would be interesting to explore how broadly their negotiating
position is discussed among all domestic stakeholders.
10 That is, products not covered by the Agreement on Agriculture, including manufacturing products, fuels and
mining products, fish and forestry products (see www.wto.org).19
Scenario 2 generates relatively strong real output gains for all countries included in
the  liberalization.  The  exception  to  this  is  China,  which  gains  much  more  from  wider
liberalization that includes all Asia-Pacific economies or WTO members. Notably, the second
scenario is the only scenario that leads to aggregate output reductions for the “Rest of South
Asia” region, since this is the only liberalization from which this region is excluded. The
situation is similar for the Russian Federation and the Central Asia region.
With regard to the aggregate impacts on welfare
11 in Figure , the results are more
diverse. This is primarily because welfare in this type of modelling is determined not only by
improved allocative efficiency in use of resources, but also by changes in terms of trade for
each region. In general, allocative efficiency is expected to improve with reductions in tariffs
and other distortions, mirroring changes in real output for an economy. However, terms of
trade reflect the price of a country’s exports relative to the price of its imports; these will
inevitably deteriorate for some regions, thus contributing adverse impacts on welfare.















11 As measured by an equivalent variation in income (Hertel, 1997).20
Figure 3. Aggregate changes in welfare under each scenario
(Unit: US$ billion)
Table   decomposes  the  contributions  of  allocative  efficiency  and  terms  of  trade
changes for each region. The table needs to be examined in order to understand the overall
impacts summarized in Figure .21
As noted above, the allocative efficiency effects – with resources tending to move to
more efficient uses when distortions are reduced – mirror changes in real GDP. These effects
are positive for all regions taking part in the various liberalization scenarios. However, terms
of trade impacts may reinforce, dampen or even overturn these.
12 For example, the results for
China indicate a small increase in welfare under the scenario that involves a 25 per cent
reduction in intra-Asia-Pacific tariffs. However, under the scenario where tariffs are fully
eliminated, the results suggest a reduction in welfare for China. The explanation, as indicated
in Table ,  is  that  while  allocative  efficiency  increases  in  each  scenario,  terms  of  trade
deteriorate.  In  scenario  1a,  the  terms  of  trade  effects  dampen  the  increases  in  allocative
efficiency, leading to small overall welfare increases. However, with the full elimination of
intraregional tariffs in scenario 1b, the terms of trade impact is sufficiently strong to overturn
the impact of increased allocative efficiency and increased real output.
Looking deeper into the terms of trade result reveals that the price index for China’s
exports declines by 0.15 per cent while the price index for imports increases by 0.56 per cent,
leading  to  a  worsening  of  the  terms  of  trade.  This  worsening  is  primarily  due  to  the
electronics, other machinery and chemicals, rubber and plastics sectors. In particular, the
price of imports for these products increases relatively strongly, harming China’s terms of
trade.
Figure indicates reductions in overall welfare for India in scenarios 1b and 2. Table 3
indicates  that  in  this  case  again,  it  is  the  terms  of  trade  overturning  positive  allocative
efficiency impacts. In the full removal of intraregional tariffs scenario, the price index for
India’s exports reduces by 1.95 per cent, while the price index for imports increases by 0.23
per  cent.  Again,  it  is  manufacturing  sectors  driving  this  negative  terms  of  trade  effect,
however, in the case of India, export prices are the main problem, with India experiencing
particularly strong declines in exports of manufactured products, including chemicals, rubber
and plastics and the other manufactured product sector in this scenario.
12 Changes in the price of capital goods will also have an impact on welfare in the GTAP model; however, these
effects have  not  been  included in  the  decomposition  since  they  do  not  generate  strong  insights  in  this
comparative static framework.22
Table 3. Decomposition of welfare by region and scenario
(Unit: US$ million
a)
Region Welfare Scenario 1a Scenario 1b Scenario 2 Scenario 3
China Total EV 270 -4 024 -1 334 3 495
Allocative eff. 1 547 1 787 15 2 324
Terms of trade -1 606 -7 153 -2 211 1 076
Japan Total EV 4 635 24 803 24 267 6 087
Allocative eff. 2 060 15 716 15 742 4 075
Terms of trade 2 962 10 449 9 929 2 345
High-income Total EV 4 302 18 819 6 033 4 989
Asia Allocative eff. 2 070 9 937 6 810 2 883
Terms of trade 2 717 10 974 314 2 614
ASEAN Total EV 3 899 15 277 13 461 4 258
Allocative eff. 2 025 6 117 3 949 2 543
Terms of trade 1 699 8 384 8 810 1 437
India Total EV 827 -1 965 -2 340 1 320
Allocative eff. 1 320 2 771 2 404 2 332
Terms of trade -413 -4 030 -3 972 -785
Total EV 108 -373 -718 107 Rest of South
Asia Allocative eff. 454 864 -210 586
Terms of trade -150 -221 -347 -160
United States Total EV -2 637 -11 654 -8 579 -999
Allocative eff. -166 -649 -595 754
Terms of trade -2 206 -9 708 -7 046 -1 504
EU27 Total EV -4 598 -19 986 -10 780 1 401
Allocative
efficiency
-1 833 -8 166 -4 806 4 298
Terms of trade -2 868 -12 229 -6 403 -2 950
Total EV 535 1 976 -507 -68




Terms of trade 65 744 -927 -505
Australasia Total EV 1 413 8 159 8 153 742
Allocative eff. 350 1 199 1 148 340
Terms of trade 971 6 412 6 477 372
Total EV -585 -2 239 -5 421 4 796 Rest of the World
(ROW) Allocative eff. 132 -364 -1 591 5 924
Terms of trade -1 196 -4 154 -5 059 -1 972
Total Total EV 8 169 28 792 22 235 26 129
Allocative eff. 8 193 29 312 22 657 26 158
Terms of trade -25 -532 -434 -32
aAllocative efficiency and terms of trade effects do not sum up to the total change in equivalent variation
(EV), due to changes in the price of capital goods (see footnote 12).
It is notable that the gains for many regions in Scenario 2 are similar to those in
Scenario 1b. In particular, full removal of tariffs in ASEAN+6 alone is estimated to lead to
US$22billion in total world welfare gains. This indicates that over three quarters of the total
welfare gains from full tariff removal could come from removal of tariffs within ASEAN+623
alone.  For  countries  including  Japan  and  Australasia, our  results  suggest the  increased
allocative efficiency and overall welfare gains from ASEAN+6 will be very similar to the
increase from full Asia-Pacific tariff removal. However, for ASEAN+6 itself, only 65 per
cent of the allocative efficiency gains available from full Asia-Pacific liberalization will come
from removal of intra-ASEAN+6 tariffs. While for China, the allocative efficiency effects of
Asia-Pacific liberalization are US$1.8b, compared with less than US$0.2b if only ASEAN+6
reduce tariffs. This is consistent with data presented in Figure , indicating less than 0.001 per
cent increase in China’s real GDP with ASEAN+6, compared with 0.07 per cent increase if
there is full Asia-Pacific  liberalization.
C. Impact on trade flows
Relatively strong increases in trade flows are projected for many regions under the
various scenarios, as shown in Figure  and Figure . Increases in both exports and imports are
relatively strong in percentage terms for India and the Rest of South Asia. A significant part
of the explanation for this is likely to lie in the relatively high tariffs  imposed by these
regions (see annex table 4). Once these are reduced or removed, there are relatively strong
increases in imports and also exports.
Figure 4. Changes in aggregate real exports
13
(Unit: Per cent)
For most regions, the more ambitious the reform, the greater the increase in exports
and imports. For example, the  greatest increases for Asia-Pacific as a  whole come from
scenario 1b, which includes full removal of tariffs in the region. These increases for most
regions  are  much  greater  than  the  increased  trade  arising  from  liberalization  within  the
smaller ASEAN+6 grouping in scenario 2. However, for Australasia there are only slightly
more exports, and similar changes in imports, when scenario 1b is compared to scenario 2.
13 This includes transportation margins and results may therefore differ slightly from the totals in tables 3 and 4.24
The results for Australasia, which includes Australia and New Zealand, tend to be dominated
by Australia as the larger country. The largest increase in imports comes from China (US$
5.5 billion under scenario 1b, but US$ 5.8 billion under scenario 2). The largest increase in
exports is to India (US$ 13.8 billion under scenario 1b,  but US$ 15.5 billion under scenario
2). Looking further  into  these  increased  exports  to  India  reveals  that  exports  from the
extraction sector are US$ 1.1 billion higher and metals US$ 500 million higher under the
ASEAN+6 scenario than under the pan-Asia-Pacific scenario. This is due to the preferential
access that Australia  has  under  ASEAN+6  rather  than  under  ESCAP.  Indeed,  other
ASEAN+6 countries also increase extractive product exports to India more than under pan-
Asia-Pacific  liberalization.  However, the  Islamic  Republic  of Iran  is  excluded  from
ASEAN+6, and it exports US$ 5.2 billion fewer extraction sector products to India under the
ASEAN+6 scenario than it does under the region-wide  tariff removal scenario.
Figure 5. Changes in aggregate real imports
(Unit: Per cent)
World exports under scenario 3 grow by 1.04 per cent, i.e., more than three times
what the growth under scenario 1a, implying that the same 25 per cent reduction in tariffs
leads to significantly higher levels of world trade under MFN liberalization than if only Asia-
Pacific countries liberalize. However, for Asia-Pacific countries, total exports grow by almost
1 per cent under scenario 1a compared with 1.4 per cent under scenario 3. Therefore, more
than two-thirds of the export growth expected under MFN liberalization may be achieved
when Asia-Pacific countries alone reduce tariffs by the same amount intraregionally.
14
14 A further unreported simulation reducing intra-ASEAN tariffs by 25 per cent suggests that this alone would
increase world exports by 0.24 per cent and intra-Asia-Pacific exports by 0.62 per cent.25
Table 4. Changes in intraregional exports
(Unit: Per cent)
Asia-Pacific WTO ASEAN+6 Total
Scenario 1a Asia-Pacific 3.57 0.83 3.52 0.97
WTO 1.52 0.32 1.69 0.33
ASEAN+6 3.77 0.89 3.75 1.04
Total 1.57 0.33 1.71 0.34
Scenario 1b  Asia-Pacific 17.69 4.72 17.29 5.39
WTO 7.86 1.79 8.55 1.86
ASEAN+6 18.55 5.03 18.28 5.78
Total 8.08 1.82 8.68 1.90
Scenario 2  Asia-Pacific 11.67 3.75 15.49 3.62
WTO 5.84 1.44 7.90 1.39
ASEAN+6 15.73 5.03 20.91 4.87
Total 5.60 1.39 7.61 1.34
Scenario 3  Asia-Pacific 1.69 1.46 1.98 1.40
WTO 2.23 1.12 2.62 1.09
ASEAN+6 1.91 1.73 2.23 1.67
Total 2.09 1.08 2.48 1.04
D. Sectoral impacts
This section examines the impact of liberalization on specific sectors in terms of trade
flows and outputs. Table  decomposes the aggregate data presented in table 4 to show the
impacts by sector for each region under the scenarios modelled. As shown, looking only at
the overall change in exports may mask significant changes at the sectoral level. Looking at
the final row of results for each scenario, it can be seen that world exports of textiles and
clothing,  crops  and  other  foods  tend  to experience  a relatively  high  impact  under  most
scenarios. This is perhaps not surprising, given that these sectors currently face the highest
average tariffs. Average tariffs are more than 9.5 per cent for the crops and foods sector, and
8.5 per cent for the textile, clothing and leather products sector, compared with average tariffs
across all sectors of approximately 3 per cent (see annex table 4).
Turning  to  focus  specifically  on  sectoral  export  results  for Asian  and Pacific
countries, again  the  crop,  other  foods  and  textiles,  clothing  and  leather  sectors  tend  to
experience particularly strong percentage increases. For example, under scenario 1a, exports
of crops from Asia-Pacific are projected to increase by 3.2 per cent, other foods by 5 per cent,
and textiles, clothing and leather by 2.8 per cent. These increases are much greater under
scenario 2b, with full removal of pan-Asia-Pacific tariffs. However, as indicated in Figure ,
while the largest percentage increase in exports is for the other foods sector, the greatest
value increase occurs in the much larger textile, leather and wearing apparel sector (and more
than half of the projected US$ 12.6 billion increase in exports is due to textiles alone). Other
large manufacturing sectors, including other machinery, chemicals, rubber and plastics as
well as metals and metal products also experience larger increases in export value than do the
smaller  agricultural  and  food  sectors.  Large  countries  such  as  China  are  particularly
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important in determining overall export results. For example, more than 40 per cent of the
increase in pan-Asia-Pacific textile, clothing and leather exports, more than 30 per cent of the
other machinery exports and approximately 20 per cent of region’s increase in exports of
chemicals, rubber and plastics together with metals and metal products are due to China. Also
notable is that while Asia-Pacific regional exports of electronics are projected to reduce by
approximately US$ 2.6 billion, exports of this sector from China are expected to increase by
US$ 3.8 billion under scenario 1a. However, reduced exports from ASEAN, Japan and other
high-income Asian countries fall significantly, leading to the overall decline in exports from
this sector for Asian and the Pacific countries.
Figure 6. Change in Asia-Pacific exports, scenario 1a
(Unit: US$ million)Table 5. Changes in sectoral exports
(Unit: Per cent)
























Scenario 1a Asia-Pacific 3.18 4.98 0.21 2.76 0.72 1.23 -0.29 1.61 1.59 2.48 1.99 0.74 0.97
WTO 0.35 0.74 0.13 1.39 0.19 0.21 0.04 0.50 0.34 0.47 0.45 0.27 0.33
ASEAN+6 3.58 5.27 0.73 2.41 0.50 1.15 0.03 1.40 2.23 2.18 2.06 0.65 1.04
World 0.38 0.76 0.09 1.41 0.19 0.21 0.04 0.50 0.36 0.49 0.54 0.28 0.34
Scenario 1b Asia-Pacific 40.62 33.14 1.87 13.71 3.24 7.80 -1.58 7.41 7.13 11.20 8.94 5.26 5.39
WTO 6.88 5.10 0.94 7.31 0.94 1.38 0.05 2.29 1.58 2.20 2.11 1.73 1.86
ASEAN+6 44.10 33.23 5.79 12.22 2.12 7.44 -0.27 6.58 9.88 9.92 9.12 4.82 5.78
World 6.95 5.44 0.71 7.42 0.94 1.39 0.06 2.33 1.65 2.32 2.53 1.69 1.90
Scenario 2 Asia-Pacific 29.06 23.39 1.99 7.82 1.01 4.30 -0.21 4.57 4.80 6.83 5.23 2.69 3.62
WTO 5.43 4.06 0.76 4.44 0.56 1.02 0.44 1.60 1.48 1.56 1.69 1.12 1.39
ASEAN+6 41.14 28.78 5.62 11.12 1.09 4.85 -0.76 5.64 9.17 9.88 7.87 2.96 4.87
World 5.28 3.95 0.66 4.42 0.54 1.01 0.44 1.59 1.20 1.50 1.56 1.10 1.34
Scenario 3 Asia-Pacific 2.38 4.02 0.53 5.80 0.33 2.72 0.01 1.40 1.16 2.25 1.61 1.98 1.40
WTO 2.08 3.32 0.41 3.72 0.81 0.94 0.31 1.26 1.29 1.23 1.48 1.24 1.09
ASEAN+6 3.21 4.40 1.02 5.92 0.19 2.77 0.38 1.29 2.27 2.33 2.04 1.88 1.67
World 1.94 3.20 0.38 3.68 0.78 0.93 0.30 1.24 1.05 1.18 1.34 1.22 1.04
* Including services.
27Table 6. Changes in output
(Unit: Per cent)
























Scenario 1a Asia-Pacific -0.30 0.10 -0.05 0.36 -0.13 0.07 -0.28 0.09 0.13 0.08 0.15 0.00 0.03
WTO -0.19 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01
ASEAN+6 -0.33 0.13 -0.07 0.15 -0.15 0.12 -0.04 -0.01 0.09 -0.08 0.08 0.03 0.03
World -0.19 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01
Scenario 1b Asia-Pacific -3.90 1.09 -0.11 2.00 -0.53 0.93 -1.31 0.49 0.60 0.46 0.79 0.26 0.14
WTO -2.30 0.07 0.01 0.35 -0.06 0.17 0.29 0.16 0.12 -0.07 0.13 0.14 0.03
ASEAN+6 -4.53 1.28 -0.18 1.10 -0.61 1.18 -0.32 0.09 0.41 -0.27 0.50 0.42 0.11
World -2.21 0.09 0.01 0.24 -0.07 0.12 0.27 0.14 0.13 -0.05 0.22 0.07 0.03
Scenario 2 Asia-Pacific -3.65 0.84 -0.07 1.07 -0.50 0.07 -0.41 0.00 0.25 -0.01 0.41 0.05 0.05
WTO -2.06 0.12 -0.03 0.22 -0.05 0.04 0.29 0.04 0.09 -0.07 0.13 0.07 0.02
ASEAN+6 -4.42 1.12 -0.13 2.04 -0.62 0.10 -0.86 0.07 0.59 0.38 0.44 0.01 0.08
World -1.99 0.11 -0.02 0.22 -0.05 0.05 0.29 0.04 0.06 -0.09 0.12 0.07 0.01
Scenario 3 Asia-Pacific -0.53 -0.25 -0.09 2.10 -0.28 0.44 -0.10 -0.33 0.00 -0.23 -0.16 0.25 0.04
WTO -0.37 -0.04 -0.03 0.23 -0.03 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.06 -0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01
ASEAN+6 -0.56 -0.26 -0.17 2.03 -0.31 0.50 0.15 -0.46 0.02 -0.36 -0.21 0.23 0.04
World -0.37 -0.05 -0.02 0.22 -0.03 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.02 0.01
* Including services.
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Changes  in  sectoral  output  will  also  result  from  the  trade  liberalization  scenarios
modelled. It may be surprising to see that sectors such as crops are projected to decline in
output in each scenario, despite significant projected increases in exports. However, it must
be remembered that in the presence of fixed factor endowments for an economy, as large
sectors expand they will draw resources from other resources. Therefore, while exports by the
crop  sector  are  expanding,  the  size  of  the  sector  is  generally  small  relative  to  the  large
manufacturing sectors that are increasing exports by a smaller percentage but greater value. It
must also be remembered that imports of crops are increasing for most regions, given the
reduction in the relatively high tariffs in this industry.
E. Conclusion
This chapter  examines a range of possible trade liberalization scenarios involving
Asian and Pacific region countries. Broader reforms do lead to larger overall gains (although
with varying results for individual countries); however, a significant proportion of gains from
multilateral  reform  appear  to  be  possible  from  comprehensive  regional  liberalization.
Focusing on a broad and comprehensive regional agreement may therefore be a useful way
forward; such an agreement should, however, be carefully constructed to contribute a path
that can later lead to the comprehensive multilateral liberalization that will bring the greatest
long-term global gains.30
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aHong Kong, China Hong Kong, China
a Taiwan Province of China Taiwan Province of China










aViet Nam Viet Nam






aSri Lanka Sri Lanka
a Rest of South Asia Afghanistan, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal
United States United States United States
EU_27 European Union_27 European Union 27 members
a, bRussian Federation Russian Federation Russian
Federation  and
Central Asia
a, b Kazakhstan Kazakhstan
aKyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan
aArmenia Armenia
a, b Azerbaijan Azerbaijan
aGeorgia Georgia
a, b Rest of FSU Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
Australasia
aAustralia Australia
aNew Zealand New Zealand
ROW Rest of Europe Rest of Europe
Rest of North America Rest of North America
Latin America Latin America
a Rest of East Asia Mongolia, Democratic People’s Rep. of Korea and Macau, China
a Oceania Rest of Oceania
a, bIslamic Republic of Iran Islamic Republic of Iran31
a Turkey Turkey
MENA Middle East and North Africa
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa
a Included in Asia-Pacific liberalization scenarios. (Regions with ESCAP members are generally included; however, the United
States and European ESCAP members are excluded).
b Not included in WTO.
Annex table 2. Sectoral aggregation
Aggregated sectors Sector Description
Crops Rice Paddy and processed rice
Wheat Wheat
Grains, crops Grains and crops
Other foods Meat, livestock Livestock and meat products
Processed food Processed food
Extraction Extraction Mining and extraction
Forestry, fisheries Forestry and fisheries
Textiles  and clothing Textiles Textiles
Wearing apparel Wearing apparel
Leather products Leather products
Wood  and paper  products Wood, paper products Wood and paper products
Motor vehicles Motor vehicles Motor vehicles and parts
Electronics Electronics Electronic equipment
Other machinery Other machinery Other machinery
Petroleum and coal products Petrol, coal products Petroleum, coal products
Chemicals, rubber and plastics Chemicals, rubber, plastics Chemicals, rubber, plastic products
Metals and metal products Metals Metals
Metal products Metal products
Other manufac. products Other manufacturing Other manufacturing
Services Utilities (services) Utilities
Construction (services) Construction
TransComm (services) Transport and communication
BusinessSvs (services) Financial, insurance, business services
HsEdHealth (services) Housing, health, education, recreation32
Annex table 3. Cumulative changes in real GDP, labour and capital, 2004-2010
(Unit: Per cent)
Unskilled Skilled GDP Population
Labour Labour
Capital
Australasia 17.1 6.6 8.9 6.1 26.1
China 83.1 3.7 5.9 24.9 75.8
Japan 12.2 -0.5 1.7 -3.6 18.0
High-income Asia 35.5 3.1 4.7 16.7 35.8
ASEAN 40.8 7.6 10.2 34.5 30.2
India 65.5 7.9 10.4 31.4 44.7
Rest of South Asia 44.4 12.1 16.0 29.6 33.2
United States 15.4 5.1 8.2 6.7 28.1
EU_27 13.6 0.0 1.6 1.7 17.4
Russian Federation and Central Asia 49.7 -1.9 0.6 3.8 25.3
ROW 28.0 10.2 10.2 21.4 23.3
Sources: Walmsley, 2006 and update, and World Bank 2009.33
Annex table 4. Average tariffs imposed, trade weighted
(Unit: Per cent)
















Crops 3.1 29.5 30.5 9.7 32.6 11.0 3.3 5.8 5.4 0.4 10.9 9.6
Other foods 10.6 22.4 16.8 14.2 75.9 23.3 4.8 4.1 12.0 2.5 15.2 10.0
Extraction 0.4 0.1 4.1 0.6 11.5 7.4 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.0 1.5 1.4
Textiles, clothing and  leather 13.1 9.2 5.2 12.8 15.8 16.0 9.6 4.5 14.9 14.4 11.8 8.5
Wood and paper products 4.2 1.0 2.2 6.8 13.2 15.9 0.2 0.1 9.9 2.9 5.0 2.0
Motor vehicles 22.9 0.0 14.8 22.2 24.2 40.6 1.1 1.1 11.9 8.2 6.4 3.9
Electronics 2.0 0.0 0.6 1.1 2.6 12.2 0.3 0.9 6.9 0.8 3.6 1.3
Other machinery 7.0 0.1 3.7 3.8 14.1 11.4 1.0 0.5 5.8 3.2 4.7 2.9
Petroleum and coal products 6.5 2.0 3.7 5.0 11.8 18.8 1.4 0.6 2.7 0.5 6.3 3.7
Chemicals, rubber and  plastics 9.8 0.9 3.9 4.5 14.4 12.1 1.4 0.5 8.2 2.7 4.3 3.0
Metals and metal products 5.1 0.6 2.5 5.0 15.8 12.4 1.0 0.4 6.6 2.9 4.5 2.9
Other manufactured products 7.9 0.5 3.1 4.4 12.7 13.7 1.3 0.8 10.6 2.2 5.3 2.9
Services 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 5.3 3.0 3.7 4.1 12.6 12.6 1.6 1.0 6.5 3.1 5.0 3.0
Source: Baseline 2010 GTAP database.34
Annex table 5. Average tariffs faced, trade-weighted
(Unit: Per cent)
















Crops 30.4 11.4 8.7 19.0 12.4 17.0 11.4 3.5 5.7 11.3 9.1 9.6
Other foods 12.5 15.9 16.0 15.9 8.4 12.0 15.9 5.3 8.0 17.3 12.9 10.0
Extraction 2.6 4.1 3.6 1.3 0.8 3.6 1.4 2.5 0.4 2.1 1.5 1.4
Textiles, clothing and  leather 11.2 12.4 13.1 9.1 8.5 5.8 6.0 3.5 5.1 7.6 5.3 8.5
Wood and paper products 2.3 4.8 5.5 3.3 5.5 6.6 1.9 1.7 2.5 2.6 1.4 2.0
Motor vehicles 4.6 10.4 10.7 7.5 9.4 7.0 2.8 2.3 4.7 5.4 1.8 3.9
Electronics 1.6 2.1 1.3 1.0 3.7 2.5 1.0 1.1 2.9 1.9 1.0 1.3
Other machinery 3.7 4.3 5.7 3.2 3.9 4.3 2.5 2.2 3.1 3.0 1.9 2.9
Petroleum and coal products 4.5 4.7 4.9 4.6 5.5 4.7 3.8 2.4 4.6 2.8 3.8 3.7
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 4.7 5.5 7.3 5.1 5.1 4.5 3.3 1.6 3.9 3.6 2.8 3.0
Metals and metal products 4.3 5.2 5.0 3.1 4.9 7.4 2.1 1.7 2.8 4.8 2.8 2.9
Other manufactured products 4.7 5.8 5.3 3.7 2.0 4.9 1.9 2.0 1.9 2.8 2.3 2.9
Services 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 5.3 5.2 4.4 3.7 4.3 5.5 2.7 1.8 1.6 5.6 2.7 3.0
Source: Baseline 2010 GTAP database.35
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During the past two decades, intraregional trade has assumed a lot of importance – with
intraregional  trade growing  rapidly  in  several  regions,  such  as  the Association  of  Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European
Union. However, intraregional trade in South Asia has not witnessed rapid expansion despite the
institutional measures taken by the South Asian countries through the South Asian Preferential
Trade Agreement (SAPTA) and the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA).
Economic cooperation among the South Asian countries had been quite limited until the
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) progressed into the second cycle
of cooperation; the region had remained highly protected until the late 1980s due to the extended
use of import-substitution policies and restrictive trade regimes followed by most of its member
countries.  In  the  1990s, when the  forces  of  trade  liberalization  and  globalization  started
spreading  across  the  world,  the  South  Asian  countries also  faced  the  opportunities  and
challenges presented by these new developments. The countries in South Asia recognized the
critical importance of stepping up intraregional cooperation in order to promote sustained growth
and development of the member countries as well as prevent the marginalization of South Asia’s
trade interests in the larger global scenario.
As  a  result,  since the  early 1990s,  South  Asia  has  made considerable  progress  in
deregulation and trade liberalization, which has helped to increase the region’s integration with
the  world  economy. Initially, these  trade  liberalization  efforts  had largely been  unilateral.
However, in recent years, South Asia has made attempts to promote intraregional trade through a
series of bilateral agreements, mainly between India and its neighbours, as well as multilateral
agreements. In 1995, the seven South Asian countries – Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives,
Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka – initiated a multilateral framework for region-wide integration
under SAPTA. Subsequently, the members of  SAPTA started moving  towards SAFTA. The
process  of SAFTA  was  formulated in  January  2004  at  the twelfth SAARC  summit  held  in
Pakistan. However,  SAFTA became  effective in  July 2006,  with  full  implementation to  be
completed between 2009 and 2013. The SAFTA agreement’s objective is the levying of zero
customs duty for trading any product between the members by 2012.
Nonetheless,  the  outcome  of  these  multilateral  measures  in  terms  of  expansion  of
intraregional  trade  has  been lacklustre.  In  spite  of  SAPTA, intraregional  trade  in  SAARC
countries has not exceeded 4 per cent of the total trade within the region. Even in the SAFTA
phase,  the  growth  of  intraregional  trade  in  South  Asia  has  not  been  significant. In  2006,
intraregional exports by SAARC countries amounted to just 5.6 per cent of their total global
exports, whereas it was 25 per cent in ASEAN region, 53.8 per cent in NAFTA and 67.6 per cent37
for the European Union (table 1). This raises a number of concerns as South Asia, with as much
as 24 per cent of the world’s population, has meagre shares in world trade and world gross
domestic product (GDP) – its share in world trade is less than 2 per cent while its share of world
GDP is only around 2 per cent.
Table 1. Intraregional trade in different trade blocs as
a percentage of world trade
Regional bloc Exports Imports
1990 2000 2006 1990 2000 2006
 ASEAN 18.9 23.0 24.9 15.2 22.5 26.3
 CARICOM
a 8.0 14.6 11.3 5.8 8.5 8.5
European Union 67.6 67.7 67.6 64.4 62.5 63.2
 MERCOSUR
 b 8.9 20.0 13.5 14.2 19.8 18.6
 NAFTA 41.4 55.7 53.8 33.9 40.5 34.3
 SAARC 3.2 4.2 5.6 2.0 4.0 3.6
Source: Handbook of Statistics, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
a Caribbean Community and Common Market.
bMercado Comun del Sur.
In this context, it is pertinent to ask which factors could influence the potential for the
growth of intraregional  trade in South Asia. It is worthwhile to note some of the important
studies in this area that have commented on the potential for growth of intraregional trade in
South Asia and the possible factors influencing such growth.
A study by Kemal and others (2001) observes that various structural and policy-induced
factors –  such  as  an  almost  identical  pattern  of  comparative  advantage,  lack  of  trade
complementarity among member countries, restrictive trade policies and political differences –
appear to be the plausible factors that have inhibited the growth of intraregional trade in South
Asia. However, they highlight the fact that potential for trade expansion within the region exists
in some areas.
Furthermore, Mohanty  (2003)  contended  that  the  South  Asian  region  had  significant
potential  for  trade  and  investment,  rejecting  the  hypothesis  that  South  Asian  countries  were
competing among  themselves  to  export  similar types  of  products  to  the  world  market  and,
therefore, that the level of regional trade would be very low. He observed that there was  a
significant level of trade potential in the region to promote intraregional trade, and that complete
harnessing  of  export  potential  of  some  important  sectors  might  significantly  improve  the
prospects  of intraregional  trade.    He  emphasized the  need  for  deeper  and  strategic  trade
liberalization to foster intraregional trade and the fact that the region should adopt a sectoral
approach as the basis for trade liberalization.
On the other hand, Mukherji (2004) argued that mere tinkering with modest preferential
margins, maintaining an unduly long phase-out period to attain the goal of a free trade area
without concern for deeper forms of integration such as removal of non-tariff barriers as well as38
investment  cooperation  and  improvement  in  trade  facilitation  measures  could  make  SAFTA
largely irrelevant.
Pitigala  (2005)  inferred  that  the  South  Asian  countries could  be  characterized  only
moderately as “natural trading partners” and pointed out several obstacles to a rapid increase in
intraregional trade in South Asia. He observed that the countries of the South Asian region had
demonstrated an increasing tendency to trading relatively intensively with partners outside the
region, due to either pure endowment differences – that is, vis-à-vis industrial countries – or
long-standing  cultural,  ethnic  and/or  religious  affiliations. According  to Pitigala, with  the
exception of India, the countries in the region are competitors in their export markets in a narrow
range of products – dominated by textile and apparel exports – which may further inhibit the
prospects of increasing regional trade to the level envisioned under SAFTA.
However, Pitigala added that while his analysis, based on the trade patterns evolving in
the 1990s and early years of the present decade, pointed to trade structures that might hinder the
rapid,  successful  implementation  of  SAFTA,  there was  evidence  that  unilateral,  non-
discriminatory trade liberalization had already helped the South Asian countries to refine their
incentive environments. This had been done through the reduction of distortions and had helped
to  enhance  the  region’s  competitiveness  in  manufactured  exports.  Hence,  he  suggested,
continuing the process of unilateral liberalization would be more likely to help South Asia to
further diversify and evolve new comparative advantages and complementarities, thus, creating
the requisite environment for the successful implementation of SAFTA.
A recent study by the Asian Development Bank and the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2008) inferred that SAFTA would help to increase the
volume of intraregional trade in South Asia, and that while some sectors would lose and some
sectors gain in each country, the net effect on the economy of individual countries of the region
would be positive. The study posited that much higher gains for the region could be secured if
SAFTA was simultaneously implemented with measures to reduce transaction costs and create
more efficient regional transportation and infrastructure networks. The study also suggested that
increasing the scope for intraregional trade in energy, improving road, rail and air links within
the  region,  building  modern  border  customs  crossings  and  developing  sophisticated
telecommunications links would be crucial to such an effort.
Against this backdrop, this chapter examines a number of possible factors underlying the
potential  for the growth  of  intraregional  trade  in  South  Asia, including  making comparative
advantages for these countries, trade complementarity between them and intra-industry trade
(IIT) between these countries. It examines all these issues primarily to assess the potential for
developing production networks in South Asia and the strengthening of its intra-industry trade.
Accordingly, the empirical analysis in this chapter covers South Asia, or the member countries
of  SAARC  (i.e.,  Bangladesh,  Bhutan,  India, Maldives,  Nepal,  Pakistan  and  Sri  Lanka).
However, among the SAARC countries, only four of the largest economies – India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka – are covered in the core empirical analysis. One of the reasons for
not covering Bhutan, Nepal and Maldives is the unavailability of the necessary data on these
countries.39
Section A analyses the trends and patterns in intraregional trade in South Asia in order to
identify  the  relative  importance  of  the  different  countries. Section B examines revealed
comparative advantages for the four major countries in this region (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan
and  Sri  Lanka). Section C discusses trade  complementarity  between  the  selected  countries.
Section D deals with the issue of intra-industry trade and the potential for developing production
networks  in  South  Asia. Section E  presents  the  conclusion  and  flags issues  for  further
investigation. All important empirical results are presented at the end of this chapter as annexes.
A. Trends and patterns in intraregional trade in South Asia
As mentioned above, several economists have argued that because South Asian countries
have similar factor endowments, the potential for conventional trade within the region based on
comparative advantage is somewhat limited. It has also been observed that the possibility of IIT
in the region is not yet very strong as the industrial development of South Asian countries has
not reached a level where these countries can take advantage of IIT. India is relatively the most
industrialized country as well as the largest market in South Asia. Hence, it is plausible to expect
India to hold the potential for leading production networks involving the other countries in the
region, which, in turn, could lead to an expansion of intraregional trade in South Asia. Against
this  backdrop,  the  trends  and  patterns  in intraregional  trade  in  South  Asia  should  first  be
considered in order to identify the relative importance of the different countries. To begin with,
figure 1 provides a comparative view of the levels of intraregional trade in 2006 as a share of
GDP in SAARC and other major regional trading blocs.
Figure 1. Intraregional trade as a share of gross domestic
product in 2006
Source:  Handbook  of  Statistics, United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and
Development.
Note: CIS = Commonwealth of Independent States.40
Table 2. Share of intraregional trade by SAARC countries in world trade
Year Intraregional exports as a percentage
of SAARC exports to world






Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund.
As table 2 shows, the magnitude of intraregional trade has limited significance for the
SAARC countries, even after a decade of multilateral trade cooperation measures. Intraregional
exports by the SAARC countries, as a proportion of their total global exports, have grown very
slowly, from 2.4 per cent in 1990 to 4.5 per cent in 2000 and 5.1 per cent in 2008. Likewise,
intraregional  imports by  these  countries,  as  a  proportion  of  their  total global imports,  have
increased very slowly, from 2.1 per cent in 1990 to 3.8 per cent in 2000 and 4.3 per cent in 2008.
Moreover, even these low figures have been biased by the figures for India, which has the largest
share in total intra-SAARC exports (75.1 per cent in 2008) (figure 2).
Figure 2. Share of SAARC countries in intra-SAARC trade
(Unit: Per cent)
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund.
Therefore, the figures for intraregional exports by the SAARC countries do not reflect
the extent of intraregional exports by the smaller countries in the region. The share of other
countries in intraregional exports has been quite low, with Maldives recording just 0.1 per cent.
On the import side, too, intraregional imports comprised only 4.3 per cent of total world imports
by the SAARC countries in 2008, with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka recording the highest import
shares within the region at 34.1 per cent and 24.3 per cent, respectively.
Tables  3a  and  3b  present  the  analysis  of  direction  of  trade  statistics for  2008 for
Bangladesh,  India,  Pakistan  and  Sri  Lanka.  It  is  evident  from table  3a  that  the advanced
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and Sri  Lanka, although more than 50 per cent of India’s total exports are to the advanced
economies. Pakistan is also dependent on the markets in these economies for 47 per cent of its
total exports. In fact, the European Union and the United States constitute the largest export
markets for Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The markets in emerging and developing
economies have been penetrated more by India than Bangladesh or Sri Lanka. In the case of each
of these countries, as already emphasized above, South Asian export accounts for a very small
share of those economies.
Table 3a. Direction of trade of South Asian countries in 2008 (exports)
Partner Reporter
Bangladesh India Pakistan Sri Lanka
Exports (US$ million)
South Asia 428.9 9 314.0 1 054.1 725.4
World 13 907.4 187 405.0 217 65.5 8 670.5
Rest of the world 13 478.5 178 091.0 207 11.4 7 945.1
Share in total exports (%)
Advanced economies 75.0 50.9 47.0 67.2
European Union 47.9 20.7 22.1 37.9
United States 21.0 13.1 16.0 21.7
Emerging and developing
economies 10.7 48.8 52.9 27.9
South Asia 3.1 5.0 4.8 8.4
India 2.4 - 2.7 6.8
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund.
Table 3b. Direction of trade of South Asian countries in 2008 (imports)
Partner Reporter
Bangladesh India Pakistan Sri Lanka
Imports (in US$ million)
South Asia 3 914.2 2 312.5 1 178.6 3 213.5
World 23 816.8 301 588.0 46 025.7 14 059.8
Rest of the world 19 902.6 299 275.5 44 847.1 10 846.3
Share in total imports (%)
Advanced economies 34.5 43.4 30.0 41.0
European Union 8.3 16.8 13.2 13.5
United States 1.8 6.8 4.8 2.2
Emerging and developing
economies 58.8 32.9 69.9 58.4
South Asia 16.4 0.8 2.6 22.9
India 14.7 - 2.2 21.2
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund.
In the case of imports by the four selected countries in South Asia, as shown in table 3b,
the emerging and developing economies account for the largest share of imports by Bangladesh,42
Pakistan and Sri Lanka, while India’s imports to those economies account for the second largest
share. The advanced economies accounted for the largest share in India’s imports in 2008. As
table 3b shows, South Asia accounts for a very small share in the imports of all the four selected
countries; only Bangladesh and Sri Lanka report noticeable figures for South Asia’s share in
their total imports.
The  trends  in intraregional  trade  in  South  Asia from  1990  to  2008 are  presented  in
annexes 1 and 2. The share of Bangladesh’s imports from South Asia in the country’s total
imports has recorded noticeable growth during the past two decades. A similar trend is also
observed in the case of Sri Lankan imports. However, neither India nor Pakistan has shown any
increase in the share of South Asian imports in their total imports during the period covered. It
should also be noted that in the case of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, increases in imports have
been mainly from India rather than any of the other South Asian countries.
1 As a result, India
recorded an increasing share for South Asia in its total exports from 1990 to 2008. However, the
magnitude of India’s exports to South Asia is still very small compared with the magnitude of
the country’s total world exports. Apart from India, Sri Lanka was the only South Asian country
whose intraregional exports recorded an increased share of its total exports from 2000 to 2008.
Thus, most of the South Asian countries showed an increasing share of intraregional
trade from 1990 to 2008. However, the increases in South Asia’s trade share are based more on
imports  from  the  region  (again,  mainly  from  India)  rather  than  exports  to  the  region. For
example, in the case of Bangladesh, the share of intraregional imports increased from 7 per cent
in 1990 to 16.3 per cent in 2008, whereas the share of its intraregional exports declined from 3.6
per  cent  in  1990  to  3.1  per  cent  in  2008.  Sri  Lanka  showed  a  rise  in  shares  for  both  its
intraregional exports and imports; however, the rise was higher for imports, which increased
from 7 per cent in 1990 to 22.9 per cent in 2008. For Nepal, the share of intraregional exports
and  imports in  2008  was  73.9  per  cent  and 59.6  per  cent,  respectively (annex  2a  and  2b),
primarily because trade was with India due to Nepal’s landlocked nature.
Thus,  large  differences  exist  in  the  relative  importance  of  South  Asian  markets  for
individual member countries of SAARC. In this context, Pitigala (2005) pointed out that one
reason  for  this  imbalance  in  trade was  because  India  maintained  a  higher  level  of  border
protection  relative  to  its  neighbouring  countries,  which  prompted  the  other  countries  in  the
region, such as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, to strengthen their integration with the developed
countries of the world. As of 2007, India’s tariff rates on agricultural products were much higher
than those applied by Pakistan, Bangladesh or Sri Lanka (table 4). In the case of non-agricultural
products, the most-favoured nation (MFN) tariff for India has declined to 11 per cent on average,
which is low compared with other countries except Sri Lanka.
The analysis of the trends and patterns in intraregional trade in South Asia from 1990 to
2008 indicates that the volume of intraregional trade in South Asia continues to be very low. All
four  of  the  selected  countries  (Bangladesh,  India,  Pakistan  and  Sri  Lanka)  are  targeting  the
1 The rising trade flows between India and Sri Lanka could be due to the FTA between the two, which became
effective in 2000.43
United States and the European Union as the main destination for their exports, although India is
also targeting the emerging and developing economies in this regard.
Table 4. Tariff rates applied by South Asian countries in 2007
 Simple average MFN applied tariff rates
Country Year Total Ag Non-ag
Bangladesh 2007 14.6 16.9 14.2
Bhutan 2007 21.9 41.4 18.9
India 2007 14.5 34.4 11.5
Maldives 2006 20.2 18.4 20.5
Nepal 2007 12.6 14 12.4
Pakistan  2007 14.1 15.8 13.8
Sri Lanka 2007 11.0 23.1 9.1
Source: World Tariff Profiles 2008, WTO.
However, two factors can be identified that can play an important role in the expansion
of intraregional trade in South Asia. First, India’s level of industrial development is far ahead of
that  in  the  other  South  Asian  countries. Therefore,  as  the  demand  for  more  industrialized
products is growing in the neighbouring countries, India can exploit those opportunities to some
extent. Second, India’s population and the size of its economy are much bigger than those of the
other South Asian countries.
Hence, there is scope for other countries in the region to increase their exports to India,
especially  in  the  less-industrialized  product  segments,  provided  India  reduces  its  border
protection levels in these segments. In fact, it has been highlighted by many studies that removal
of tariff and non-tariff barriers, especially by India could play a significant role in the expansion
of intraregional trade in South Asia.
B. Revealed comparative advantage
This section discusses the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) indices, which have
been calculated for the region’s four major trading partners: Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri
Lanka. These indices have been computed using the United Nations Comtrade trade flow data at
the SITC (Rev 3) three-digit level.
International trade theory postulates that countries with different comparative advantages
have greater  opportunities  for  trade  in  comparison with  those that  share  a  high  degree  of
similarity in factor endowments. This implies that countries with diverse RCA profiles would
have  more  opportunities  to  trade  with  one  another  than  those  with  similar  RCA  profiles.
Therefore, there is a greater potential for the growth of intraregional trade if trading partners
within the region exhibit different comparative advantages in products.44
The RCA index is the most frequently used measure for assessing trade competitiveness
of an industry/country. The RCA index was first introduced by Balassa in 1965 (also known as
the Balassa index), as a measure of international trade specialization and hence of international
competitiveness. Balassa (2005) presumed that in the absence of any comprehensive data on
factor costs, export performance could be used to reveal the comparative advantage of individual
countries.
The RCA index for a country in a particular product (or industry) is measured by its
share in total exports of that country relative to the product’s (or industry’s) share in total world
exports. The RCA index is expressed as:
RCA = (Xij/Xit)/(Xnj/Xnt) (1)
where  X  represents  exports,  i  is the  country,  j  is the  product  (or  industry),  t  is  a  set  of
commodities  (or  industries)  and  n  is  a  set  of  countries.  A  comparative  advantage  (or
disadvantage) is “revealed”, if the RCA value is greater (or less) than 1.
For example, the RCA between India and the world in industry “j” is defined as RCA
India-world  industry “j”  equals percentage  share  of  India’s industry “j”  exports  in  the  total
exports from India to the world /percentage share of world exports of industry “j” in the total
exports of the world.
Thus, by estimating the RCA indices for the selected countries for 2008 (see annex 3),
these countries are found to have comparative advantage in similar products – mainly primary
goods and labour-intensive manufactured goods. Textiles, yarns and fabrics, leather and apparel,
and accessories remain as the products with the highest RCA value for all four of the selected
countries. Thus, a vast similarity of comparative advantage remains in products among the major
trading partners within the region. However, there are some cases where individual countries,
mainly India, have exhibited products with comparative advantages different from the others in
the  region;  these  could  be  the  products  where  member  countries could expand intraregional
trade.  For example,  India  has  a  comparative  advantage  in  chemicals,  dyes,  pharmaceuticals,
leather products, machinery and transport equipment, and base metals vis-à-vis other selected
SAARC  countries.  Sri  Lanka  has a comparative  advantage  in  veneers,  plywood,  wood
manufactures, rubber, rubber tyres and articles, pottery, pearls and precious stones, electrical
transformers  and  miscellaneous  manufactured  articles.  Pakistan  has  shown  a  comparative
advantage in medical instruments, toys and games, food processing machines and polyesters,
whereas  Bangladesh  has  exhibited a comparative  advantage  in machine  tools  and
telecommunication equipment.
This  analysis  shows  that  textiles  and  apparel  exports  still  remain  the  products  with
highest comparative advantages for the selected countries, thus, all the countries compete against
each other in this category of exports in the rest-of-the-world markets. Nonetheless, there should
be scope for increasing intraregional trade in South Asia as there are also some products where
countries have exhibited diverse profiles of comparative advantage. However, a country with a
relatively high  comparative  advantage in  some  products can  increase its exports (for  those
products)  only  if  those  products  figure  significantly  in  the  import  baskets  of  other  member
countries in the region. This raises the question of trade complementarity between the selected
South Asian countries, which is discussed in the next section.45
C. Trade complementarity index
The trade complementarity index tries to measure how well the export profile of one
country, or group of countries, matches the import profiles of others. In addition, changes in the
value of the trade complementarity index over time can help determine whether the trade profiles
of the countries under consideration are growing more or less compatible (Ng and Yeats, 2003).
They argued that similarities between the types of goods exported and the goods imported by
East Asian countries formed a strong factor underlying the expansion of their intraregional trade.
Some of the main proponents of this index, such as, Michaely (1994), had used the index to
evaluate prospects for Latin American trade arrangements, whereas Yeats (1997) applied the
index in analysing the compatibility of intraregional trade in sub-Saharan African countries.
2
According to both Michaely and Yeats, higher index values indicated more favourable prospects
for a successful trade cooperation arrangement between the countries.
In  the  present analysis of SAARC  countries, trade complementarity  between  two
countries i and j (Cij) can be defined as:
Cij, = 100 - ∑ (|Mki – Xkj| / 2) (2)
where i = a SAARC country or SAARC region, j = another SAARC country or SAARC region,
k represents product category, Xkj is the share of product k in the exports of country j and Mki is
the share of product k in the imports of country i. The value of the index Cij would range from
zero (i.e., when no product exported by one country is imported by the other) to 100 (when the
import basket of i matches completely with the export basket of j and the shares of the different
products in those baskets also match).
The trade  complementarity  indices for  the  selected  South  Asian  countries have  been
computed in two ways – among themselves as well as between a country and the SAARC region
as a whole. These computations are based on United Nations Comtrade data at the SITC (Rev 3)
four-digit level for 1990 and 2008. Thus, for expansion of intraregional trade within the SAARC
region, what is exported by one country should be imported by another country or the SAARC
region as a whole. Also, it is necessary to analyse whether export and import profiles within the
region  are growing  more or  less compatible  over  time  in  order  to  assess  the  change  in  the
potential for intraregional trade in this region over the past two decades.
The values of the trade complementarity indices for the two different  points of time
indicate that export complementarities of Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, vis-à-vis each
other, have  improved  during  the  past  two  decades, although  not  significantly.  For example,
2 Yeats (1997) pointed out that the index had its limitations. Yeats noted that it “takes the existing structure (share)
of exports as a given and attempts to determine how well it matches a potential partner’s imports. This assumes that
either existing exports will be diverted to the regional partner, or the country can expand these exports at constant
costs. Also, the approach assumes there is something optimal about the existing structure of trade. This need not be
the case. Third, the complementarity index treats all exports as equals, yet some may have very different associated
national policy objectives. Fourth, the influence of distance and transport costs is neglected in the complementarity
index”.46
Bangladesh’s complementarity in terms of its exports is only 15 per cent with Pakistan and 14.3
per cent with Sri Lanka. On the other hand, India’s trade complementarity indices, in terms of
exports,  have  shown  sharp  increases  with  all  other  regional  trading  partners.  The  export
complementarity between India and Bangladesh rose from 23.4 per cent in 1990 to 35.3 per cent
in 2008; however, this was less than those between India and Pakistan (which more than doubled
from 20 per cent in 1990 to 44.4 per cent in 2008) or between India and Sri Lanka (which
increased from 27.6 per cent to 46 per cent during the same period and is the highest in the
region). However, there was a decline in India’s complementarity indices as an importer and the
other selected countries as exporters.
However,  India’s  import  complementarity with  the  SAARC  region  as  an  exporter
increased  from  30.6  per  cent  in  1990  to  37.6  per  cent  in  2008.  This  result  might  seem
contradictory to the earlier result, but it is possible that India’s complementarity in imports from
other countries in the region, such as Nepal (which was not included in the present analysis), is
much higher. Furthermore, the SAARC region’s complementarity with other countries in the
region has improved in the period covered, and is highest for Sri Lanka at 45.6 per cent.
Table 5. Trade complementarity indices for South Asian countries, 1990 and 2008
Importing country Exporting
country
Year Bangladesh India Pakistan Sri Lanka SAARC
Bangladesh 1990 - 10.0 6.2 4.1 8.7
2008 - 9.4 15.0 14.3 11.8
India 1990 23.4 - 20.0 27.6 31.7
2008 35.3 - 44.4 46.0 42.1
Pakistan 1990 15.2 12.5 - 11.8 12.4
2008 23.8 12.3 - 25.1 14.7
Sri Lanka 1990 7.6 20.3 9.6 - 18.7
2008 15.4 16.3 18.8 - 17.3
SAARC 1990 24.3 30.6 18.2 26.3 -
2008 41.3 37.6 42.8 45.6 -
Source:  Author’s calculation based on United Nations Comtrade Data at 4-digit level.
* The latest available data for Bangladesh are for 2007.
From the  above  analysis,  it  can  be seen  that  India’s  exports  show  the  maximum
complementarity with imports of other regional trading partners. Thus, India’s exports are able
to fulfil, to a certain extent, the region’s import demand for goods and, in particular, those of Sri
Lanka and Pakistan; however, the exports of the latter two countries show low complementarity
with India’s imports. Overall, the evidence of trade complementarity in the South Asian region is
mixed. The observed pattern implies that trade complementarities in the region have increased
over  time, although  they  are  still at comparatively  low  levels.  However, the rise in
complementarities together with increasing comparative advantage suggests that intraregional
trade in South Asia certainly has a potential to grow over time.47
Against the backdrop of low levels of trade complementarity between the major trading
countries in South Asia, in which India’s exports complement the imports of other countries
reasonably  well  but  the  exports  of  those  countries  do  not  complement  Indian  imports,  it is
imperative to think of specific means through which intraregional trade could be expanded in
South Asia. The experiences of some of the other regions in the world suggest that IIT could be
one possible way for promoting intraregional trade in South Asia. However, this would require
the South Asian countries to be at different stages of production within an industry, which would
strengthen the potential of intraregional trade. This issue is examined in the following section,
using IIT indices for the selected countries.
D. Intra-industry trade
Intra-industry trade occurs when a country simultaneously imports and exports similar
types of products within the same industry or sector.  There are two types of IIT: horizontal and
vertical IIT. Horizontal IIT refers to the simultaneous exports and imports of goods classified in
the  same  sector  and  at  the  same  stage  of  processing.  This  is  usually  based  on  product
differentiation. Vertical IIT refers to the simultaneous exports and imports of goods classified in
the same sector but which are at different stages of processing. This is normally based on the
“fragmentation”  of  the  production  process  into  different  stages,  each  performed  at  different
locations by taking advantage of the local conditions.
The phenomenon of IIT first received attention in the 1960s in the studies of Verdoorn
and  Balassa  on  the  increased  trade  flows  among  European  countries.  However,  Grubel  and
Lloyd  (1975)  provided  the  definitive  empirical  study  on  the  importance  of IIT  and how  to
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(3)
The Grubel-Lloyd (GL) index varies between “zero” (indicating zero IIT, i.e. the country
only imports or only exports goods or services in the same sector), and “1” (indicating pure IIT,
i.e. a country's exports are exactly equall to its imports within the same sector).
In this chapter, IIT has been analysed using the aggregate industry classification (eight
industries) provided in WITS for the selected South Asian countries, for 1990, 2000 and 2008.
However, analysing IIT at an aggregate level would not explain precisely its composition and it
could even overestimate the composition. Therefore, IIT among Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and
Sri Lanka has also been analysed at the more detailed 3-digit level for 2008. The 10 top products
having a high  value  of IIT  indices  for  each  country  with  its  trading  partners are  presented.
Nonetheless, only those industries that have both high value IIT indices as well as high volumes
of bilateral trade (see annex 4) have been considered for analysis.
However, the GL index has also been criticized for lacking desirable dynamic properties;
it has been shown that an increase or decrease in the GL index over time is not necessarily
associated with corresponding increases or decreases in IIT. If, for example, trade liberalization48
results in an equal/proportional increase in exports and imports within an industry, then the
volume of IIT will increase over time; however, in this case, the proportion of IIT reflected in
the GL index would not increase (Hamilton and Kniest, 1991). Likewise, if the imposition of a
trade barrier results in a decline in the exports from a country and, hence, a decline in the volume
of IIT, the GL index may not be able to capture this fall in IIT (Andresen, 2003). In order to
address  these  lacunae  in the  GL index,  a  number  of  Marginal Intra-Industry  Trade (MIIT)
indexes have been developed, starting with the index developed by Hamilton and Kniest (1991).
The MIIT indexes measure only the new trade flow during that period.
Among the different versions of the MIIT index, the most widely used index has been the
one developed by Brülhart (1994):
 MIIT
B = 1 – (|ΔX - ΔM| / |ΔX| + |ΔM|)        (4)
where ΔX refers to the change in the quantity of exports from a country in a particular product
category from period t1 to t2, and ΔM refers to the change in quantity of imports to that country
in the same product category from period t1 to t2.
The Brülhart index of MIIT takes on values between 0 and 1, with 0 indicating zero IIT,
i.e. the country only imports or only  exports goods or services in the  same sector, and  “1”
indicating pure IIT, i.e. a country's exports are exactly equall to its imports within the same
sector. This chapter analyses marginal IIT between the four selected countries from 2000 to
2008, using trade data at the 3-digit level of product categories (annex 4).
1. India and Bangladesh
With regard to trade between India and Bangladesh in 2008, there were only two sectors
in which IIT accounted for a moderate share – the chemicals sector, and the ores and metals
sector. In some of the other sectors such as manufactures, other manufactures n.e.s., textiles and
miscellaneous goods, IIT accounted for a low share. In the remaining sectors, i.e., agricultural
materials, agricultural raw materials, food, and machinery and transportation, the level of IIT
between the two countries was almost negligible.
At the 3-digit level, the GL index of IIT between India and Bangladesh in 2008 was
found to be high for a number of product categories, and in the case of some of the categories the
volume of trade between the two countries was also found to be high. The product categories
include:  telecommunications  equipment;  non-ferrous  base  metal  waste  and  scrap;  elements,
oxides  and  halogen  salts  (inorganic  chemicals);  soaps,  cleansing  and  polishing  preparations;
men/boys’ woven textile fabrics; special yarns and fabrics; and leather.
Among these product categories, there are quite a few in which the relative significance
of IIT (as indicated by the value of the Brülhart indices) appears to have increased from 2000 to
2008. These product categories include: elements, oxides and halogen salts; men/boys’ woven
textile fabrics; special yarns and fabrics; leather; knit and crochet fabrics; soaps, cleansing and
polishing preparations; and telecommunications equipment. The value of the Brülhart index is49
0.6 or higher in the case of each of these product categories, indicating a greater role of IIT in
new trade created during 2008.
2. India and Pakistan
In trade between India and Pakistan in 2008, a moderate level of IIT was observed in
sectors such as other manufactures, miscellaneous goods, and basic ores and metals. In sectors
such as food, manufactures and textiles there was evidence of IIT between the two countries, but
its extent was rather low.
Some of the product categories at the 3-digit level, where IIT between the two countries
figured  prominently  in  2008,  included:  carboxylic  acid  compound  (organic  chemicals);
polyacetals/polyesters (plastics in primary forms); textile yarns; special yarns and fabrics; and
floor coverings (textile products). A moderate level of IIT was also observed in a few other
product categories.
However, the relative significance of IIT from 2000 to 2008 (as indicated by the value of
the Brülhart indices) appears to be high only for textile yarn at 0.98. In a few of the other product
categories mentioned  above IIT appears  to  be  increasing;  these  include: tulles,  lace  and
embroidery; special yarns and fabrics; floor coverings (textile products); and articles of plastic.
3. India and Sri Lanka
Unlike the case of IIT between India and Pakistan, or that between India and Bangladesh,
IIT between India and Sri Lanka can be observed in many sectors. The extent of IIT between
India  and  Sri  Lanka  in  2008  was  high  in  sectors such  as agricultural  raw  materials,
miscellaneous goods, and machinery and transport, while it was moderate in sectors such as
agricultural materials and food, manufactures, and ores and metals.
At  a  disaggregate  level,  the  main  product  categories that  recorded  high IIT  in  2008
included: spices; rubber tyres; lime, cement and construction material; glassware (non-metallic
mineral  manufactures);  veneer  and  plywood;  paper,  and  paper  board  and  articles;  made-up
textile articles; tulles, lace and embroidery; and electric power machinery and parts.
Among  these  categories,  there  are  a  few  in  which  the  relative  significance  of IIT
increased between 2000 and 2008. The value of the Brülhart index is found to be greater than 0.8
in each of these product categories, which include: spices; rubber tyres; veneer and plywood;
tulles, lace and embroidery; and electric power machinery and parts. Overall, during this period,
IIT  contributed  significantly  to  marginal  trade  between  the  two countries  in  as  many  as  35
product categories (the value of the Brülhart index of MIIT is found to be higher than 0.5 in each
of these product categories).
4. Pakistan and Bangladesh
In trade between Pakistan and Bangladesh in 2008, a high level of IIT was observed in
sectors such as agricultural materials, agricultural raw materials and food. The other sectors that50
recorded IIT between these two countries in 2008, although to a much lower extent, included
ores and metals, miscellaneous goods and textiles.
At  a  disaggregate  level,  food-processing  machines  was  the  only  product  category to
report a high extent of IIT between Pakistan and Bangladesh in 2008. IIT of a moderate level
was  observed  in  the  categories  of made-up  textile  articles,  base  metal  manufactures,  crude
vegetable materials and rotating electrical plant. A low level of IIT was observed in product
categories such as spices, articles of apparel, headgear and non-text clothing, plastics in primary
forms and articles of plastics.
Table 6. Intra-industry trade among South Asian countries, 1990 to 2008
Partner Bangladesh Sri Lanka Pakistan Reporter
Product Name 1990 2000 2008 1990 2000 2008 1990 2000 2008
Agricultural materials 0.61 0.20 0.11 0.32 0.30 0.59 0.96 0.56 0.17
Agricultural raw materials 0.50 0.55 0.14 0.23 0.74 0.70 0.19 0.76 0.12
Chemicals 0.04 0.38 0.49 0.14 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.03
Food 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.38 0.25 0.52 0.67 0.54 0.22
Manufactures 0.03 0.16 0.23 0.07 0.05 0.40 0.66 0.12 0.27
Miscellaneous goods 0.04 0.21 0.23 0.16 0.08 0.79 0.05 0.90 0.63
Ores and metals 0.00 0.01 0.31 0.37 0.95 0.58 0.41 0.14 0.37
Other manufactures, n.e.s. 0.04 0.15 0.23 0.16 0.05 0.25 0.19 0.40 0.69
Textiles 0.17 0.32 0.21 0.00 0.05 0.14 0.06 0.68 0.23
India
Machinery and transport 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.71 0.00 0.45 0.07
Agricultural materials 0.87 0.76 0.91 0.95 1.00 0.83
Agricultural raw materials 0.76 0.90 0.95 0.67 0.34 0.03
Chemicals 0.07 0.27 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.17
Food 0.30 0.57 0.61 0.96 0.87 0.71
Manufactures 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.11 0.08
Miscellaneous goods 0.00 0.15 0.34 0.89 0.10 0.75
Ores and metals 0.01 0.03 0.41 0.05 0.36 0.75
Other manufactures 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.07
Textiles 0.49 0.37 0.33 0.05 0.07 0.04
Pakistan
Machinery and transport 0.05 0.36 0.04 0.15 0.12 0.29
Agricultural materials 0.01 0.04 0.20
Agricultural raw materials 0.02 0.02 0.05
Chemicals 0.17 0.41 0.47
Food 0.00 0.05 0.30
Manufactures 0.37 0.53 0.63
Ores and metals 0.04 0.00 0.00
Other manufactures 0.61 0.56 0.72
Textiles 0.66 0.90 0.46
Sri
Lanka
Machinery and transport 0.43 0.50 0.43
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from United Nations Comtrade, WITS.
Note:  Agricultural materials = SITC 0+1+2-27-28+4, agricultural raw materials = SITC 2- 22-27-28, chemicals =
SITC5, food = SITC 0+1+22+4, manufactures, miscellaneous goods = SITC 9, ores and metals = 27+28+68, other
manufactures = 6+8-68, textiles = 25+ 65+84 and machinery and transport equipment = SITC 7.51
However, there was no increase in the relative significance of IIT between 2000 and
2008 for any of the product categories mentioned above with the exception of rotating electrical
plant  in  which IIT appears  to  have  contributed  a  moderate  share  of  the  new  trade  between
Pakistan and Bangladesh over the past decade.
5. Pakistan and Sri Lanka
The level of IIT between Pakistan and Sri Lanka in 2008 was high for sectors such as
agricultural materials, food products, ores and metals, and miscellaneous goods. The extent of
IIT between the two countries was low or negligible in the remaining sectors.
The product categories at the 3-digit level, where IIT between the two countries figured
prominently  in  2008,  included:  electrical  distribution  equipment;  mineral  manufactures;
headgear and non-textile clothing; miscellaneous chemical products; base metal manufactures;
and miscellaneous manufactured articles. A moderate level of IIT between the two countries was
also observed for special yarns and fabrics, other crude minerals, elements, oxides and halogen
salts, and electrical equipment.
Except for miscellaneous chemical products, electrical distribution equipment and other
crude minerals, there was no increase in the relative significance of IIT in the product categories
mentioned above. This indicates that IIT seems to have contributed the major share of the new
trade between Pakistan and Sri Lanka over the past decade.
6. Sri Lanka and Bangladesh
In trade between Sri Lanka and Bangladesh in 2008, IIT accounted for a high share in
only two sectors – manufactures and other manufactures. In some of the other sectors such as
chemicals, textiles, and machinery and transport, moderate levels of IIT were observed in 2008.
At a disaggregate level, the product categories showing a high level of IIT between Sri
Lanka and Bangladesh were printed matter and spices. A moderate level of IIT between these
two countries was observed for paper, and paper board and articles, textile yarn, and special
yarns and fabrics. Low levels of IIT was could be observed in woven cotton fabrics, headgear
and non-textile clothing, and articles of plastic.
The indices of marginal IIT from 2000 to 2008 show that the share of IIT was high or
moderate only in product categories such as man-made woven fabrics, paper, and paper board
and articles, and woven cotton fabric. In other product categories, such as headgear and non-
textile clothing, tulles, lace and embroidery, textile yarn and articles of plastics, the share of IIT
in total marginal trade was quite low
Thus, the product coverage of IIT among the selected South Asian countries has been
rather  limited. IIT  appears  to  play a  relatively  important  role  in  bilateral  trade  between  the
selected countries in only a few product categories including: spices; chemicals and chemical
products; textile yarns, fabrics and made-up textile articles; leather; rubber manufactures; wood52
and paper products; base metals and mineral manufactures; and basic machinery and transport
equipment.  Moreover,  the  level  of IIT  is  high  only  for  a  few product  categories, mainly  in
India’s trade with Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, where noticeable levels of IIT can be observed
across a number of product categories.
Similarly, with regard to the changes in IIT during 2000 to 2008, IIT has accounted for a
high or moderate share of the marginal trade only in trade between India and Sri Lanka, and
between India and Bangladesh. This implies that bilateral trade liberalization measures between
India and Sri Lanka (the India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement, 2000), and between India and
Bangladesh could have encouraged the expansion of IIT among these countries.
With regard to the potential for growth of intraregional trade in South Asia through IIT,
the  analysis  in  this  chapter  indicates  that a  number  of  product  categories  and  sectors are
experiencing  an  increasing  share  of IIT  among these  countries.  These  could  be among  the
product categories and sectors where further reduction of tariffs, removal of non-tariff barriers
and reduction of transportation costs will augment IIT in South Asia. India, which relatively
speaking is the most industrialized country as well as the largest market in the region, could play
a  major  role  in  this  regard  through  further  unilateral  as  well  as  bilateral  trade  liberalization
measures. In addition, it is plausible to expect India to have the potential for leading production
networks involving the other countries in the region, which, in turn, could lead to an expansion
of intraregional  trade  in  South  Asia.  Vertical IIT  can  grow  through  production  sharing
arrangements  between  these  countries,  in  which  the  manufacturing  process  for  a  product  is
initiated in one country and the processing activities are transferred to another.
E. Conclusion
The magnitude of intraregional trade, until now, has had limited significance for the
SAARC countries, since intraregional exports of the SAARC countries, as a proportion of their
total world exports, have grown very slowly, from 2.4 per cent in 1990 to 4.5 per cent in 2000
and 5.1 per cent in 2008. Likewise, intraregional imports of these countries, as a proportion of
their total world imports, have increased very slowly, from 2.1 per cent in 1990 to 3.8 per cent in
2000 and 4.3 per cent in 2008. In each of the selected countries, South Asia accounts for a very
small  share of their  exports.  The advanced economies  continue  to  be  the  most  important
destination for exports; in fact, the European Union and the United States constitute the largest
export markets for all these South Asian countries. The markets in emerging and developing
economies have been penetrated more by India than Bangladesh or Sri Lanka. The emerging and
developing economies account for the largest share of imports by Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri
Lanka, while India’s imports from these economies account for the second largest share. The
advanced economies account for the largest share in India’s imports.
The increases in the share of South Asian trade, over the past two decades, are based
more on imports from the region (mainly from India) rather than exports to the region. The share
of Bangladesh’s imports from South Asia in the country’s total imports is showing a noticeable
growth over the past two decades while a similar trend is observed for Sri Lanka. However,
neither India nor Pakistan has shown an increase in the share of their imports from South Asia in
their total imports during the period covered by the analysis. In addition, India has maintained a53
higher  level  of  border  protection  relative  to  its  neighbouring  countries,  which  may  have
prompted other countries in the region, such as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, to strengthen their
integration with the developed countries. Only India appears to be in a relatively strong position
to increase its exports to the other South Asian countries in a number of product categories; the
other three countries appear to lack such an advantage in terms of export composition.
Computation  of  the  RCA  indices  for  2008  shows  that the  selected  countries  have a
comparative  advantage  in  similar  products (mainly  primary  goods  and  labour-intensive
manufacture goods). Textiles, yarns and fabrics, leather, and apparel and accessories remain the
products with the highest RCA value for all four of the selected countries.
In terms of trade complementarity, India’s exports show the maximum complementarity
with imports of other regional trading partners. India shows an ability to fulfil, to some extent,
the region’s import demands, particularly those of Sri Lanka and Pakistan; however, the exports
of these two countries show low complementarity with India’s imports. The observed pattern
implies that trade complementarities in the region have increased over time, although they are
still  at  comparatively  low  levels.  However,  the  rise  in  complementarities together  with
increasing comparative advantage in some product categories suggests that intraregional trade in
South Asia does have the potential to grow over time.
Since trade complementarity between the major trading countries in South Asia is not
high, and because only India’s exports complement the imports of other countries reasonably
well while exports by those countries do not complement India’s imports, this chapter looked at
the potential for promoting intraregional trade in South Asia through IIT. IIT appears to have
played  a  relatively  important  role  in  bilateral  trade  between  the  selected  countries  in  a  few
product categories such as: spices; chemicals and chemical products; textile yarns, fabrics and
made-up textile articles; leather; rubber manufactures, wood and paper products; base metals and
mineral manufactures; and basic machinery and transport equipment. These could be some of the
product categories and sectors where further reduction of tariffs, removal of non-tariff barriers
and reduction of transportation costs will augment IIT in South Asia.
The  product  categories  or  sectors  in  which  the  South  Asian  countries  show  trade
complementarity to some extent could also be prioritized for such measures. India could play a
major  role  in  this  regard  through  further  unilateral  as  well  as  bilateral  trade  liberalization
measures. In addition, India may have the potential for leading production networks involving
the other countries in the region, which, in turn, could lead to an expansion of intraregional trade
in South Asia.54
Annexes
Annex 1. Share of intraregional trade in total trade
 (Unit: Per cent)
Reporter Partner Intraregional exports Intraregional imports
1990 2000 2008 1990 2000 2008
India 1.3 0.9 2.4 4.7 10.5 14.7
Maldives 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Nepal 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
Pakistan 1.4 0.6 0.6 1.9 1.0 1.2
Sri Lanka 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
Bangladesh
South Asia 3.6 1.6 3.1 7.0 11.7 16.3
Bangladesh 1.7 2.0 1.8 0.1 0.2 0.1
Maldives 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Nepal 0.2 0.3 1.0 0.1 0.5 0.3
Pakistan 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.1
Sri Lanka 0.6 1.4 1.4 0.1 0.1 0.2
India
South Asia 2.7 4.2 5.0 0.4 0.9 0.8
Bangladesh 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
India 0.1 0.3 0.9 4.7 9.2 10.3
Nepal n.a. 0.0 0.0 n.a. 0.0 0.0
Pakistan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.4
Sri Lanka 13.9 17.8 7.9 6.9 13.5 4.5
Maldives
South Asia 14.0 18.1 8.8 12.2 23.0 15.1
Bangladesh 0.3 0.3 6.0 2.6 0.5 0.2
India 7.0 42.6 67.6 10.0 36.6 59.3
Maldives n.a. 0.0 0.0 n.a. 0.0 0.0
Pakistan 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.1
Sri Lanka 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.0
Nepal
South Asia 7.7 42.9 73.9 13.4 37.4 59.6
Bangladesh 1.8 1.6 1.2 0.5 0.3 0.2
India 0.9 0.7 2.7 0.6 1.7 2.2
Maldives 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Nepal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sri Lanka 1.2 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.2
Pakistan
South Asia 4.0 3.2 4.8 1.6 2.4 2.6
Bangladesh 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1
India 1.1 1.1 6.8 4.5 9.0 21.2
Maldives 0.4 1.7 0.7 0.2 0.5 0.1
Nepal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Pakistan 1.7 0.5 0.7 1.9 1.1 1.4
Sri Lanka
South Asia 3.7 3.5 8.4 7.0 10.6 22.9
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund.55
Annex 2a. Direction of trade of South Asian countries, 1990 to 2008 (exports)
Reporter Partner 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008
Share of economies in total exports (%)
Advanced economies 75.3 87.6 78.0 77.2 75.0
China 1.0 3.7 1.6 1.2 1.1
Emerging and dev. economies 24.2 12.0 7.4 7.7 10.7
European Union 33.8 44.8 40.2 46.8 47.9
India 1.3 1.1 0.9 1.4 2.4
Middle East 4.9 3.2 2.4 1.6 1.4
South Asia 3.6 2.7 1.6 2.2 3.1
Bangladesh
United States 30.5 31.9 31.8 23.6 21.0
Advanced economies 62.4 66.1 64.3 56.6 50.9
China 0.1 0.9 1.8 6.6 11.1
Emerging and dev. economies 33.0 29.8 32.1 43.1 48.8
European Union 28.5 27.5 24.3 22.2 20.7
Middle East 6.8 8.3 11.0 14.4 15.1
South Asia 2.7 5.1 4.2 5.2 5.0
India
United States 15.1 17.4 21.3 16.7 13.1
Advanced economies 71.3 68.5 69.2 59.6 47.0
China 1.2 1.5 2.7 2.7 4.4
Emerging and dev. economies 28.7 31.1 30.7 40.3 52.9
European Union 36.7 31.0 27.9 26.5 22.1
India 0.9 0.5 0.7 2.1 2.7
Middle East 8.7 11.6 12.3 13.6 19.9
South Asia 4.0 3.2 3.2 4.6 4.8
Pakistan
United States 12.4 15.1 25.2 24.8 16.0
Advanced economies 65.8 80.8 79.7 70.7 67.2
China 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.6
Emerging and dev. economies 30.3 17.3 18.3 27.0 27.9
European Union 26.8 32.4 28.3 30.9 37.9
India 1.1 0.8 1.1 8.9 6.8
Middle East 17.4 6.6 6.2 7.3 8.4
South Asia 3.7 2.7 3.5 10.2 8.4
Sri Lanka
United States 25.9 35.6 40.2 31.1 21.7
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund.56
Annex 2b. Direction of trade of South Asian countries, 1990 to 2008 (imports)
1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 Reporter Partner
Share of economies in total imports (%)
Bangladesh Advanced economies 53.2 52.6 48.1 35.8 34.5
China 3.8 9.2 7.4 13.5 14.7
Emerging and dev. economies 33.7 38.2 34.3 54.9 58.8
European Union 17.1 12.3 9.7 8.8 8.3
India 2.1 15.3 10.5 14.1 14.7
Middle East 17.2 3.6 5.1 13.6 13.3
South Asia 3.7 17.7 11.7 15.3 16.4
United States 186.0 394.0 213.9 326.5 428.6
India Advanced economies 5.1 6.1 2.4 2.4 1.8
China 0.6 2.4 2.9 7.3 11.8
Emerging and dev. economies 47.8 38.4 27.6 27.8 32.9
European Union 23.6 26.6 21.2 16.3 16.8
Middle East 29.0 20.8 8.5 6.6 6.1
South Asia 1.0 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.8
United States 12.6 9.7 6.3 5.6 6.8
Pakistan Advanced economies 53.9 54.9 39.8 38.6 30.0
China 3.1 4.4 5.0 9.2 15.4
Emerging and dev. economies 46.0 45.1 60.2 61.3 69.9
European Union 23.8 24.5 15.4 17.1 13.2
India 0.1 0.7 1.7 2.3 2.2
Middle East 29.1 19.6 38.3 30.2 33.0
South Asia 2.3 1.5 2.4 2.8 2.6
United States 14.1 9.3 6.1 6.0 4.8
Sri Lanka Advanced economies 55.1 61.5 61.3 47.1 41.0
China 2.5 3.6 3.8 7.1 11.2
Emerging and dev. economies 44.7 38.3 38.5 52.8 58.4
European Union 23.9 19.2 14.4 14.6 13.5
India 4.8 10.5 9.0 20.7 21.2
Middle East 23.7 7.4 8.4 11.5 13.7
South Asia 6.5 12.2 10.6 22.4 22.9
United States 4.4 3.9 3.8 2.3 2.2
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund.57
Annex 3. Revealed comparative advantage of South Asian countries, 2008
Product Product name Bangladesh India Pakistan Sri Lanka
001 Live animals except fish 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.01
011 Beef, fresh/chilled/frozen 0.01 2.62 0.77 0.06
012 Meat n.e.s., fresh/chilled/frozen 0.11 0.33 0.01
016 Meat/offal preserved 0.09 0.10 0.02 0.02
017 Meat/offal preserved n.e.s. 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.25
022 Milk pr. except butter/cheese 0.14 0.43 0.61 0.09
023 Butter and cheese 0.00 0.77 0.09 0.00
024 Cheese and curd 0.04 0.00 0.00
025 Eggs, albumin 2.49 0.02 0.20
034 Fish, live/fresh/chilled/frozen 11.64 0.66 2.76 6.73
035 Fish, dried/salted/smoked 1.25 0.21 2.39 1.54
036 Crustaceans molluscs etc. 32.66 4.25 2.32 2.40
037 Fish/shellfish, prepared/preserved 0.01 0.97 0.60 0.06
041 Wheat/meslin 0.00 0.00 0.72 0.00
042 Rice 2.36 11.83 92.82 0.37
043 Barley grain 0.63 0.02 0.00
044 Maize except sweet corn. 2.59 0.53 0.00
045 Cereal grains n.e.s. 0.00 1.72 0.02 0.03
046 Flour/meal wheat/meslin 0.01 0.07 0.38 18.97
047 Cereal meal/flour n.e.s. 0.00 1.58 4.78 1.18
048 Cereal etc., flour/starch 0.16 0.36 0.53 0.34
054 Vegetables, fresh/chilled/frozen 2.63 1.23 0.73 1.07
056 Veg. root/tuber prepared/preserved 0.06 0.80 0.29 0.62
057 Fruit/nuts, fresh/dried 1.57 1.69 1.96 3.21
058 Fruit preserved/fruit preps. 0.06 0.51 0.14 3.45
059 Fruit/veg. juices 0.22 0.04 0.95 0.12
061 Sugar/molasses/honey 1.12 5.16 6.04 0.07
062 Sugar confectionery 0.01 0.36 3.81 0.26
071 Coffee/coffee substitute 0.01 1.79 0.01 0.02
072 Cocoa 0.03 0.00 0.09
073 Chocolate/cocoa preps 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.05
074 Tea and mate 3.40 7.40 0.23 354.50
075 Spices 0.07 13.73 4.65 59.45
081 Animal feed except unml cereal 0.04 3.94 0.16 2.01
091 Margarine/shortening 0.02 0.03 3.51
098 Edible products n.e.s. 0.36 0.25 0.24 0.93
111 Beverage non-alcohol n.e.s. 0.01 0.02 0.33 0.24
112 Alcoholic beverages 0.05 0.12 0.04 0.06
121 Tobacco, raw and wastes 1.05 4.19 0.50 6.83
122 Tobacco, manufactured 0.46 0.50 0.02 2.25
211 Hide/skin (except fur) raw 0.25 0.79 0.01 0.00
212 Fur skins/pieces, raw 0.00 0.00
222 Oil seeds etc. - soft oil 0.13 1.13 0.48 0.02
223 Oil seeds - not soft oil 0.00 1.65 1.30 8.85
231 Natural rubber/latex/etc. 0.03 0.69 0.00 11.37
232 Rubber synth/waste/etc. 2.19 0.35 0.20 0.27
244 Cork natural/raw/waste 0.02 0.25
245 Fuelwood/wood charcoal 0.01 0.69 0.05 2.42
246 Wood chips/waste 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.06
247 Wood in rough/squared 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03
248 Wood simply worked 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.0758
251 Pulp and waste paper 0.22 0.00 0.02 0.84
261 Silk 0.02 0.55 0.33
263 Cotton 673.19 12.24 11.14 0.11
264 Jute/bast fibre raw/retd 280.16 14.63 0.93 0.00
265 Veg. text fibre except cotton/jute 0.28 1.02 0.03 184.09
266 Synthetic spinning fibre 0.12 2.84 0.68 0.01
267 Man-made fibres n.e.s. 0.06 1.44 0.19 0.15
268 Wool/animal hair 0.00 0.52 0.78 0.00
269 Worn clothing etc. 2.03 0.05 4.00 0.68
272 Fertilizers crude 0.00 0.08 0.37 0.10
273 Stone/sand/gravel 0.01 5.64 1.22 0.34
274 Sulphur/unroasted pyrites 1.11 0.00
277 Natural abrasives n.e.s. 0.00 8.07 0.12 133.34
278 Other crude minerals 0.01 1.90 0.77 1.41
281 Iron ore/concentrates 6.31 0.02 0.00
282 Ferrous waste/scrap 0.50 0.05 0.10 0.05
283 Copper ores/concentrates 0.03 0.03
284 Nickel ores/concs/etc. 0.00 0.00
285 Aluminium ores/concs/etc. 2.79 0.00 0.00
287 Base metal ore/concs n.e.s. 0.02 1.78 4.71 0.51
288 Nf base metal waste n.e.s. 4.42 0.12 0.29 0.09
289 Precious metal ore/conc. 0.84 0.00 0.00
291 Crude animal material n.e.s. 0.14 0.46 2.37 0.56
292 Crude veg. materials n.e.s. 0.09 1.92 1.30 1.74
321 Coal non-agglomerated 0.05 0.00
322 Briquettes/lignite/peat 0.03 0.01
325 Coke/semi-coke/retort c 1.18 0.00
333 Petrol/bitumen, oil, crude 0.00 0.00
334 Heavy petrol/bitumen oils 7.75 3.77 1.25 0.00
335 Residual petrol, products 0.03 2.10 1.65 0.00
342 Liquid propane/butane 0.00
343 Natural gas 0.11 0.02 0.00
344 Petrol/hydrocarbon gas 0.22 0.10
345 Coal gas/water gas/etc. 0.00 29.44 0.04
411 Animal oil/fat 0.21 0.00 0.29
421 Fixed veg. oil/fat, soft 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.01
422 Fixed veg. oils not soft 0.03 0.87 0.04 0.53
431 Animal/veg. oils processed 0.00 0.95 10.19 5.25
511 Hydrocarbons/derivatives 2.48 0.00 0.00
512 Alcohols/phenols/derivatives 0.01 1.03 3.99 0.04
513 Carboxylic acid compound 0.00 1.18 0.20 0.00
514 Nitrogen function compounds 0.00 1.34 0.00 0.00
515 Organo-inorganic compounds 0.10 0.44 0.01 0.00
516 Other organic compounds 0.00 6.63 0.01 0.19
522 Elements/oxides/hal salt 2.48 0.80 0.10 0.36
523 Metal salts of inorganic acid 0.00 1.10 0.21 0.01
524 Other inorganic chemicals 0.00 0.17 0.01 0.00
525 Radio-active etc. material 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.10
531 Synth org. colour agents 0.21 7.51 0.24 0.15
532 Dyeing/tanning extracts 0.00 2.11 0.11 0.00
533 Pigments/paints/varnish 0.01 0.40 0.23 0.08
541 Pharmaceuticals excp. medicaments 0.00 0.65 0.16 0.02
542 Medicaments include vet 1.97 1.20 0.21 0.01
551 Essential oil/perfume/flavour 0.00 1.65 0.03 0.65
553 Perfume/toilet/cosmetics 0.06 0.42 0.13 0.17
554 Soaps/cleansers/polishes 0.04 0.53 0.35 0.17
562 Manufactured fertilizers 1.28 0.05 0.00 0.01
571 Primary ethylene polymer 0.00 0.34 0.06 0.0059
572 Styrene primary polymers 0.00 0.49 0.25 0.00
573 Vinyl chloride etc., polymers 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.01
574 Polyacetals/polyesters 0.00 0.97 3.26 0.03
575 Plastic n.e.s. - primary form 0.30 0.42 0.04 0.07
579 Plastic waste/scrap 0.60 0.11 1.97 0.19
581 Plastic tube/pipe/hose 0.03 0.40 0.29 0.03
582 Plastic sheets/film/etc. 0.38 0.58 0.09 0.06
583 Monofilament rods/sticks 0.01 0.21 0.01 0.02
591 Household/garden chemicals 0.00 3.19 0.02 0.09
592 Starches/glues/etc. 0.55 0.88 0.54 0.10
593 Explosives/pyrotechnics 0.00 0.83 0.13 0.00
597 Oil etc additives/fluids 0.00 0.31 0.01 0.02
598 Misc. chemical prods n.e.s. 0.06 0.48 0.08 0.56
611 Leather 83.77 3.17 14.07 0.05
612 Leather manufactures 0.01 3.67 2.44 0.01
613 Furskins tanned/dressed 0.00 0.00 0.00
621 Materials of rubber 0.00 0.54 0.01 0.90
625 Rubber tyres/treads 0.01 1.23 0.04 9.65
629 Articles of rubber n.e.s. 0.03 1.01 0.01 5.23
633 Cork manufactures 0.07 0.00 0.00
634 Veneer/plywood/etc. 0.02 0.15 0.26 1.32
635 Wood manufactures n.e.s. 0.00 0.25 0.15 1.02
641 Paper/paperboard 0.02 0.27 0.12 0.02
642 Cut paper/board/articles 0.24 0.24 0.13 0.45
651 Textile yarn 10.64 5.54 21.27 1.14
652 Cotton fabrics, woven 3.51 3.04 56.41 0.76
653 Man-made woven fabrics 2.55 3.81 6.00 0.36
654 Woven textile fabric n.e.s. 2.89 3.51 0.21 0.50
655 Knit/crochet fabrics 1.81 0.45 2.55 2.32
656 Tulle/lace/embr/trim etc. 0.21 1.85 0.97 2.91
657 Special yarns/fabrics 1.50 0.53 0.66 1.00
658 Made-up textile articles 29.77 4.71 55.69 2.14
659 Floor coverings etc. 0.23 6.43 9.46 0.92
661 Lime/cement/construction materials 0.03 2.65 14.26 0.42
662 Clay/refractory material 0.15 0.42 0.05 0.93
663 Mineral manufactures n.e.s. 0.06 0.50 0.43 0.07
664 Glass 0.13 0.46 0.21 0.12
665 Glassware 0.14 0.83 0.38 0.33
666 Pottery 0.36 0.15 0.18 9.88
667 Pearls/precious stones 0.00 12.73 0.03 9.27
671 Pig iron etc., ferro alloy 3.52 0.28 0.00
672 Primary/prods iron/steel 1.36 0.01 0.00
673 Flat rolled iron/steel products 0.18 1.08 0.01 0.00
674 Rolled plated m-steel 0.37 2.90 0.00 0.03
675 Flat-rolled alloy steel 0.26 0.00 0.00
676 Iron/steel bars/rods/etc. 1.43 0.87 0.06 0.02
677 Iron/steel railway material 0.01 0.23 0.00 0.01
678 Iron/steel wire 0.00 1.81 0.03 0.23
679 Iron/steel pipe/tube/etc. 0.13 2.26 0.49 0.01
681 Silver/platinum etc. 0.00 0.05 0.00
682 Copper 0.11 1.77 0.27 0.38
683 Nickel 0.09 0.00 0.00
684 Aluminium 0.00 0.58 0.00 0.02
685 Lead 0.12 0.56 0.19 2.63
686 Zinc 0.02 3.50 0.02 0.00
687 Tin 0.38 0.00
689 Misc non-ferrous base metal 0.15 0.00 0.00
691 Iron/steel/aluminium structures 0.07 1.06 0.35 0.1660
692 Metal store/transport cont. 0.08 0.56 0.20 0.04
693 Wire products except ins. electr. 0.01 1.76 0.08 0.04
694 Nails/screws/nuts/bolts 0.02 0.88 0.03 0.22
695 Hand/machine tools 0.51 0.86 0.13 0.12
696 Cutlery 0.03 1.02 4.73 0.41
697 Base metal household equipment 0.01 2.13 1.15 0.07
699 Base metal manufac. n.e.s. 0.77 1.11 0.04 0.06
711 Steam generating boilers 0.04 1.75 0.17 0.01
712 Steam/vapour turbines 0.03 0.60 0.00 0.00
713 Internal combust engines 0.08 0.57 0.01 0.01
714 Engines non-electric n.e.s. 0.07 0.16 0.00 0.00
716 Rotating electric plant 0.48 1.17 0.02 0.03
718 Power generating equip. n.e.s. 0.01 0.25 0.01 0.00
721 Agric machine except tractors 0.00 0.16 0.07 0.00
722 Tractors 1.35 0.60 0.00
723 Civil engineering plant 0.14 0.32 0.04 0.04
724 Textile/leather machinery 0.86 0.58 0.44 0.05
725 Paper industry machinery 0.03 0.25 0.03 0.00
726 Printing industry machinery 0.02 0.35 0.06 0.02
727 Food-processing machines 0.01 0.59 1.12 0.08
728 Special industrial machines. 0.27 0.36 0.02 0.01
731 Machine tools remove material 2.14 0.25 0.05 0.00
733 Metal m-tools w/o metal-rmvl 0.01 0.26 0.02 0.03
735 Metal machine tool parts 1.89 0.83 0.01 0.00
737 Metalworking machines n.e.s. 0.01 0.93 0.04 0.00
741 Industrial heat/cool equipment 0.02 0.50 0.07 0.28
742 Pumps for liquids 0.01 0.54 0.03 0.02
743 Fans/filters/gas pumps 0.02 0.49 0.22 0.01
744 Mechanical handling equipment 0.02 0.17 0.01 0.77
745 Non-electr machines n.e.s. 0.47 0.26 0.03 0.24
746 Ball/roller bearings 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.00
747 Taps/cocks/valves 0.02 0.74 0.01 0.01
748 Mechanical transmission equipment 0.04 0.57 0.00 0.00
749 Non-electrical parts/acc., machinery 0.02 0.71 0.02 0.12
751 Office machines 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00
752 Computer equipment 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00
759 Office equipment parts/accessories 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.07
761 Television receivers 0.29 0.07 0.00 0.00
762 Radio broadcast receiver 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00
763 Sound/television recorders etc. 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
764 Telecomms equipment n.e.s. 1.01 0.12 0.08 0.11
771 Elect power transmission equip. 0.04 1.13 0.07 1.19
772 Electric circuit equipment 0.08 0.46 0.01 0.88
773 Electrical distribution equipment 0.05 0.66 0.04 1.08
774 Medical etc., elec. diag. equipment 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.00
775 Domestic equipment 0.00 0.19 0.09 0.00
776 Valves/transistors etc. 0.01 0.13 0.00 0.02
778 Electrical equipment n.e.s. 0.02 0.31 0.05 0.14
781 Passenger cars etc. 0.00 0.30 0.01 0.00
782 Goods/service vehicles 0.04 0.23 0.01 0.02
783 Road motor vehicles n.e.s. 0.00 0.51 0.04 0.00
784 Motor vehicle parts/accessories 0.18 0.48 0.04 0.11
785 Motorcycles/cycles etc. 1.62 1.36 0.09 1.42
786 Trailers/caravans etc. 0.24 0.06 0.02 0.88
791 Railway vehicles, equipment 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00
792 Aircraft/spacecraft etc. 0.16 0.58 0.00 0.03
793 Ships/boats etc. 0.75 2.04 0.07 0.37
811 Prefabricated buildings 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.1761
812 Sanitary/plumbing/heat fixtures 0.02 0.29 0.55 0.01
813 Lighting fixtures etc. 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.02
821 Furniture/stuff furnishing 0.16 0.30 0.31 0.43
831 Trunks and cases 0.16 1.85 0.29 0.27
841 Men’s/boys’ wear, woven 45.82 2.44 11.47 15.20
842 Women/girl clothing woven 60.55 3.85 4.12 21.09
843 Men/boy wear knit/crocheted 17.34 3.32 29.02 17.39
844 Women/girl wear knit/crocheted 6.13 2.29 5.03 31.51
845 Articles of apparel n.e.s. 186.06 1.94 3.23 15.89
846 Clothing accessories 0.77 2.42 12.51 13.98
848 Headgear/non-textile clothing 0.92 2.63 21.29 12.00
851 Footwear 1.97 1.57 1.21 0.48
871 Optical instruments n.e.s. 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.52
872 Medical/etc. instruments 0.12 0.21 2.61 0.00
873 Meters and counters n.e.s. 0.00 0.37 0.01 0.00
874 Measure/control appliances n.e.s. 0.61 0.21 0.01 0.24
881 Photographic equipment 0.02 0.38 0.00 0.00
882 Photographic supplies 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.00
883 Cine-film developed 2.26 0.00 0.00
884 Optical fibres 0.75 0.21 0.00 0.00
885 Watches and clocks 0.03 0.13 0.00 0.02
891 Arms and ammunition 0.00 0.32 0.51 0.00
892 Printed matter 0.55 0.36 0.05 1.97
893 Articles n.e.s. of plastics 0.44 0.54 0.38 0.67
894 Baby carriages/toys/games/sports 1.39 0.14 2.64 0.86
895 Office/stationery supplies 0.00 0.92 0.24 0.03
896 Art/collections/antiques 0.12 1.42 0.01 0.03
897 Jewellery 0.01 6.82 3.01 0.98
898 Musical instruments/records 0.00 0.17 0.06 0.02
899 Misc. manufactured articles n.e.s. 0.51 0.51 1.15
961 Coins, non-gold, non-current 0.40 3.62
971 Gold, non-monetary except ore 0.01 0.00 0.00
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Comtrade, WITS.62
Annex 4.  Intra-industry trade indices of South Asian countries
*
Annex table 1. Intra-industry trade of India with Bangladesh






1 522 Elements/oxides/hal salt 21 671.5 41 657.0 63 328.6 0.68 0.97
2 655 Knit/crochet fabrics 9 255.5 3 732.5 12 987.9 0.57 0.70
3 611 Leather 4 084.9 6 927.8 11 012.7 0.74 0.78
4 288 Nf base metal waste n.e.s. 2 500.7 3 578.8 6 079.5 0.82
5 554 Soaps/cleansers/polishes 3 563.7 1 879.1 5 442.8 0.69 0.69
6 654 Woven textile fabric n.e.s. 1 404.8 2 810.5 4 215.3 0.67 0.28
7 764 Telecomms equipment n.e.s. 1 640.5 1 963.5 3 604.0 0.91 0.68
8 841 Men/boys’ wear, woven 1 362.4 2 196.6 3 558.9 0.77 0.96
9 657 Special yarns/fabrics 1 691.0 1 287.3 2 978.3 0.86 0.93
10 665 Glassware 2 106.6 857.0 2 963.6 0.58
Annex table 2. Intra-industry trade of India with Pakistan
S.
No.






1 334 Heavy petrol/bitumen oils 124 538.0 154 008.0 278 546.6 0.89
2 651 Textile yarn 8 419.9 8 858.1 17 277.9 0.97 0.98
3 513 Carboxylic acid compound 5 068.9 5 233.5 10 302.4 0.98 0.00
4 893 Articles n.e.s. of plastics 1 475.6 3 287.3 4 762.8 0.62 0.37
5 278 Other crude minerals 928.5 1 508.3 2 436.8 0.76 0.04
6 657 Special yarns/fabrics 454.5 940.3 1 394.8 0.65 0.43
7 656 Tulle/lace/embr/trim etc. 787.4 331.5 1 118.9 0.59 0.59
8 894 Baby
carriages/toys/games/sports
659 266.7 925.8 0.58
9 574 Polyacetals/polyesters 596.7 278.7 875.3 0.64
10 659 Floor coverings etc. 237.2 574.7 812.0 0.58 0.57
Annex table 3. Intra-industry trade of India with Sri Lanka






1 075 Spices 43 650.6 54 408.0 98 058.6 0.89 0.85
2 081 Animal feed exc. unml
cer.
49 926.2 33 888.6 83 814.7 0.81
0.90
3 625 Rubber tyres/treads 12 482.0 9 329.8 21 811.8 0.86 0.99
4 661 Lime/cement/construction
materials
5 154.7 6 348.0 11 502.7 0.9
0.00
5 656 Tulle/lace/embr/trim etc. 4 415.8 2 980.4 7 396.2 0.81 0.90
6 634 Veneer/plywood/etc. 3 225.0 3 385.4 6 610.4 0.98 0.84
7 642 Cut paper/board/articles 2 739.5 3 177.7 5 917.2 0.93 0.00
8 658 Made-up textile articles 3 119.5 2 505.0 5 624.5 0.89
9 665 Glassware 1 997.6 2 852.1 4 849.8 0.82 0.53
10 771 Elect. power transm equip. 1 780.8 1 340.4 3 121.1 0.86 0.97
______________________63
* Source: For all tables in annex 4, author’s calculations, based on data from Comtrade and WITS.
Annex table 4. Intra-industry trade of Pakistan with Bangladesh






1 658 Made-up textile articles 366.7 1 161.4 1 528.1 0.48 0.00
2 075 Spices 128.3 868.4 996.6 0.26
3 292 Crude veg. materials n.e.s. 195.7 748.1 943.9 0.41 0.00
4 716 Rotating electric plant 427.0 80.8 507.7 0.32 0.65
5 575 Plastic n.e.s. - primary form 388.2 46.0 434.2 0.21
6 893 Articles n.e.s. of plastic 341.0 43.9 384.9 0.23 0.00
7 699 Base metal manufac. n.e.s. 230.6 68.9 299.5 0.46
8 845 Articles of apparel n.e.s. 27.6 230.9 258.5 0.21
9 727 Food-processing machines 150.4 94.5 244.9 0.77
10 848 Headgear/non-textile clothing 28.9 207.4 236.3 0.24 0.16
Annex table 5. Intra-industry trade of Pakistan with Sri Lanka






1 278 Other crude minerals 342.9 907.2 1 250.1 0.55 0.70
2 522 Elements/oxides/hal salt 600.3 242.9 843.1 0.58
3 598 Misc chemical prods n.e.s. 227.7 115.8 343.5 0.67 0.67
4 657 Special yarns/fabrics 207.8 77.5 285.3 0.54 0.00
5 773 Electrical distrib equipment 50.7 68.1 118.8 0.85
6 899 Misc. manuf. articles n.e.s. 43.7 71.5 115.2 0.76 0.00
7 848 Headgear/non-textile clothing 41.4 72.9 114.3 0.72 0.00
8 699 Base metal manufac. n.e.s. 53.1 23.0 76.1 0.6
9 663 Mineral manufactures n.e.s. 27.8 44.3 72.1 0.77
10 778 Electrical equipment n.e.s. 43.9 17.0 60.9 0.56 0.60
Annex table 6. Intra-industry trade of Sri Lanka with Bangladesh






1 652 Cotton fabrics, woven 4 118.3 494.5 4 612.8 0.21 0.38
2 848 Headgear/non-text clothing 2 024.5 235.8 2 260.3 0.21 0.23
3 656 Tulle/lace/embr/trim etc. 1 447.3 126.3 1 573.6 0.16 0.16
4 651 Textile yarn 396.3 1 051.9 1 448.2 0.55 0.22
5 893 Articles n.e.s. of plastic 836.4 142.0 978.4 0.29 0.31
6 075 Spices 136.6 232.3 368.9 0.74
7 642 Cut paper/board/articles 188.0 70.9 258.9 0.55 0.54
8 892 Printed matter 122.1 102.5 224.6 0.91
9 657 Special yarns/fabrics 157.4 59.3 216.7 0.55 0.00
10 653 Man-made woven fabrics 167.9 11.76 179.7 0.13 0.7364
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IV. European Union-India bilateral free trade agreement:
Potential implications for the excluded low-income
economies in Asia and Africa
By Selim Raihan
Introduction
Since the beginning of the 1990s the world has witnessed ambitious multilateral
trade negotiations together with a proliferation of regional trading blocs. With the inception
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 as an institution to oversee the multilateral
trading system and promotion of trade, many people thought that multilateralism would
eventually  reduce  the  scope  of  regionalism.  Nevertheless,  since  1995,  the  number  of
regional  trade  agreements  (RTAs)  has  increased  from  less  than  150  to  more  than  250.
Today,  the  quantum  of  global  trade  conducted  through  RTAs  and  preferential  trade
agreements (PTAs) is more than 50 per cent of total trade flows.
It  is  somewhat  paradoxical  that  despite  the  demonstrated  benefits  of  unilateral
liberalization in the academic literature, bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) and RTAs
have proliferated. The proponents of regionalism consider RTAs as “building blocks” to
multilateralism, while the opponents perceive them as “stumbling blocks” to worldwide free
trade. Given that the progress on various multilateral trade negotiations is very slow, the
emergence of RTAs has been seen by many as a preferred and feasible route to push an
aggressive trade liberalization agenda bypassing WTO. Concerns have also been expressed
that rising bilateralism can actually weaken the interest of poor and vulnerable developing
countries, as these countries have to make much greater commitments to opening up and
implementing reforms under RTAs than under multilateral agreements.
Given the very nature of the bilateral/regional deals, they are discriminatory. Under
such arrangements member countries exchange trade concessions to improve their relative
competitiveness in their regional market over the rest of the world suppliers. Almost always,
the  excluded  countries  that  are  subject  to  such  discrimination  include  least  developed
countries  (LDCs)  and  other  low-income  developing  countries.  By  undermining
competitiveness, discriminatory preferences may cause terms of trade shocks to suppliers
from non-member countries, leading to adverse trade and welfare implications. Even when
some poorer countries enjoy non-reciprocal trade concessions in the form of reduced tariffs
or relaxed quantitative restrictions under various schemes, such as the Generalized System
of Preferences, the formation and/or expansion of RTAs involving the preference donor
countries  will  result  in  loss  of  preference  for  the  traditionally  preference-dependent
countries.67
From the above perspectives, the ongoing European Union-India FTA negotiations
have  attracted  much  attention  among  trade  policymakers.  In  contrast  to  most  of  the
developing economies, India is regarded as a country with significant supply side capacity.
This means that in response to any meaningful trade concessions resulting from a bilateral
deal,  Indian  suppliers  can  substantially  increase  their  exports  to  the  European  Union,
perhaps at the cost of other developing countries and European Union domestic suppliers. In
this way, the likely trade diversion in the European Union may result in reduced imports
from other developing and least developed countries and increased imports from India. On
the other hand, India’s tariff protection on a range of products is relatively high. Therefore,
taking advantage of exchanged tariff concessions under the FTA, European Union suppliers
may  replace  India’s  imports  from  other  sources,  resulting  in  trade  diversion  for  India.
Consequently, the overall welfare gains for India will depend on the relatively strength of
the trade creation and trade diversion impacts.
Turning to its potential implications for other excluded developing countries, since
the European Union has been one of the principal export destinations for most LDCs and
other  low-income  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific  (ACP) countries  many  of  which  also
receive significant trade preferences extension of similar preferences to India might result in
their loss of competitiveness. Furthermore, a number of South Asian countries have now
negotiated bilateral and regional FTAs with India; for these countries, a European Union-
India  FTA  could  very  well mean  competing  with  European  Union  suppliers  in  India’s
market.  A  European  Union-India  FTA would also  have  trade  consequences  for  other
developing country suppliers in the European Union as well as the Indian market.
Against the above backdrop, this chapter undertakes a comprehensive assessment of
the potential implications of the European Union-India FTA for India as well for various
other  low-income  developing  countries  in  Asia  and  Africa.  Such  an  analysis  provides
important information on, and insights into bilateral trade patterns of developing countries
involving the European Union and India. In fact, it helps in identifying the scope of loss of
competitiveness for the excluded developing countries and the countries that are already
enjoying trade preferences in the European Union. In addition, the analysis will be useful to
policymakers in developing countries by providing them with important information, and by
identifying a set of measures that can be of help to those countries.
Section  A  of  this chapter  describes  the  methodology  of  the  research.  Section  B
presents  an  analysis  of  the  theoretical  and  empirical  perspectives  of  RTAs.  Section  C
provides a background to the proposed European Union-India FTA while section D presents
a summary of the empirical studies on the FTA. Section E analyses the structure of the
excluded  low-income  economies  in  Asia  and  Africa  and  section F  compares  the  trade
similarity of those excluded low-income economies with the European Union and India.
Section G calculates the margins of preferences in the European Union and Indian markets.
Section H contains a brief overview of the GTAP model. Section I presents the simulation
results and section J provides the conclusion.
A. Methodology
The study described in this chapter used global databases and a suitable general
equilibrium method to meet its specific objectives.  Trade issues, by their nature, require an
analytical  framework  that  allows  a  holistic  view  of  world  economies.  This  is  not  only68
because of interlinkages between various sectors in any given economy, but also because of
relationships between sectors in one economy with the rest of the world. These national,
regional and global linkages may occur either in inputs or products markets or, as is usually
the case, in both. Therefore, in order to avoid ignoring these linkages, a general equilibrium
methodology such as one using the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model is one of
the analytical instruments used in the study.
The  global  computable  general  equilibrium  (CGE)  modelling  framework  of  the
Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) is the best possible way for carrying out an ex ante
analysis of economic and trade consequences of multilateral or bilateral trade agreements.
The GTAP model is a comparative static model and uses a common global database for the
CGE analysis. Version 7 of the GTAP database, the base year of which is 2004, was used in
the analysis. The GTAP database was updated to 2008 by incorporating different changes in
global trade scenarios that occurred during 2004 and 2008.
B. Regional trade agreements: Theoretical and empirical perspectives
Trade theory and evidence suggest that there are several forms of RTAs,
1 which
include:  (a) the  Preferential  Trade  Area  (PTA),  where  tariffs  are  lowered  among  the
members but maintained against the outside world; (b) the FTA, where tariffs are removed
among members but maintained against the outside world; (c) the Customs Union, where all
tariffs among the members are eliminated, while external tariffs are adjusted to a common
level; (d) a Common Market, which is a Customs Union plus free movement of factors of
production among the member countries; and (e) an Economic Union which is a Customs
Union plus common economic laws for the member countries (i.e., the European Union).
In trade theory, the welfare effects of any RTA are analysed, using two concepts:
trade  creation  and  trade  diversion  (see  box).  The  overall  welfare  effects  of  economic
integration  are  ambiguous  and  require  a  case-by-case  judgment.  The  reason  is  that
integration is both a policy of protection and a move towards free trade. The effect of the
protectionist element of integration is called trade diversion, and the effect of the trade
liberalisation element is called trade creation. The overall effect of an RTA on welfare for a
member country is determined by comparing the trade creation and trade diversion effects.
If trade creation dominates, the formation of an RTA will enhance welfare. On the contrary,
if the trade diversion effect is greater than the trade creation effect, the RTA will lead to a
welfare loss for the country under consideration.
2
1 For a general survey of the theory of preferential trading arrangements, see Panagariya, 2000.
2 If member countries are low-cost producers of the traded good, there will be no trade diversion effect and
integration will unambiguously increase welfare.69
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 Case :  If  A  imposes  a  tariff  of  100  per  cent  on  both  B  and  C,  only  A’s  own
producers will be in A’s domestic market.
 Case : If A imposes a tariff of 50 per cent on both B and C, only C will be the
supplying country in A’s market.
 Case : If A forms a FTA with B, but retains the 50 per cent duty on C, B will be the
supplying country in A.
If   was the initial condition,  moving to   will be considered as trade creation,
welfare enhancing for A.
If   was the initial condition, moving to   is an example of trade diversion with
adverse consequences on welfare of A.
The fundamental arguments for regionalism rest on the evidence that suggests RTAs
are predominantly trade-creating (Rodriguez-Delgado, 2007). Krugman (1991) argued that
most RTAs were likely to entail relatively low welfare losses resulting from trade diversion,
since the countries involved were often geographical neighbours and hence already engaged
in a sizable amount of trade. He also argued that, through RTAs, countries could “lock-in”
reform, which was often politically not feasible under multilateralism. Whalley (1996), for
example, asserted that a desire for increased credibility of domestic reforms was a central
preoccupation behind the Mexican negotiating position on the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA). Also, failure or stalemate of the multilateral trade talks means trade
liberalization can only take place through RTAs. Countries can build on the progress of
regionalism and can ultimately move toward a freer trade regime on the whole.
There are, however, some critical arguments against formation of any RTA. It is
alleged that through an RTA the spirit of multilateralism is undermined. It is argued that the
world might be divided into a few protectionist blocs, and protectionists might accept RTAs
in order to oppose further multilateral liberalization. Therefore, RTAs  might work as  a
stumbling block rather than building blocks for multilateralism. Also, the “spaghetti bowl”
effect can emerge because of many complicated simultaneous RTA negotiations (Bhagawati
and Panagariya, 1996). RTAs also discriminate against the non-member countries, and even
LDCs could seriously be discriminated against due to the RTAs among the developed and
developing  countries.  NAFTA  is  a  good  example  in  this  regard,  and  it  is  argued  that
because  of  NAFTA,  LDCs  such  as  Bangladesh  have  been  discriminated  against  while
Mexico has been favoured in the United States market  (Razzaque, 2005). Furthermore,
RTAs distort resource allocation, favouring regional producers to the potential detriment of
local consumers (Rodriguez-Delgado, 2007). Recent research on RTAs has also emphasized
the global consequences of multiple and overlapping RTAs in terms of the transaction costs
they impose. It is further suggested that resources in trade ministries are limited. Therefore,
too  much  involvement  in  RTA  negotiations  may  distract  attention  from  multilateral
liberalization.
There  are  also  concerns  that  through  an  RTA  (reducing  tariffs  for  the  member
countries) the prices of goods imported from the member countries in the domestic market
might not fall as the member countries might see the home country’s market as a “captive70
market” for their exporters.  For example, it is often alleged by the critics of the South
Asian  Free  Trade  Agreement  (SAFTA)  that  through  this  regional  trading  arrangement,
Indian exporters may  find a “captive market” for their exporters in Bangladesh (World
Bank, 2006). As a result, even though Bangladesh reduces the tariffs for Indian products,
the prices of those products may not fall in Bangladesh as the Indian exporters will have the
“freedom” to raise prices to the level at which the products from the rest of the world are
sold in Bangladesh (with higher tariffs).
In general, there are some agreements among economists about the pre-conditions
for home country welfare expansion from an RTA. For example, the home country could
gain if: (a) the home country’s tariffs are at a high level prior to the agreement; (b) the
contemplated partner has a high tariff level; (c) the partner has a high economic size; (d)
there is a high share of the partner in providing the home country’s imports; (e) there is a
low ratio of imports from the rest of the world to the home country’s aggregate economic
activity; (f) relative prices in the partner’s economy are close to those of the rest of the
world; and (g) there are similarities in the economic activities of the partner with the rest of
the world.
C. Background of the proposed European Union-India FTA
Both  the  European  Union  and  India  have  mutual  interests  in  pursuing  greater
cooperation in trade. The European Commission launched its new trade policy, “Global
Europe – Competing in the World” with a view to connecting external trade policies to the
European Union’s internal trade policies for creating a single market through an agenda of
progressive liberalization and deregulation. The failure of multilateral trade talks with the
stalemate at WTO actually opened the door for a new generation of bilateral agreements on
trade and investments. In order to achieve the objective of “competitiveness of European
corporations”, the European Union planned to aggressively advance issues that could not be
advanced in multilateral talks. The top priority of the plan was to gain a hold in the potential
markets and the so-called “new areas of growth”. The mandates authorizing the European
Commission to negotiate the new FTAs comprise five building blocks:
(a) Market access for European business due to the elimination of tariff and non-
tariff barriers;
(b) The  so-called  Singapore  issues  (investment,  government  procurement,
competition  and  trade  facilitation),  which  were  rejected  at  Cancun  by
governments of the South;
(c) Intellectual property rights (IPR);
(d) The service sector which is a stronghold of the European Union economy; and
(e) A  reference  to  sustainable  development,  including  rhetoric  about  social  and
environmental standards, core labour rights and decent work.
The criteria for the selection of new partners for those competitiveness-driven FTAs
are: (a) market potential and size; and (b) a high level of protection against European Union
exports and investors. India is considered as a top priority on this list. On the other hand, in
line with its new export-oriented development path, India also sees the opening of markets
as a mutual interest. It has a keen interest in access to the European Union market, as
Europe is  India’s biggest market, and the top export market for its 10 biggest exports.
European Union-India trade rose from € 28 billion in 2003 to € 55 billion in 2007, pushing71
the two to start negotiations on a bilateral trade agreement in 2007. Figure 1 suggests that,
despite the fact that the share of India’s exports to the European Union in its total exports
had declined over time, its share remained well above 20 per cent in 2007.


















































































Source: Calculated based on data accessed from Direction of Trade (CD-ROM), International
Monetary Fund, 2008.
However, it appears from figure 2 that exports from India to the European Union
increased quite considerably over time. In 1990, the export value increased from US$ 6,252
million in 1990 to US$ 35,517 million in 2007. Also, the share of India’s exports to the
European Union’s total imports increased during this period. In 1990, this share was 0.4 per
cent, which increased to 0.66 per cent in 2007.





























































































Source: Calculated based on data accessed from Direction of Trade (CD-ROM), International
Monetary Fund, 2008.72
On  the  other  hand,  an  increasing  trend  is  observed  in  figure  3  in  the  share  of
European Union exports to India in total European Union exports. In 1990 the share was
0.06 per cent, increasing to 0.08 per cent in 2007.










































































































































Source: Calculated based on data accessed from Direction of Trade (CD-ROM), International Monetary
Fund, 2008.
The European Union’s exports to India increased substantially during the 2000s. In
2000, they totalled US$ 10,690 million, increasing to US$ 44,020 million in 2007. However,
despite the fact that the share of imports from the European Union in India’s total imports
declined over time, in 2007 the share was still as high as 17.6 per cent.
































































































Source: Calculated based on data accessed from Direction of Trade CD-ROM, International Monetary
Fund, 2008.
A European Union-India summit held in 2005 generated political commitment to
increasing bilateral trade and economic cooperation, and to dealing with barriers to trade73
and investment between the two trading partners. A High-Level Trade Group comprising
government representatives and business leaders was formed to explore or submit a report
on (a) how to widen bilateral trade and investment and (b) the possibility of reaching a
bilateral trade and investment agreement. On 13 October 2006, the Group submitted its
report, which recommended the elimination of duties on 90 per cent of tariff lines and trade
volumes within seven years, and other partial liberalization milestones.
As of 4 February 2009, five rounds of negotiations have been held. Specific areas to
be  covered  by  the  FTA  include  trade  in  goods,  trade  in  services,  investments,  trade
facilitations,  public  procurement,  technical  regulations,  intellectual  property  rights  and
geographical indication, competition policy and dispute settlement.
Market access for goods remains the core component of any FTA. The European
Union pushed hard for the elimination of duties on 90 per cent of tariff lines and tariff
volume over seven years by both India and the European Union (for India, 90 per cent
represents about 4,500 lines out of 5,000). However, India advocated an asymmetrical deal
in which the European Union would eliminate 95 per cent of tariffs, leaving India at the 90
per cent level, reflecting the massive difference in the levels of development between the
parties. In the initial proposal, the European Union’s exclusion list included 226 products,
mostly  chemicals,  petrochemicals,  plastics,  ceramics  and  glassware.  On  the  other  hand,
India proposed an exclusion list of about 150 agricultural goods and 250 manufactured
products. The agricultural goods included processed food, dairy products, sugar, fruit and
vegetables,  meat  products  including  poultry,  maize,  honey,  mushrooms,  egg  products,
saffron, coriander seeds, vanaspati and cocoa powder. The manufactured goods included
some  textiles  and  clothing  (i.e.,  woollens)  textile  machinery,  rubber,  cars,  commercial
vehicles  and  two-wheelers,  paper  and  paper  board,  furniture,  chemicals,  machinery  and
appliances, fish and fish products, and wines and spirits (ActionAid, 2008). However, there
has not been any further agreement on this issue.
D. Empirical studies of European Union-India FTA
There have been few studies so far on the proposed European Union-India FTA.
ActionAid (2008) suggested that India had average applied most-favoured nation tariffs on
goods of 16 per cent, with very high tariff peaks (up to 160 per cent) on a relatively small
list of goods. This, coupled with the relatively small (25 per cent, excluding petroleum
products) and declining European Union market share (from more than 40 per cent in the
early 1990s) and the low overlap in production structures between the European Union and
India, suggests that there is considerable scope for trade diversion for India. This would
imply an increase in India’s imports from the European Union, but at the expense of more
efficient suppliers from third countries. For the European Union, India’s share in imports
and exports is around 1.5 per cent with some increase during the past decade. The low share
of trade with the European Union, coupled with the low tariffs applied by the European
Union on Indian exports (although with a higher incidence of tariff peaks), suggest that
there is little scope for trade creation and, again, greater likelihood of trade diversion.
Meincke (2008) indicated that far-reaching tariff elimination and liberalization of
government  procurement  could  have  negative  effects  on  the  most  vulnerable  and
marginalized groups in Indian society, and hamper rather than foster human development.74
Achterbosch and others (2008) suggested that India had little to gain and much to
lose  from  a  free  trade  agreement  with  the  European  Union  if  it  merely  involved  tariff
reduction in trade with the European Union.
The results from a CGE study done by Polaski and others (2008) suggest that Indian
exports would increase by US$ 3.5 billion (5.5 per cent) and India’s imports would increase
by $2.6 billion (3.4 per cent). Because the overall increase in imports would be less than the
increase in exports, India’s existing bilateral trade deficit with the European Union would
narrow. Overall, India would experience a very small welfare loss (minus US$ 250 million).
In  contrast,  the  European  Union  would  benefit  unambiguously  from  the  agreement,
although to a very modest extent. Exports would increase by US$ 1.3 billion, a gain of 0.05
per cent in the share of total European exports. Imports would increase by US$ 3.2 billion
(0.12 per cent). Europe’s existing bilateral trade surplus with India would decrease.
In a CGE study by CEPII-CIREM (2007) on a potential European Union-India FTA,
two scenarios were simulated. While they are identical with regard to protection in goods
(95 per cent of tariffs are removed on both sides), the difference lies in the treatment of
services. In the first scenario, protection in services is cut by 10 per cent, while in the
second scenario a 25 per cent cut is considered. In both scenarios, the tariff dismantling
begins in 2007 and is fully implemented in 2013, with a shorter transition period for the
European Union. The impact of trade liberalization on foreign direct investment is taken
into account in the simulations. European Union exports to India increase in all services
sectors  and  in  both  scenarios.  Overall,  they  increase  by  5  per  cent  and  16  per  cent  in
scenarios  1  and  2,  respectively  (plus  US$  500  million  and  plus  US$  1.6  billion,
respectively).  Conversely,  India  increases  its  export  of  services  in  all  sectors,  in  both
scenarios. This emanates from the overall gain in competitiveness of the Indian economy
due  to  depreciation  of  the  real  exchange  rate.  Overall,  total  Indian  exports  of  services
increase by US$ 600 million following scenario 1 and US$ 1.2 billion in scenario 2 (+3.3
per cent and +6.5 per cent, respectively).
The most comprehensive study so far, undertaken by Winters and others (2009),
used  a  “Sussex  framework”  for  the  analysis.  It  concluded  that  the  dissimilarities  of
composition of export structures between the partners’ exports to each other, and excluded
countries’ exports to them, suggested that the scope for negative effects arising from the
European Union-India FTA would be relatively limited. The South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries would be by far the most vulnerable to negative
impacts from the FTA. Other developing countries such as Brazil and China as well as the
Russian  Federation  would  generally  experience  trade  diversion  rather  than  trade
reorientation  in  the  European  Union  market,  especially  in  manufacturing.  In  the  Indian
market, such countries would suffer considerable competitive pressures from the improved
access for the European Union, but since they trade little with India, it would not be of great
significance in aggregate. ACP countries would mainly suffer from trade reorientation as
India receives preferences from the European Union as deep as their own. However, the
methodology adopted in the study was partial equilibrium in general and hence could not
take into consideration the general equilibrium effects of this FTA deal. Also, the study
does not attempt to estimate the welfare impacts on those countries.75
E. Structure of the excluded low-income economies
This  section  presents  the  analysis  of  the  export  structure  of  the  countries  under
consideration, and protection in India and European Union. Understanding these structures
is a very important starting point for the examination of the potential implications of the
proposed  FTA  for  these  countries.  The  source  of  information  was  the  GTAP  database
version 7.
1. Structure of exports
Table 1 presents the figures for the export structure for the low-income countries
under consideration. It appears that for most of the African countries, agricultural and agro-
processing commodities are the main export items. In many of those countries, industries
have low shares in the export earnings. In contrast, most of Asian countries, especially those
in South Asia, are the exporters of skilled-labour manufactured products. These features of
the export structure of the African and South Asian countries have been well explained by
Table 1. Structure of exports (sectoral shares in total exports)
BGD PAK LKA XSA KHM LAO NGA SEN ETH MDG MWI MUS MOZ TZA UGA ZMB BWA
Paddy rice 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Wheat 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cereal grains 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 1.4 0.7 1.8 0.1
Vegetables 0.2 1.0 1.1 2.3 0.4 0.8 0.1 1.9 3.3 3.7 2.6 0.1 1.6 5.1 1.7 1.6 0.0
Oil seeds 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 5.5 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.6 1.4 0.3 1.6 0.0
Sugar cane 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
Plant-based fibres 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.1 1.6 0.7 0.5 3.0 0.0 1.2 3.8 1.6 5.5 0.0
Crops, nec 0.4 0.3 7.9 1.4 0.1 2.6 0.9 0.2 14.6 8.8 39.2 0.1 3.7 10.6 16.6 4.5 0.0
Livestock 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Animal products 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.6 2.5 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.1 1.2 0.7 0.3 0.2
Raw milk 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Wool 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Forestry 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.0 0.1 4.9 0.1 0.3 2.0 0.7 0.1 0.0 1.3 2.7 0.2 0.2 0.1
Fisheries 0.3 0.1 0.7 1.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0
Coal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Oil 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.8 0.9 3.1 80.8 0.0 0.0 21.1 24.6 15.1 0.0 0.0 39.3 0.0 0.0
Gas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Minerals 0.0 0.3 1.0 0.3 0.0 0.8 0.2 2.2 0.3 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.9 6.1 0.1 3.6 65.8
Meat 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.5
Meat products 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.2
Vegetable oils and fat 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.1 0.0
Dairy products 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
Processed rice 0.0 3.7 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Sugar 0.1 0.8 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.6 9.4 9.3 1.0 0.8 0.1 1.7 0.0
Food products 4.0 1.6 6.5 3.6 1.4 0.8 0.4 16.1 2.4 12.1 0.3 3.5 5.7 11.9 9.6 0.9 0.7
Beverages and tobacco 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.7 0.0 1.4 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 1.4 0.3 0.1 0.2
Textiles 33.0 43.4 9.2 9.5 19.5 9.6 0.2 0.9 1.4 11.8 1.7 15.7 0.3 3.3 1.4 1.7 1.4
Wearing apparel 43.0 14.8 32.1 9.4 48.8 17.7 0.0 0.2 1.1 14.4 6.1 11.0 0.1 2.1 0.3 0.1 1.2
Leather products 3.4 2.5 0.6 0.6 5.0 1.0 0.6 0.5 2.4 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1
Wood products 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.4 1.4 18.6 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.8 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.1
Paper products 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.1 2.0 1.9 0.7 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.2
Petroleum products 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.0 0.7 2.3 0.3 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0
Chemical rubber, plastic 1.4 2.3 7.1 4.2 2.0 0.8 0.3 20.4 0.5 0.5 1.4 2.1 0.5 1.6 1.1 2.0 1.0
Mineral products 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.8 0.2 0.6 0.0
Ferrous metals 0.2 0.3 0.3 3.2 0.2 0.3 0.0 1.6 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.9 0.3 0.1
Metals 0.1 0.4 2.0 1.3 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.8 5.8 0.1 0.2 0.1 51.9 9.5 5.0 66.4 6.4
Metal products 0.1 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.5
Motor vehicles and parts 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 2.7
Transport equipment 0.3 1.9 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.3
Electronic equipment 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.6 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1
Machinery and equipment 0.7 1.7 3.2 0.6 0.2 1.1 0.3 2.1 0.3 0.5 0.5 2.8 0.3 0.6 0.6 1.0 1.1
Other manufactures 0.2 2.6 4.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.2 3.1 0.0 1.1 0.4 0.2 0.7
Services 10.9 17.3 17.8 42.9 16.3 29.6 8.6 34.4 51.6 18.6 5.5 31.5 28.8 30.0 15.9 4.0 15.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Tables 1 and 2 calculated from version 7 of the GTAP Database.76
Wood and Mayer (1999), and Mayer and Wood (2000), who argued that the concentration
by African countries on exports of unprocessed primary products was caused largely by the
region’s combination of low levels of education and abundant natural resources. On the
other  hand,  they  suggested  that  the  export  structure  of  the  South  Asian  countries  was
explained by their relative abundance of low-skilled labour.
2. Importance of European Union and Indian markets for exports
Table 2 lists the shares of the countries under consideration in European Union
imports of various products in 2004. It appears that Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka had
notable  shares  in  the  European  Union’s  imports  of  textiles  and  wearing  apparel.  For
example, Bangladesh had a 2.8 per cent and 2.9 per cent share in European Union imports
of textiles and wearing apparel. In contrast, some African countries had reasonable shares in
European  Union  imports  of  agricultural  and  agro-processing  products.  For  example,
Tanzania had a 12.4 per cent share of European Union imports of sugar. However, for most
of the products, these low-income countries had either very low or negligible shares.
Table 2. Shares in total imports by the European Union, 2004
BGD PAK LKA XSA KHM LAO NGA SEN ETH MDG MWI MUS MOZ TZA UGA ZMB BWA
Paddy rice 0.2 8.7 0.1 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0
Wheat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cereal grains 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0
Vegetables 0 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0 0 0 0.1 0 0.1 0
Oil seeds 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sugarcane 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0.4 0.2 0 0 0 0 12.4 0 0 0
Plant-based fibres 0.2 0.2 0.7 0 0 0.1 0 0.2 0 0.4 0 0 0.7 0.7 0.4 0 0
Crops nec 0 0 0.7 0 0 0 1.3 0 0.6 0.3 0.7 0 0.1 0.6 1 0.3 0
Livestock 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Animal products 0 0.3 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0.3 0 0 0.1 0 0.1 0 0 0
Raw milk 0 0.9 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0
Wool 0 0 0 1.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Forestry 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 0 0.2 0.1 0 0.1 0 0 0 0.4 0 0 0
Fisheries 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0.9 0 0.1 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0
Coal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oil 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 2.4 0 0 0.1 0 0.1 0 0 0.1 0 0
Gas 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Minerals 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 6.6
Meat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4
Meat products 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Vegetable oils and fats 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dairy products 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Processed rice 0.1 2.1 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.2 0 0.1 0 0.1 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0
Sugar 0.1 2.3 0 0.3 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.3 0.7 8.6 0.3 0.4 0 0.3 0
Food products 0.2 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0 0.2 0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0 0
Beverages and tobacco 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Textiles 2.8 2.2 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.1 0 0 0 0.1 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0
Wearing apparel 2.9 1.5 1.1 0 0.4 0.1 0 0 0 0.1 0 0.3 0 0 0 0 0
Leather products 0.4 0.4 0.1 0 0.2 0 0.4 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wood products 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Paper products 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Petroleum products 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chemical rubber, plastic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mineral products 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ferrous metals 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Metals 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.3 0 0 0.1 0
Metal products 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Motor vehicles and parts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Transport equipment 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Electronic equipment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Machinery and equipment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other manufactures 0 0.4 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0
Services 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 077
In the Indian market, Sri Lanka and the rest of South Asia had notable shares in
India’s imports of a number of commodities (table 3). Although Bangladesh had either zero
or very low shares in most of the commodities, in the case of fishing it had a 49 per cent
share of the total imports. Some African countries had reasonable shares in agricultural,
agro-processing and mineral products. For example, Nigeria had a share of more than 28 per
cent in India’s imports of oil while Tanzania had a share of almost 24 per cent in India’s
imports of sugar cane. However, for most of the products, these low-income countries had
either very low or zero shares.
Table 3. Shares in total imports by India, 2004
BGD PAK LKA XSA KHM LAO NGA SEN ETH MDG MWI MUS MOZ TZA UGA ZMB BWA
Paddy rice 0.0 0.0 0.6 3.0 0.6 3.8 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.1
Wheat 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cereal grains 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.7 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 1.3 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 6.1 0.7 0.2 0.3
Vegetables 0.1 3.0 1.2 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.0 2.5 7.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Oil seeds 0.0 0.1 2.2 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sugar cane 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
Plant-based fibres 6.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.5 0.3 10.4 1.8 1.0 0.0
Crops nec 0.4 1.9 13.0 9.8 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.1 1.5 0.1 0.0 0.0
Livestock 0.1 0.2 0.0 28.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0
Animal products 0.2 0.0 0.1 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 5.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.4 0.0 0.0
Raw milk 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0
Wool 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Forestry 0.0 0.2 0.2 1.6 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0
Fisheries 49.1 0.2 2.8 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0
Coal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Oil 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Gas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Minerals 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0
Meat 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2
Meat product 0.0 0.0 1.4 1.5 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.5
Vegetable oils 0.0 0.1 1.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Dairy products 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Processed rice 0.2 0.4 0.5 2.5 1.1 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.0 5.9 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sugar 0.1 13.6 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Food products 0.8 0.1 0.7 6.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Beverages and tobacco 0.1 0.0 0.0 5.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Textiles 0.8 1.0 0.4 4.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Wearing apparel 1.7 0.8 0.4 14.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Leather products 0.8 0.4 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Wood products 0.2 0.0 5.1 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Paper products 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Petroleum products 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Chemical rubber, plastic 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mineral products 0.1 0.0 2.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ferrous metals 0.1 0.0 0.5 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Metals 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Metal products 0.3 0.0 1.5 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Motor vehicles and parts 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Transport equipment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Electronic equipment 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Machinery and equipment 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other manufactures 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Services 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: Calculated from version 7 of the GTAP Database.
The figures in tables 2 and 3 may create the impression that the European Union and
Indian  markets are,  in  general,  not  very  important  for  the  low-income  countries  under
consideration.  However, table  4  indicates  that  the  European  Union  market  is  a  very
important export destination for most of those low-income countries. Among the Asian
countries,  the  European  Union  market  accounts  for  as much  as  54.15  per  cent  of  total78
Bangladeshi exports. Among the African countries, Botswana has a more than 70 per cent
share.  However,  the  Indian  market  is  not  a  major  export  destination  for  most  of  the
countries  under  consideration.  Among  the  Asian  countries, the  rest  of  South  Asia
(Afghanistan, Bhutan, Maldives and Nepal) has the highest share followed by Sri Lanka.
Among the African countries, Nigeria has a reasonably high share as  far as the  Indian
market is concerned.
Table 4. Country shares of exports to India and European Union in total exports
India European Union
Bangladesh (BGD) 0.98 54.15
Pakistan (PAK) 0.91 32.01
Sri Lanka (LKA) 6.13 35.94
Rest of South Asia (XSA) 18.58 35.98
Cambodia (KHM) 0.15 31.42
Lao People’s Democratic Republic (LAO) 0.20 46.29
Nigeria (NGA) 19.14 20.87
Senegal (SEN) 11.97 38.09
Ethiopia (ETH) 0.86 36.65
Madagascar (MDG) 1.33 46.99
Malawi (MWI) 1.84 34.55
Mauritius (MUS) 1.60 54.81
Mozambique (MOZ) 1.58 66.51
Tanzania (TZA) 6.19 35.36
Uganda (UGA) 2.26 36.47
Zambia (ZMB) 1.10 11.01
Botswana (BWA) 0.11 71.76
Source: Version 7 of the GTAP Database.
F. Trade similarities of excluded low-income economies with
the European Union and India
In examining the impact of the European Union-India FTA deal on the excluded
low-income economies in Asia and Africa, it is useful to explore the similarity of exports of
those countries with India in the European Union market and with the European Union in
the Indian market. One useful way of examining trade similarity is comparison of the top 50
export products of those countries, in both the European Union and the Indian markets.
Table 5 shows the number of commodities at the HS 4 digit level that are common in the
export baskets of India and other low-income countries in the European Union market as
well as the number of commodities that are common in the export baskets of the European
Union and other low-income countries in the Indian market. In the European Union market,
among the Asian low-income economies the maximum similarity with India appears to be
with Sri Lanka; and among the African low-income economies, the maximum similarity
with  India  is  with  Madagascar.  However,  for  all  other  African  countries,  the  export
similarity  is  very  low.  In  the  Indian  market, among  all  the  low-income  economies  the
similarity with the European Union is very low.79
The above findings are also supported by the F-K index
3 constructed by Winters and
others (2009). Table 6 gives the values of the index. The general conclusion is that in the
European Union market, the maximum similarity  with  India is observed for Sri Lanka,
whereas the similarity index is very low for all the countries under consideration.
Table 5. Top 50 export items – similarity with India and European Union (HS 4 digit level)
Country/region European Union market:
similarity with India
Indian market: similarity
with the European Union
Bangladesh (BGD) 16 5
Pakistan (PAK) 15 6
Sri Lanka (LKA) 18 8
Rest of South Asia (XSA) 15 6
Cambodia (KHM) 09 4
Lao People’s Democratic Republic (LAO) 07 3
Nigeria (NGA) 2 7
Senegal (SEN) 1 4
Ethiopia (ETH) 7 4
Madagascar (MDG) 16 4
Malawi (MWI) 7 5
Mauritius (MUS) 5 5
Mozambique (MOZ) 4 6
Tanzania (TZA) 8 5
Uganda (UGA) 2 4
Zambia (ZMB) 4 3
Botswana (BWA) 11 5
Source: Computed from WITS database.
Table 6. Similarity of composition in trading structures
Country/region European Union market:
Similarity with India
Indian market:
Similarity with the European Union
1 2 3 1 2 3
Bangladesh 0.179 0.173 0.000 0.020 0.020 0.020
Nepal 0.138 0.126 0.000 0.033 0.033 0.033
Pakistan 0.259 0.241 0.200 0.031 0.031 0.031
Sri Lanka 0.269 0.180 0.152 0.072 0.072 0.072
CARICOM 0.101 0.074 0.001 0.029 0.029 0.029
Central Africa 0.037 0.018 0.000 0.043 0.043 0.043
Eastern and Southern Africa 0.182 0.140 0.001 0.047 0.046 0.046
Pacific-EPA 0.031 0.013 0.002 0.010 0.010 0.010
SADA (less South Africa) 0.044 0.023 0.001 0.025 0.025 0.025
West Africa 0.056 0.034 0.001 0.031 0.031 0.031
Source: Winters and others, 2009.
Note: (1) = similarity across all products; (2) = similarity across products in which India (European Union) has +ve
 tariffs; and (3) = exports from both suppliers and both have +ve tariffs.
The aforementioned discussions points to the possibility of a low impact on the
excluded low-income economies because of the low trade similarity in both the European
Union and the Indian market. However, it should be kept in mind that the impacts on the
excluded economies don’t entirely depend on the similarity of trade of these countries with
3 The F-K index of import similarity between country m and n can be defined, in general, as
   
i
in im mn FK   , min
where im 
 and in 
 are the share of imports from country m in product i and the share of imports from country
n in product i, respectively. This index was computed at the 6-digit level of disaggregation. The FK index is
equal to one when the structure of trade (defined by the share of each sector in total trade) across the two
countries being compared is identical, and is equal to zero when the structure of trade is completely different.80
the FTA partners, since many of these countries also enjoy significant preferences in the
European Union and the Indian market. Such an FTA risks the loss in preferences for these
countries. The next section discusses the margin of preferences of the excluded low-income
countries in the European Union and Indian markets.
G. Margin of preferences in the European Union and Indian markets
The GTAP database provides the benchmark level and structure of protection in the
European Union and India, which is useful in understanding the initial conditions from
which the tariff liberalization aspects of the FTA need to be assessed. Most of the low-
income economies enjoy some preferences in the European Union and Indian markets, and
their margins of preferences for various products can be calculated from the GTAP database.
Table 7. Margin of preference in the European Union market compared to the tariff
rates on Indian products (percentage point difference)
BGD PAK LKA XSA KHM LAO NGA SEN ETH MDG MWI MUS MOZ TZA UGA ZMB BWA
Paddy rice 0 9 9 58.9 46.9 44.9 58.9 48.9 58.9 39.3 58.9 58.9 58.9 58.9 58.9 58.9 58.9
Wheat 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8
Cereal grains 19.9 18 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.1 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.9 -8.2 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.9
Vegetables 0.9 0.5 0 0.9 0.9 0.2 0 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.9 -6.8 0.9 0.9 -0.5 0.9 0.9
Oil seeds 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sugar cane 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Plant-based fibres 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Crops nec 1.6 1.6 0 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
Livestock 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8
Animal products 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Raw milk 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wool 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Forestry 1 1 0.6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Fisheries 3.5 3.5 0 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
Coal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oil 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Minerals 0 -0.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Meat 254.3 234.4 254.3 254.3 254.3 254.3 254.3 254.3 254.3 254.3 254.3 183.7 254.3 254.3 254.3 254.3 176.2
Meat products 17.7 0 17.7 17.7 17.7 17.7 17.7 17.7 17.7 17.7 17.7 17.7 17.7 17.7 17.7 17.7 5.8
Vegetable oils and fat 1.7 0.9 0 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 -0.1 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
Dairy products 20.2 0 0 20.2 20.2 20.2 -89.3 20.2 20.2 20.2 20.2 -20.6 20.2 20.2 20.2 20.2 20.2
Processed rice 59.4 0 0 109.3 44.6 62.3 109.3 105.3 0 72.2 -28.9 -6.5 109.3 109.3 109.3 109.3 109.3
Sugar 0 27.2 0 0 34 34 34 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 18.8 0 34
Food products 6.8 4.3 1.1 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 5.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 2.1
Beverages and tobacco 19.8 19.8 0 19.8 19.8 19.8 18.1 19.8 19.8 19.8 19.8 16.2 19.8 19.8 19.8 19.8 19.8
Textiles 7.4 3.7 0 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4
Wearing apparel 8.6 7.5 0 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6
Leather products 3.4 1.1 0 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4
Wood products 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Paper products 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Petroleum products 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chemical rubber, plastic 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Mineral products 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ferrous metals 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Metals 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
Metal products 0.2 0.2 0 0.2 -0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Motor vehicles and parts 4.1 4.1 3.7 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1
Transport equipment 0.7 0.7 0 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
Electronic equipment 1.1 1.1 0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
Machinery and equipment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other manufactures 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Source: Calculated from version 7 of the GTAP Database.
Note: Positive figures indicate preference.81
Table 7 shows the calculated margins of preferences, where the positive figures refer
to the existence of preferences. It can be seen from table 7 that there are some significant
margins  of  preferences  for  these  low-income  countries  in  the  European  Union  market
compared with the tariff rates imposed on imports from India. For the Asian countries, the
margins of preference on textiles and clothing, which are their major export items to the
European Union, are very important. For the African countries, however, the margins of
preference on agricultural and agro-recessing are very relevant.
Table 8 shows the calculated margins of preference for the low-income economies
in the Indian market compared with the tariff rates on imports from the European Union.
Among  the  Asian  countries,  Sri  Lanka  and  rest  of  South  Asia  enjoy  some  significant
preferences over the European Union in the Indian market. Some African countries also
have some preferences in the agricultural and agro-processing products.
Table 8. Margins of preference in the Indian market compared to the tariff rates on
European Union Products (percentage point difference)
BGD PAK LKA XSA KHM LAO NGA SEN ETH MDG MWI MUS MOZ TZA UGA ZMB BWA
Paddy rice 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
Wheat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cereal grains 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 -74.3 5.1 5.1 5.1
Vegetables 0 11.9 0 6.1 43.8 43.8 13.6 13.8 13.4 11.8 3 13.8 13.2 12.9 43.8 43.8 43.8
Oil seeds 16.2 0 0 16.2 16.2 16.2 -13.8 16.2 -13.8 16.2 16.2 -13.8 16.2 -13.8 16.2 16.2 16.2
Sugar cane 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Plant-based fibres 0 3.1 0 13.1 13.1 13.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 2.6 3.1 3.1 3.1 2.9 3.1 3.1 13.1
Crops nec 0 0 0 24.1 27.2 27.2 -2 27.2 -7.3 -41.4 -68.1 -34.6 -72.8 -40.4 -64.6 27.2 27.2
Livestock 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Animal products 0 2.7 0 1.9 2.7 2.7 1 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 -1.1 2.7 -0.4 -16.7
Raw milk 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wool 15 0 15 0 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Forestry 0 5.6 5.6 0 5.8 0 4.2 -19.2 -19.2 -8.8 10.8 5.8 5.8 4.4 5.8 10.8 10.8
Fisheries 25.9 0 0 11.7 26.2 26.2 26.2 -3.8 26.2 26.2 26.2 26.2 26.2 -3.8 26.2 5.1 26.2
Coal 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Oil 0 0 0 0 0 0 -10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gas 0 0 0 0 0 0 -10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Minerals 1 0.8 5.6 12.8 15 15 5.5 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
Meat 17.8 17.8 17.8 0 17.8 17.8 17.8 17.8 -11.7 17.8 17.8 17.8 17.8 17.8 17.8 17.8 17.8
Meat products 39.3 39.3 0 0 39.3 39.3 39.3 39.3 39.3 39.3 39.3 39.3 39.3 39.3 39.3 39.3 39.3
Vegetable oils and fats 19.2 42.6 32.8 36.9 72.6 72.6 72.6 72.6 72.6 72.6 72.6 72.6 72.6 42.6 72.6 72.6 72.6
Dairy products 6.7 0 5.8 36.7 36.7 36.7 36.7 36.7 36.7 36.7 36.7 -22.3 36.7 36.7 36.7 36.7 36.7
Processed rice 57.3 0 57.3 57.3 57.3 57.3 57.3 57.3 57.3 57.3 57.3 -12.7 57.3 57.3 57.3 57.3 57.3
Sugar 35.4 35.4 35.4 20.9 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 50.4 35.4 50.4 50.4 50.4
Food products 13.6 4.8 0 11.6 38.7 38.7 38.7 8.7 5.8 38.7 38.7 -19.7 38.7 8.7 8.7 38.7 38.7
Beverages and tobacco 107.2 76.5 13.9 99.7 137.2 137.2 -18.1 137.2 137.2 137.2 137.2 37.2 137.2 137.2 137.2 137.2 137.2
Textiles 1.2 0 0.7 14.6 0.7 15.7 0.7 -13.9 -14.3 -10.8 0.7 0.7 15.7 -8.6 0.7 15.7 15.7
Wearing apparel 0 0 0 14.7 0 14.7 14.7 14.7 -0.3 14.7 14.7 -0.3 14.7 -0.3 14.7 14.7 14.7
Leather products 2.5 1.1 0 13.8 3.4 13.8 1.9 8.8 2.3 13.8 13.8 -1.2 13.8 5.2 2.3 13.8 -1.2
Wood products 0 0.4 0.1 7.9 15 15 3.4 15 0.4 0 0 0 15 4.2 0 15 15
Paper products 0 0 0 13.6 0 14.4 1.6 -0.6 10.4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 14.4 9 14.4 -0.6 1.1
Petroleum products 0 0 0 14.5 14.5 14.5 4.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 -0.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5
Chemical rubber, plastic 5.8 0.1 0.1 11.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 -13.9 -10 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 0.2 15.2 -0.2
Mineral products 5.8 0 1.4 12 15 15 15 0 0 15 0 0 15 0 15 0 15
Ferrous metals 0 0 0 13.1 0 0 -0.9 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -0.8 -1.1 -1.1 2.7
Metals 0 0 0 9.8 0 15 0 0 0 15 15 0 0 0 0 0 15
Metal products 0 0 0 15 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 15
Motor vehicles and parts 0 15.6 0 30.6 30.6 30.6 30.6 30.6 30.6 30.6 30.6 -44.3 30.6 30.6 -3.6 30.6 30.6
Transport equipment 0 0 0 7.6 7.6 7.6 3.5 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 -4 7.6 -6.9 7.6 7.6 7.6
Electronic equipment 0 3.6 0.8 4.4 4.4 4.4 2.6 4.4 4.4 4.4 3.4 -3.9 4.4 4.4 -0.8 4.4 4.4
Machinery and equipment 0 0 0 14.1 0 14.2 0 0 0 14.2 -0.8 -0.3 14.2 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8
Other manufactures 0 0 0.2 7.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 0
Services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Source: Calculated from version 7 of the GTAP Database.
Note: Positive figures indicate preference.82
However, despite some notable preferences, most of the Asian and African countries
(except the rest of South Asia and Sri Lanka) have very low levels of imports into India.
Therefore, even the loss in preferences is unlikely to result in large losses in exports to the
Indian market by those countries.
H. GTAP model
The  GTAP  model  is  a  comparative  static  model,  and  is  based  on  neoclassical
theories.
4 It  is  a  linearized  model  and  it  uses  a  common  global  database  for  the  CGE
analysis. The model assumes perfect competition in all markets, constant returns to scale in
all production and trade activities, and profit and utility maximizing behaviour of firms and
households, respectively. The model is solved using the software GEMPACK (Harrison and
Pearson, 1996).
1. Household income and expenditure
In the GTAP model, each region has a single representative household, termed as the
regional  household.  The  income  of  the  regional  household  is  generated  through  factor
payments  and  tax  revenues  (including  export  and  import  taxes),  net  of  subsidies.  The
regional household allocates expenditure over private household expenditure, government
expenditure and savings according to a Cobb Douglas per capita utility function.
5 Thus,
each component of final demand maintains a constant share of total regional income.
6
The private household buys commodity bundles to maximize utility, subject to its
expenditure constraint. The constrained optimizing behaviour of the private household is
represented in the GTAP model by a constant difference of elasticity expenditure function.
The private household spends its income on consumption of both domestic and imported
commodities,  and  pays  taxes.  The  consumption  bundles  are constant elasticity  of
substitution (CES) aggregates of domestic and imported goods, where the imported goods
are  also  CES  aggregates  of  imports  from  different  regions.  Taxes  paid  by  the  private
household cover commodity taxes for domestically produced and imported goods, and the
income tax net of subsidies.
2. Government consumption
The Government also spends its income on domestic and imported commodities and
pays  taxes.  For  the Government,  taxes  consist  of  commodity  taxes  for  domestically
produced and imported commodities. Like the private household, government consumption
is a CES composition of domestically produced goods and imports.
4 Full documentation of the GTAP model and the database can be found in Hertel, 1997, and Dimaranan and
McDougall, 2002.
5 Savings enter in the static utility function as a proxy for future consumption.83
3. Savings and investment
The GTAP model considers the demand for investment in a particular region as
savings driven. In the multi-country setting the model is closed by assuming that regional
savings are homogenous and contribute to a global pool of savings (global savings). This is
then allocated among regions for investment in response to the changes in the expected rates
of  return  in  different  regions.  If  all  other  markets  in  the  multi-regional  model  are  in
equilibrium,  if  all  firms  earn  zero  profits,  and  if  all  households  are  on  their  budget
constraint, such treatment of savings and investment will lead to a situation where global
investment must equal global savings, and Walras' Law will be satisfied.
4. Producers’ income
In the GTAP model, producers receive payments for selling consumption goods and
intermediate inputs, both in the domestic market and to the rest of the world. Under the zero
profit assumption employed in the model, these revenues must be precisely exhausted by
spending on domestic intermediate inputs, imported intermediate inputs, factor income and
taxes paid to regional household (taxes on both domestic and imported intermediate inputs
and production taxes net of subsidies).
5. Production technology
The GTAP model considers a nested production technology with the assumption
that every industry produces a single output, and constant returns to scale prevail in all
markets.  Industries  have  a  Leontief  production  technology  to  produce  their  outputs.
Industries maximize profits by choosing two broad categories of inputs, i.e., a composite of
factors (value added) and a composite of intermediate inputs. The factor composite is a CES
function of labour, capital, land and natural resources. The intermediate composite is a
Leontief function of material inputs, which are in turn a CES composition of domestically
produced goods and imports. Imports are sourced from all regions.
6. International trade
The  GTAP  model  employs  the  Armington  assumption,  which  provides  the
possibility to distinguish imports by their origin and explains intra-industry trade of similar
products. Following the Armington approach, import shares of different regions depend on
relative  prices  and  the  substitution  elasticity  between  domestically  and  imported
commodities.
7. Base data and base year adjustments
Version 7 has 2004 as the base year, updated national, economic and trade data, and
more importantly protection data from the MacMaps (CEPII / ITC joint project). The new
GTAP database has lower tariffs than the earlier versions as a result of the reform efforts until
2004 and the inclusion of bilateral trade preferences. The GTAP database has been further
adjusted to incorporate the phasing out of the Multifibre Agreement in 2005 as well as few
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements.84
8. Region and commodity aggregation
Data on regions and commodities are aggregated to meet the objectives of the study
described in this chapter. Version 7 of the GTAP database covers 57 commodities, 113
regions/countries  and  5  factors  of  production.  The  current  study  has  aggregated  57
commodities into 43, and 113 regions into 23 as shown in tables 9 and 10, respectively.
Table 9. Commodity aggregation in the GTAP model
No. Code Sector description Comprising old sectors
1 Pdr Paddy rice Paddy rice
2 Wht Wheat Wheat
3 Gro Cereal grains nec Cereal grains nec
4 v_f Vegetables, fruit, nuts Vegetables, fruit, nuts
5 Osd Oil seeds Oil seeds
6 c_b Sugar cane, sugar beet Sugar cane, sugar beet
7 Pfb Plant-based fibres Plant-based fibres
8 Ocr Crops nec Crops nec
9 Ctl Cattle, sheep, goats, horses Cattle, sheep, goats, horses
10 Oap Animal products nec Animal products nec
11 Rmk Raw milk Raw milk
12 Wol Wool, silkworm cocoons Wool, silkworm cocoons
13 Frs Forestry Forestry
14 Fsh Fisheries Fisheries
15 Coa Coal Coal
16 Oil Oil Oil
17 Gas Gas Gas
18 Omn Minerals nec Minerals nec
19 Cmt Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horses Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horses
20 Omt Meat products nec Meat products nec
21 Vol Vegetable oils and fats Vegetable oils and fat
22 Mil Dairy products Dairy products
23 Pcr Processed rice Processed rice
24 Sgr Sugar Sugar
25 Ofd Food products nec Food products nec
26 b_t Beverages and tobacco products Beverages and tobacco products
27 Tex Textiles Textiles
28 Wap Wearing apparel Wearing apparel
29 Lea Leather products Leather products
30 Lum Wood products Wood products
31 Ppp Paper products, publishing Paper products, publishing
32 p_c Petroleum, coal products Petroleum, coal products
33 Crp Chemical, rubber, plastic products Chemical, rubber, plastic products
34 Nmm Mineral products nec Mineral products nec
35 i_s Ferrous metals Ferrous metals
36 Nfm Metals nec Metals nec
37 Fmp Metal products Metal products
38 Mvh Motor vehicles and parts Motor vehicles and parts
39 Otn Transport equipment nec Transport equipment nec
40 Ele Electronic equipment Electronic equipment
41 Ome Machinery and equipment nec Machinery and equipment nec
42 Omf Other manufactures nec Other manufactures nec
43 Serv Services Electricity; gas manufacture, distribution; water; construction;
trade; transport nec; sea transport; air transport; communication;
financial services nec; insurance; business services nec;
recreation and other services; public
admin/defence/health/education; dwellings.85
Table 10. Region aggregation in the GTAP model
No. Code Region description Comprising old regions
1 IND India India
2 European
Union 25
European Union 25 Austria; Belgium; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia;
Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Ireland; Italy;
Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; Netherlands; Poland;
Portugal; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; United Kingdom
3 BGD Bangladesh Bangladesh
4 PAK Pakistan Pakistan
5 LKA Sri Lanka Sri Lanka
6 XSA Rest of South Asia Rest of South Asia
7 KHM Cambodia Cambodia
8 LAO Lao People’s Democratic Republic Lao People's Democratic Republic
9 NGA Nigeria Nigeria
10 SEN Senegal Senegal
11 ETH Ethiopia Ethiopia
12 MDG Madagascar Madagascar
13 MWI Malawi Malawi
14 MUS Mauritius Mauritius
15 MOZ Mozambique Mozambique
16 TZA Tanzania Tanzania
17 UGA Uganda Uganda
18 ZMB Zambia Zambia
19 BWA Botswana Botswana
20 BRA Brazil Brazil
21 CHN China China
22 USA United States of America United States of America
23 ROW Rest of the world Australia; New Zealand; rest of Oceania; Hong Kong, China;
Japan; Republic of Korea; Taiwan Province of China; rest of
East Asia; Indonesia; Myanmar; Malaysia; Philippines;
Singapore; Thailand; Viet Nam; rest of South-East Asia;
Canada; Mexico; rest of North America; Argentina; Bolivia;
Chile; Colombia; Ecuador; Paraguay; Peru;
Uruguay; Venezuela; rest of South America; Costa Rica;
Guatemala; Nicaragua; Panama; rest of Central America;
Caribbean; Switzerland; Norway; rest of the European Free
Trade Association ; Albania; Bulgaria; Belarus; Croatia;
Romania; Russian Federation; Ukraine; rest of Eastern Europe;
rest of Europe; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; rest of former Soviet
Union; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Georgia; Islamic Republic of
Iran; Turkey; rest of Western Asia; Egypt; Morocco; Tunisia;
rest of North Africa; rest of Western Africa; Central Africa;
South Central Africa; Zimbabwe; rest of Eastern Africa; South
Africa; rest of South African Customs
I. Simulation and results
A scenario of a full FTA between the European Union and India was simulated
using the GTAP model. Under this scenario, all tariffs on exports from the European Union
to India, and from India to the European Union, were reduced to zero.
1. Welfare effects
The  welfare  effects  of  the  simulation  for  the  countries/regions  concerned  are
presented in table 11. It appears that in terms of absolute value, maximum welfare gain is
attained by the European Union, followed by India. However, in terms of share in GDP,
India’s welfare gain is much higher than that of the European Union. All the low-income
economies in Asia and Africa under consideration would experience welfare loss. In terms
of  absolute  value,  Bangladesh  would  incur  the  maximum  welfare  loss,  almost US$ 84
million, which is 0.15 per cent of that country’s GDP. However, in terms of share in GDP,86
the rest of South Asia would experience the largest loss in welfare, equivalent to 0.5 per
cent. It appears that in Asia, the welfare losses of the South Asian countries are much higher
than those of Cambodia and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. This is mainly because
of the low trade similarity of Cambodia and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic with
India and the European Union in the European Union and Indian markets, respectively (as
indicated in table 5). Among the African low-income economies, Nigeria would experience
the largest  welfare  loss  in  absolute  value  while  Senegal  would  experience the largest
welfare loss in terms of share in GDP. In general, however, it appears that the welfare losses
of most of these low-income economies would not be very high.
















India -941.4 5 533.7 1 070.4 5 662.6 0.88
European Union 25 14 082.8 -2 782.2 -304.2 10 996.4 0.09
Bangladesh -23.0 -57.2 -3.7 -83.9 -0.15
Pakistan -7.8 -32.1 -3.7 -43.6 -0.06
Sri Lanka -9.6 -56.5 -2.2 -68.3 -0.34
Rest of South Asia -23.3 -41.4 -5.0 -69.7 -0.50
Cambodia -0.4 -1.4 -0.6 -2.0 -0.02
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 -0.8 -0.03
Nigeria -9.8 -28.3 -8.3 -46.4 -0.07
Senegal -8.2 -12.5 -5.3 -26.0 -0.36
Ethiopia -1.3 -1.7 -0.3 -3.3 -0.05
Madagascar 0.0 -1.9 0.0 -1.9 -0.04
Malawi -1 -2.9 0.2 -3.7 -0.21
Mauritius -2.9 -8.4 -0.1 -11.4 -0.19
Mozambique -0.6 -2.5 -0.1 -3.2 -0.05
Tanzania -1.8 -7.0 0.5 -8.3 -0.07
Uganda -0.2 -3.8 -0.3 -4.3 -0.06
Zambia -0.3 -1.7 -0.1 -2.1 -0.04
Botswana -0.1 -8.5 0.9 -7.6 -0.09
Source: Simulation results.
The decomposition of the welfare effects (table 11) suggests that India’s gain from
the FTA would be primarily driven by terms of trade gain, whereas for the European Union
the gain would mainly be due to the rise in allocative efficiency. India would incur a loss in
allocative efficiency because of the loss in tariff revenue. India’s terms of trade gain would
be due to the rise in the prices of her export items relative to the prices of imports arising
out of this FTA.
However, the European Union, because of elimination of tariff protection on many
of its inefficient production processes (especially agricultural products), would experience
large gains in allocative efficiency as resources would divert from the inefficient sectors to
the  more  efficient  sectors.  The  low  income  economies  in  Asia  and  Africa  under
consideration would suffer from both losses in allocative efficiency and negative terms of
trade shock. However, for all these countries, negative terms of trade shocks would be the
dominant factor behind welfare loss.
2. Macroeconomic effects
Table 12 presents the impact on some macroeconomic variables for the countries
under consideration. It seems that India would experience a fall in real GDP by 0.15 per87
cent from the base run. This would be due to the larger increase in imports compared with
exports. India’s imports would rise by 10.8 per cent compared with a small rise in exports
by only 1.08 per cent. On the other hand, the European Union would experience a rise in
real GDP by 0.11 per cent, and its imports and exports would rise by 0.28 per cent and 0.43
per cent, respectively. This suggests that the European Union-India FTA would result in
greater market access for the European Union in India compared to India’s market access in
the European Union.
Table 12. Macroeconomic impacts
Countries/regions Real GDP (% change
from the base run)
Imports (% change
from the base run)
Exports (% change
from the base run)
India -0.15 10.79 1.08
European Union 25 0.11 0.28 0.43
Bangladesh -0.04 -0.38 -0.91
Pakistan -0.04 -0.01 -0.66
Sri Lanka -0.05 -0.10 -0.90
Rest of South Asia -0.17 -0.10 -1.32
Cambodia -0.01 -0.02 -0.08
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 0.00 -0.09 -0.02
Nigeria -0.01 -0.01 -0.12
Senegal -0.11 -0.95 -0.77
Ethiopia -0.02 -0.10 -0.08
Madagascar 0.00 -0.01 -0.11
Malawi -0.05 -0.21 -0.49
Mauritius -0.05 -0.19 -0.54
Mozambique -0.01 -0.09 -0.09
Tanzania -0.02 0.00 -0.23
Uganda 0.00 -0.14 -0.14
Zambia 0.00 -0.06 -0.08
Botswana 0.00 -0.01 -0.24
Source: Simulation results.
The macroeconomic impacts on other low-income countries are also shown in table
12. Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the rest of South Asia, Cambodia, Nigeria, Senegal, Ethiopia,
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique and Tanzania would experience falls in real GDP, whereas
other low-income economies would not experience any impact on their real GDP. Among
the Asian countries, the rest of South Asia would incur a loss in real GDP by 0.17 per cent.
Among the African countries, the largest fall in real GDP would be experienced by Senegal.
It also appears that all these low-income economies would face losses in exports. The losses
in exports for Bangladesh and Sri Lanka would be as high as 0.9 per cent of their total
exports. The corresponding figure for the rest of South Asia is 1.32 per cent. Cambodia and
the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, however, experience very low figures of losses in
exports. Among the African countries, the largest fall in exports would be faced by Senegal.
3. Losses in exports to the European Union and Indian markets
From the GTAP simulation results it is also possible to isolate the loss in the exports
of the low-income economies in the European Union and the Indian market. It should be
noted that the losses of the low-income economies in exports would also be driven by losses
in preferences of these countries in the European Union and India due to the diversion of
trade in the European Union and India because of the FTA deal. It appears that the patterns
of impacts on the low-income economies as far as export losses in the European Union and
Indian markets are concerned. In South Asia, Bangladesh and Pakistan would experience88
the bulk of their losses in the European Union market, whereas, Sri Lanka and rest of South
Asia  would  incur  major  losses  in  the  Indian  market.  Cambodia  and  the  Lao People’s
Democratic Republic would experience virtually no losses in exports to the Indian market.
Among the African countries, only Nigeria and Senegal would face larger export losses in
the Indian market. However, for most of the other African countries, the losses in exports to
the European Union market would be higher than those in the Indian market.
Table 13. Losses in exports
(Unit: US$ million)
Country/region European Union market Indian market Total
Bangladesh -56.3 -7.5 -63.8
Pakistan -79.2 -2.7 -81.9
Sri Lanka -10.1 -55.3 -65.4
Rest of South Asia -2.8 -47.0 -49.8
Cambodia -12.4 0.0 -12.4
Lao People’s Democratic Republic -2.2 0.0 -2.2
Nigeria -3.6 -14.1 -17.7
Senegal -0.7 -21.6 -22.3
Ethiopia -1.8 -0.5 -2.3
Madagascar -5.0 -0.6 -5.6
Malawi -1.1 0.0 -1.1
Mauritius -16.0 -3.9 -19.9
Mozambique -1.3 -0.8 -2.1
Tanzania -6.9 -3.4 -10.3
Uganda -1.5 -0.2 -1.7
Zambia -0.9 -3.1 -4.0
Botswana -40.6 -0.1 -40.7
Source: Simulation results.
Table 14 shows the losses in the exports of major commodities in the European
Union  market  by  the  low-income  economies.  It  is clearly evident  that in  the  case  of
Bangladesh, textiles and wearing apparel are the two dominant products that suffer from
loss exports to the European Union market. For Pakistan, paddy and processed rice as well
as textiles and wearing apparel constitute the bulk of the losses in exports. For the African
countries, mainly the agricultural and agro-processing commodities would experience losses
in exports.












Bangladesh -1.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.9 -21.8 -23.4 -0.5
Pakistan -35.1 -8.8 -0.5 -18.5 -10.7
Sri Lanka -0.2 -0.5 -0.8 -4.1
Rest of South Asia -2.6
Cambodia -0.2 -0.4 -3.0 -4.8 -4.1
Lao People’s
Democratic Republic
-0.9 -0.3 -1.0 -0.1 -0.4
Nigeria -0.1 -1.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6
Senegal -0.1 -0.3 -0.3
Ethiopia -0.5 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Madagascar -0.1 -0.1 -0.7 -0.1 -0.2 -1.0 -1.0
Malawi -0.6 -0.1
Mauritius -0.3 -0.6 -0.1 -8.3 -3.4
Mozambique -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2
Tanzania -0.8 -0.6 -1.4 -0.4 -0.1 -0.8 -0.1 -0.2
Uganda -0.6 -0.1 -0.2
Botswana -34.6
Source: Simulation results.89
Table 15 lists the major products of the low-income economies that would suffer
from export losses in the Indian market. Bangladesh would experience some notable export
losses in the case of chemicals, rubber and plastic products. Sri Lanka and rest of South
Asia  would,  however,  experience  losses  in  exports of a  number  of  mineral  and
manufacturing commodities. For Sri Lanka, the largest loss would be in exports of metals.
For Nigeria, some notable losses would be in exports of oil. Senegal would experience
losses in exports of chemicals, rubber and plastic products. For other African countries, the
figures for losses in exports to the Indian market would be minimal.
Table 15. Losses in exports of major commodities in India
(Unit: US$ million)





















Bangladesh -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -5.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.6 -0.3
Pakistan -0.2 -0.1 -1.5 -0.1 -0.4
Sri Lanka -0.1 -0.2 -2.6 -1.5 -5.0 -3.2 -3.2 -22.1 -2.6 -15.3
Rest of
South Asia
-1.0 -1.3 -2.9 -1.6 -1.1 -14.1 -0.3 -15.4 -4.5 -1.2 -1.8
Nigeria -13.5 -0.4 -1.5 -1.2 -0.2
Senegal -0.3 -20.9 -0.4
Mauritius -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.7 -2.7
Tanzania -1.9 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.1
Zambia -2.4 -0.1 -0.6
Source: Simulation results.
J. Conclusion
This chapter details the analysis of, and insights into the welfare, macroeconomic
and trade impacts on a number of low-income economies as a result of a proposed bilateral
FTA  between  the  European  Union  and  India.  A  global  general  equilibrium  modelling
technique was applied in the analysis. A simulation of a scenario depicting a full FTA
between  India  and  the  European  Union was conducted.  The  simulation  results  are
summarized below:
(a) The European Union-India FTA would result in welfare gains for both India and
the European Union. In absolute terms, the gains of the European Union would
be much higher than those of India. However, in terms of share in GDP, the
gains of India would be much larger than that of the European Union. India’s
welfare gain would mainly be driven by the gain in terms of trade, whereas the
European Union’s welfare gain would primarily be due to a gain in allocative
efficiency;
(b) All  the  low-income  economies  under  consideration in  the  analysis would
experience  losses  in  welfare, with  the  welfare  losses  for  the  South  Asian
countries being much higher than for the other low-income economies in Asia
and Africa. Bangladesh would appear to experience the largest loss in welfare in
absolute value, whereas the rest of South Asia would incur the largest loss in
terms of share in GDP. The welfare losses of these low-income economies are
mainly driven by the loss in terms of trade. However, in general, the extent of
welfare losses in terms of share in their GDP for most of these countries would
not be very high;90
(c) Most of these low-income countries would also experience losses in real GDP
and exports. For the rest of South Asia, the loss in real GDP would be as high as
0.17 per cent while in exports it would be as high as 1.32 per cent. Other South
Asian countries such as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka would also experience losses
in exports by more than 0.9 per cent. However, for most of the other countries,
the losses in real GDP and exports would not be very large;
(d) Most  of  the  low-income  countries  under  consideration  in  the  analysis  would
experience falls in exports, in both the European Union and  Indian markets,
mainly because of losses in preferences and diversion of trade in both those
markets. However, the pattern of export loss is different for different countries.
Countries such  as  Bangladesh  and  Pakistan  would  suffer  from  larger  export
losses in the European Union market compared with the Indian market, whereas
for Sri Lanka and rest of South Asia the impacts would be just the opposite.
Most  of  the  other  low-income  countries  would,  however,  experience  larger
losses in exports to the European Union market;
(e) The product-wise figures suggest that the losses of Asian low-income countries
in exports to the European Union market would be dominated by the losses in
exports of textiles and wearing apparel. Most of the African countries would,
however,  experience  losses  in  exports  of  agricultural  and  agro-processing
products to the European Union market. In the Indian market, Sri Lanka and rest
of South Asia would experience losses in exports of a number of mineral and
manufacturing  products.  Bangladesh’s  loss  in  exports to  the  Indian  market
would be primarily chemicals, rubber and plastics products. Most of the African
countries would incur losses in exports of oil, minerals and mineral products to
the Indian market;
(f) The  simulation  results  in  general  suggest  that  the  impacts  of  the  European
Union-India FTA on most of the excluded low-income economies would not be
very large. It should, however, be noted that the impacts, as derived from the
simulation results, would be static in nature and that the dynamic impacts could
be much larger than the static impacts. For example, although the static loss in
preferences for Bangladesh’s exports of textiles and clothing to the European
Union market might appear to be small, such a loss might result in a long-term
loss in competitiveness; thus, the dynamic losses could be much larger than the
static losses.91
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V. What behind-the-border reforms in services and investment




What  behind-the-border  reforms in  services  and  investment  are  best  done  through
trade agreements? One way to answer this question is to think of trade agreements as being
exercises in piecemeal reform, in the sense that they provide opportunities for reform, but in a
constrained, partial manner. The key policy question is whether countries should unreservedly
take advantage of these opportunities, despite the constraints, or whether the nature of the
constraints should temper the way in which they go about the reforms.
The  key  policy  dilemma  originates  in  the  theory  of  the  second  best.  Lipsey  and
Lancaster (1956) noted that if, for institutional or other reasons, one of the conditions for
economic  efficiency  cannot  be  achieved,  then  the  other  conditions  may  no  longer  be
desirable. Their definition of piecemeal policy was a situation where it was still a “second
best” optimal to achieve the other conditions, even though the best could not be achieved.
Examples  of  papers  that  have  tried  to  characterize  piecemeal  second-best  policy  include
Davis and Whinston (1965) and Boadway and Harris (1977).
In the context of goods trade, the principles of piecemeal reform are well understood.
The economic cost of a tariff is a function, not just of the average level of tariff, but also of its
dispersion.  So  a  key  guiding  principle  of  piecemeal  tariff  reform  is  that  it  should  not
exacerbate  the  dispersion.  Otherwise,  partial  reform  may  actually  worsen  economic  well-
being. In his seminal analysis, Corden (1971 and 1974) therefore examined options such as
the “concertina” method – where high tariffs would be squeezed down to medium levels at
the first stage, then these and the existing medium tariffs would be squeezed down to a lower
level and “across-the-board” reductions – where each year, all tariffs would be reduced by an
equal percentage.
This guiding principle is now sufficiently well-accepted in trade negotiating circles
that it has been embodied in a negotiating modality. In the current round of non-agricultural
market access negotiations under the World Trade Organization (WTO), tariff cuts will take
place according to the so-called Swiss formula, which ensures that within each country the
highest  tariffs  will  undergo  the  greatest  percentage  cuts.  According  to  this “ops  down”
formula, the partial reform achieved via the negotiations will reduce both the average level of
tariffs and their dispersion.
1 An  earlier  version  of  this  paper  was  presented  to  ESCAP  conference  on  ‘Emerging  Trade  Issues  for
Policymakers in Developing Countries of Asia and the Pacific: New Era of Trade Governance’, Manila, 4-6
March 2009.94
The aim of this paper is to explore whether there are principles that can be brought to
bear in negotiating the services and investment provisions of trade agreements, and which can
help to ensure that the partial reforms achieved under those agreements add to, rather than
detract  from  economic  well-being.  These  principles  might  be  seen  as  the  services  and
investment equivalents of the “top-down” principle for tariff reform. It is not intended to go
as  far  as  developing  a  negotiating  modality  for  services  or  investment,  as that  would  be
premature. However, the principles developed here could be used by individual countries on a
voluntary basis when undertaking negotiations in services and investment.
There are two possible levels of analysis. One is to compare trade agreements to other
modes of liberalization, as exercises in piecemeal reform. Should countries embrace trade
agreements  in  services  and  investment  whenever  the  opportunity  arises,  even  though  the
liberalization achieved under them is likely to be constrained in various ways? Or should
countries watch for instances when trade agreements might make things worse?
The  second  level  of  analysis  is  to  consider  which  particular  reforms  should  be
included in trade agreements (the question posed in the title of this paper). Should countries
negotiate whatever they can within trade agreements? Or should they  worry  about which
reforms will avoid losses and/or deliver the biggest gains? The paper proceeds with those two
levels of analysis in turn.
A. Trade agreements versus other modes of liberalization
2
Trade agreements can be either multilateral or preferential, but they typically involve
the reciprocal exchange of trade concessions with one or more trading partners. They stand in
contrast to unilateral liberalization, where a country “goes it alone”.
In the context of goods trade, the benefits of reciprocity are clearly understood. The
key economic benefit is that reciprocity helps to neutralize the negative terms of trade effects
of unilateral tariff reform (e.g., Bagwell and Staiger, 1999). It is also argued that reciprocity
helps with the political economy of tariff reform – the benefits to exporting interests from a
trading partner’s concessions can be offset against the losses to import-competing interests
from a country’s own concessions (e.g., Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2008).
In  the  case  of  services  and  investment,  the  benefits  of  reciprocity  for  either  the
economics  or  the  political  economy  of  reform  have  yet  to  be  established.  This  section
explores  these  issues;  however,  it  must first  be established  exactly  what  types  of  partial
reforms trade agreements can be expected to achieve in services and investment.
As noted recently (Dee and Findlay, 2009), there are at least four ways to define and
evaluate the services and investment provisions of trade agreements:
(a) Evaluate the rules;
(b) Evaluate the commitments made under those rules;
2 Parts of this section draw on Dee and Findlay, 2009.95
(c) Evaluate the extent to which the commitments constrain or change the status quo,
given that there can be large gaps between bound and applied protection in the
areas of both services and investment;
(d) Evaluate whether any change to the status quo has economic significance.
1. Evaluating the rules
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) under WTO imposes one key
discipline on all services trade – the most-favoured nation obligation. This requires a country
to treat the services suppliers of all other countries equally. There is to be no discrimination
among the various different foreign sources of services.
Beyond that, there are two other key disciplines that apply on a positive list basis, i.e.,
they  only  apply  to  selected  services  sectors  that  a  country  chooses  to  subject  to  those
disciplines. The first is a national treatment obligation. This requires a country to treat the
services suppliers of all other countries the same as its domestic suppliers. There is to be no
discrimination  between  domestic  and  foreign  suppliers.  The  second  is  a  market  access
obligation. This requires a country to refrain from applying six specific types of quantitative
restrictions on services suppliers, be they domestic or foreign suppliers. For example, there is
to be no limit on the number of services suppliers or on the value of services transactions.
GATS  recognizes  the  right  of  individual  governments  to  regulate.  Non-economic
objectives  can  be  pursued,  for  example,  through  universal  service  obligations.  Services
provided  by  governments  are  quarantined. However,  GATS  also  requires  that  domestic
regulatory regimes be the “least burdensome” necessary to achieve their objectives. Although
this provides a further WTO discipline on non-discriminatory measures that fall outside of the
narrow  scope  of  GATS “market  access”  commitments,  the  discipline  is  rather  loose,
especially  since  the  definition  of “least  burdensome”  has  yet  to  be  decided on by  WTO
members.
The presumption exists that the services provisions of preferential trade agreements
(PTAs) will be GATS-plus. That is, they will impose rules at least as liberal as those of
GATS, and impose them on at least as many sectors. In part, this presumption is written into
GATS itself. For the services provisions of PTAs to be WTO-consistent, they need to have
substantial sectoral coverage, and provide for the absence or elimination of substantially all
discrimination, in the sense of the national treatment obligation. However, it should be noted
that there is no WTO requirement for PTAs to address non-discriminatory market access
limitations, or to address domestic regulation. In fact, enforcing WTO consistency has proved
no easier in services than it has in goods.
In practice, when PTAs have included services provisions, they have tended to be of
two  types.  GATS-style  agreements  have  included  national  treatment  and  market  access
obligations for services on a positive list basis, and have included investment provisions only
via the treatment of commercial presence in the services sector. In contrast, North American
Free  Trade  Agreement-style pacts have  included  national  treatment  and  market  access
obligations for services on a negative list basis. That is, the obligations apply to all services96
sectors, except those nominated for exclusion in an annex of reservations and exceptions;
they have typically included a separate chapter on investment that imposes most-favoured
nation  and  national  treatment  obligations  on  investment  in  all  sectors  (again,  subject  to
reservations and exceptions), not just in services.
Several recent studies have compared the rules established under PTAs to those of the
GATS (e.g., Marchetti and Roy, 2008; Dee and Findlay 2009). They have shown that in many
dimensions, PTAs are not as liberal on average as WTO agreements. This is in part because
some PTAs have no substantive services provisions at all – only a minority of the agreements
between developing countries have such provisions. It is also because many PTAs are silent
on issues such as domestic regulation, monopolies, private business practices, safeguards and
subsidies. These are not areas where PTAs have forged ahead of WTO disciplines. However,
on the two core issues of market access and national treatment, PTAs are now more liberal on
average than WTO. This is largely because of the growing list of agreements that include
these disciplines on a negative list rather than a positive list basis.
2. Evaluating the commitments
On commitments, Roy, Marchetti and Lim (2006) and Marchetti and Roy (2008) find
that PTAs tend to go significantly beyond GATS offers under the Doha Round, in terms of
improved  and  new  bindings.  Further,  the  proportion  of  new/improved  commitments  is
generally much greater in PTAs (compared with GATS offers) than in GATS offers (when
compared with  existing  GATS  commitments).  Some  countries  are  described  as  showing
spectacular improvements in their PTA commitments. Among them are countries that have
signed a PTA with the United States. On average, these now have mode 1 (cross-border) and
mode 3 (commercial presence) commitments in more than 80 per cent of services subsectors,
compared with  commitments  in  less  than  half  of  the  services  subsectors  in  their  GATS
schedules/offers.
In  most  cases  where  PTA  commitments  improve  on  WTO  commitments,  it  is
primarily  through  new  bindings  rather  than  through  improvements  on  existing  bindings.
Arguably, though, the commitments are more likely to imply real liberalization in the latter
case than in the former. Exceptions to the general trend include China and India, whose PTA
commitments (China with Hong Kong, China and Macao, China, and India with Singapore)
tend  to  take  the  form  of  improvements  to  sectors  already  committed  under  GATS
schedules/offers rather than new bindings, and are mostly limited to mode 3 (commercial
presence).
Finally, the above authors note that PTAs provide for advances both for sectors that
tended to attract fewer offers in the GATS (e.g., audiovisual, road, rail and postal-courier) as
well as for sectors that were already popular targets for GATS offers (e.g., professional and
financial services). One exception is health services, where PTA commitments do not appear
to go significantly beyond GATS offers.
Overall,  Roy,  Marchetti  and  Lim  (2006)  concluded  that  “PTAs  generally  have
provided for significant improvements over GATS commitments, sometimes even leading to97
real liberalization of the market.
3. Evaluating the extent of real liberalization
In a recent exercise, Barth and others (2006) compared regulatory practice with actual
WTO commitments in the financial sector for 123 WTO members. They found significant
differences between commitments and actual practice. Some of their examples are:
(a) More than 30 WTO members that prohibit foreign firms from entering through
acquisitions, subsidiaries or branches in their WTO schedules allow such entry in
practice;
(b) Six WTO members do not allow foreign entry through subsidiaries or branches,
even though in their schedules they indicated they do. This anomaly may reflect
the “prudential carve  out”  in GATS,  whereby  members  are  not  required  to
schedule  limitations  maintained  for  prudential  purposes.  However,  it  is  highly
questionable whether bans on foreign entry could be defended as purely prudential
measures;
(c) A large number of WTO members prohibit banks from engaging in insurance or
securities activities in their schedules, but allow such activities in practice;
(d) Twenty-six  WTO members  in  practice  set  the  same  minimal  capital  entry
requirements for domestic and foreign banks, even though in their schedules they
do not commit to such non-discriminatory treatment.
Barth  and  others  (2006) also  looked  for  evidence  of  statistically  significant
correlations between WTO commitments and regulatory practice.  Even if the two do not
match exactly, they expect the correlation to be positive. However, their finding did not bear
this out:
“The  results…indicate  that,  on  average,  countries  are  more  open  based  on
actual  practice  than  their  WTO  commitments.  The  difference  in  means
between  actual  practice  and  commitments,  moreover,  is  statistically
significant. Also, there is no significant correlation between actual practice
and commitments. These results hold for developing countries and countries
with more than 2 million people, but not for the developed countries. The
latter group of countries is, on average, less open based upon actual practice
than commitments.”
This last, rather explosive finding passes without further comment!
As evidence about whether PTAs promote real liberalization, the findings are merely
circumstantial. However, if WTO commitments lag in actual practice by a significant margin,
then even if PTAs improve significantly on WTO commitments they may still themselves lag
in actual practice.
Roy, Marchetti and Lim (2006) also attempted to assess whether PTA commitments
led to real liberalization. They did not make direct comparisons with regulatory practice, but98
looked for instances where PTA commitments were phased in over time, using the phasing
mechanism as an indication that real liberalization is taking place. They noted that the group
of countries making such phased commitments was fairly widespread, although it appeared
that  financial  services  and  telecommunications  dominated.  Most  phase-out  commitments
have been contracted by countries as part of a PTA with the United States, although not
exclusively.
Certainly,  the  PTA  experience  with  partners  other  than  the United  States  can  be
dramatically  different.  It  is  widely  recognized  that  in  the Association  of  Southeast  Asian
Nations (ASEAN) members, WTO commitments and PTA commitments can lag in actual
practice by a considerable margin (e.g., Stephenson and Nikomborirak, 2002). In fact, one of
the recent PTAs that contains no services commitments whatsoever is that between ASEAN
and China.
4. Evaluating the economic significance of real liberalization
Dee (2007) argued the following three propositions:
(a) When real liberalization of services and investment occurs in trade agreements, it
tends to involve the removal of discrimination against foreigners;
(b) In PTAs, this tends to be on a preferential basis, i.e., only for the particular partner
country;
(c) Therefore,  when  real  liberalization  of  services  and  investment  occurs  in  trade
agreements,  it  tends  not  to  involve  the  liberalization  of  restrictions  that  affect
domestic and foreign players equally.
This  is  despite  the  fact  that  GATS  specifically  recognizes  certain  types  of  non-
discriminatory restrictions on market access, and imposes weaker disciplines on other non-
discriminatory  restrictions  through  its  provisions  on  domestic  regulation.  This  chapter
outlines a number of reasons for these outcomes.
Some of the reasons are reflected in the attitude of trade negotiators. Two statements
often heard from trade negotiators are that they “do not want to give away negotiating coin”
and that “they are not in the business of negotiating on behalf of other countries”. This latter
sentiment, in particular, places the imperative on ensuring that trade concessions in PTAs are
restricted to being preferential, even when economic arguments suggest that a country could
gain more from making them on a non-preferential basis.
With an imperative for PTA concessions to be preferential, this often dictates that the
concessions need to target measures that explicitly discriminate against foreigners. This is
because, in many cases, the only provisions that can feasibly be liberalized on a preferential
basis are those that discriminate against foreigners. Furthermore, as noted, the requirements
for WTO consistency only require PTAs to remove limitations on national treatment. They do
not require them to address issues of market access or domestic regulation.
Another statement heard from trade negotiators is that they will only commit to things99
that  their  country  was  planning  to  do  anyway.  According  to  this  imperative,  when
commitments are made that affect domestic services providers as well as foreigners, they tend
to involve no real liberalization that would not have taken place anyway. For example, Roy,
Marchetti and Lim (2006) noted that the United States always lodged a broad exception for
the market access obligation in its PTAs whose purpose was to ensure that those PTAs did
not go beyond its market access obligations under GATS.
Other reasons for the above outcomes are reflected in the attitudes of a country’s
trading partners. Under the request-and-offer negotiating modality (which is currently being
used  in  the  Doha  negotiations  on  services,  and  is  the  means  by  which  many  PTAs  are
negotiated), countries are asked to contemplate, not just reforms that are in their own best
interests, but also reforms that are in their trading partners’ best interests. It will tend to be in
a trading partner’s best interests to target only those provisions that explicitly discriminate
against foreigners – in that way, the foreign market share is maximized. Foreign producers
would generally have little interest in unleashing competition from promising domestic new
entrants. They would rather join a cartel on a far more selective basis! Even if the preference
they  receive  is  eventually  eroded  by  other  agreements,  they  will  receive  a  first-mover
advantage that can confer a permanent benefit, particularly when establishing in the market
involves sunk costs (Mattoo and Fink, 2002).
The above observations define the way in which trade agreements in services and
investment tend to be constrained. The economic significance of the constraints comes from
observing that different types of services trade restrictions can have different kinds of effects.
Some  regulatory  trade  restrictions,  particularly  quantitative  restrictions,  create
artificial scarcity. The prices of services are inflated, not because the real resource cost of
producing them has gone up, but because incumbent firms are able to earn economic rents
(excess profits) – akin to a tax, but with the revenue flowing to the incumbent rather than to
government.  Liberalization  of  these  barriers  would  not  only  yield  relatively  small  gains
associated with better resource allocation, it would also have redistributive effects associated
with the elimination of rents to incumbents. Such rent-creating restrictions are tariff-like, with
the redistribution of rent having effects similar to the redistribution of tariff revenue.
Alternatively, services trade restrictions could increase the real resource cost of doing
business. An example would be a requirement for foreign service professionals to retrain in a
new  economy,  rather  than  to  pass  an  accreditation  process.  Liberalization  would  be
equivalent to a productivity improvement (saving in real resources), and yield relatively large
gains. This could increase returns for the incumbent service providers as well as lower costs
for users elsewhere in the economy.
This distinction has two important implications. First, the gains from liberalizing cost-
escalating barriers are likely to exceed the gains from liberalizing rent-creating barriers by a
significant margin. Second, in the context of PTAs, the danger of net welfare losses from net
trade diversion arises if the relevant barriers are rent-creating, since rent distribution can have
the same effects as tariff redistribution (see also Pomfret, 1997).100
So  the  key  to  establishing  the  economic  significance  of  any  real  services  trade
liberalization achieved in trade agreements is to establish whether it targets trade barriers that
create rents or raise costs.
As noted above, the barriers that are easiest to liberalize on a preferential basis are
explicit quantitative restrictions. These create artificial scarcity, and hence tend to generate
rents. For example, one popular target for liberalization in PTAs has been barriers in banking
and telecommunications. The limited empirical evidence suggests that in these sectors (where
explicit barriers to entry are rife), barriers appear to create rents. In distribution services,
where indirect trade restrictions also apply, barriers appear to increase costs. In air passenger
transport and the professions, barriers appear to have both effects.
In particular, discriminatory barriers in the professions appear to create rents, while
the non-discriminatory restrictions (such as restrictions that require partnerships, and require
both  the  investors  and  managers  of  professional  firms  to  themselves  be  licensed
professionals)  increase  costs (Gregan  and  Johnson, 1999;  Kalirajan and  others, 2000;
Kalirajan, 2000;  Nguyen-Hong, 2000; Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and
Development, 2005;  and  Copenhagen  Economics, 2005). In  addition, theoretical  arguments
suggest that barriers in maritime and electricity generation primarily affect costs (Steiner, 2000; and
Clark, Dollar and Micco, 2004).
Dee (2007) showed that if an East Asian PTA managed to eliminate all discrimination
against foreigners in the sectors where empirical evidence was available, the gains would be
small  compared  to  a  moderately  successful  completion  of  the  Doha  Round. In  fact,  they
would be trivial compared to a comprehensive programme of unilateral regulatory reform that
instead  targeted  non-discriminatory,  behind-the-border  restrictions  on  competition.  The
reason is that there appears to be a reasonably strong correlation in practice between measures
that discriminate against foreigners and measures that create rents.
Thus,  those  who  have  evaluated  the  services  and  investment  provisions  of  trade
agreements according to their rules or commitments have tended to see “doughnuts”. Those
who have evaluated them according to whether they create any real, significant liberalization
have tended to see “holes”.
5. Whether to enter trade negotiations – principles of piecemeal reform
The above discussion suggests that for both PTAs and multilateral agreements, there
are reasons to be cautious about the size of the potential gains. In both cases, there are also
situations where the trade agreements could make things worse.
In the case of PTAs, the problem is that if concessions are made to a particular foreign
trading partner, prior to removing non-discriminatory distortions and ensuring the general
contestability of the market, then the  concessions simply risk handing  monopoly rents to
foreigners. Furthermore, if the new trading partner has to incur sunk costs to enter the market,
then a country risks landing itself permanently with a second-class supplier who is difficult to
budge (see also Dee and Findlay, 2008; and Marchetti and Roy, 2008).101
Multilateral trade agreements can avoid some of these problems by opening a market
to  many  foreign  players  simultaneously. However, this  does  not  mean  that  they  are
completely without problems.
At best, removing discrimination against all foreign suppliers simultaneously will not
be sufficient to ensure the full benefits of market opening. It is useful to draw a comparison
with the theory of  goods trade. When  goods  are homogeneous  and domestic and foreign
varieties are perfect substitutes, removing all discrimination against foreign suppliers will be
sufficient to ensure that the country can access goods at the lowest possible price (in this case,
“the”  world price), even if domestic suppliers  are still penalized by domestic distortions.
However, services are typically highly differentiated, often being tailored to the needs of
individual customers. In this case, simply removing discrimination against foreign suppliers
will not be sufficient to ensure that a country can access goods at the lowest possible price. If
domestic suppliers are still penalized by distortions, the prices of their services will remain
too high, despite the foreign competition. The empirical analysis by Dee (2007) suggested
that this latter problem could be highly significant in practice.
At worst, removing discrimination against all foreign suppliers simultaneously can
move  a  country’s  resource  allocation  in  the  wrong  direction,  risking  an  adverse  overall
economic outcome. If domestic suppliers are subject to domestic regulatory impediments, the
resources  devoted  to  domestic  supply  will  be  too  small,  and  in  a  first-best  situation,  the
domestic  sector  should  be  bigger.  However,  subjecting  the  sector  to  more  foreign
competition, while keeping it subjected to its own domestic regulatory impediments, will tend
to make the sector shrink rather than grow – domestic resource allocation is thus moved in the
wrong direction. This has the potential to make economic well-being worse (depending on
whether the sector is a general equilibrium substitute to complement to other sectors in the
economy) (see also Dee, Hardin and Holmes, 2000).
Not only is this a potentially bad economic outcome, it is also a poor outcome in terms
of domestic political economy. Potential domestic new entrants are a key group likely to be in
favour of reform. Failure to lift the domestic regulatory impediments that hold them back
therefore misses an opportunity to mobilize them as part of the pro-reform coalition.
To the extent that both PTAs and multilateral trade agreements focus on barriers to
services trade and investment that create rents rather than raise costs, they both represent poor
political  economy  in  another  sense.  Often,  the  essence  of  barriers  to  services  trade  and
investment  is  that  they  serve  to  protect  incumbent  service  providers  from  any  new
competition, be it from domestic players or foreigners. Thus, incumbent service providers are
often the most vociferous opponents of reform. Yet trade reforms that manage to lower cost
structures have the potential to benefit even the incumbent service providers. Failure to lift
the domestic regulatory impediments that hold them back misses an important opportunity to
mobilize incumbents as part of the pro-reform coalition.
Indeed, the politics of regulatory reform is often the politics of incumbent versus a
range of opposing interests – not just potential new entrants (either domestic or foreign), but
also upstream supplying industries, downstream using industries, consumers and, sometimes,102
even  governments.  Most  of  the  protagonists  are  domestic.  Trade  negotiations  are  forums
where the politics is domestic versus foreign. They are not forums that can mobilize the full
range of domestic pro-reform interests.
The case for reciprocity in services and investment
In  this  regard,  international  reciprocity  does  not  help  greatly  with  the  political
economy of trade reform in services and investment. This is because the politics is primarily
one of competing domestic interests, not domestic versus foreign interests (Dee and Findlay,
2008).
Furthermore, international reciprocity does not help greatly with the economics of
trade reform in services and investment. In goods trade, the adverse terms of trade effects
occur because goods trade barriers operate at the border. However, the regulatory barriers to
services and investment are primarily behind-the-border barriers, and their first-round effects
are primarily on domestic prices and costs. If unilateral trade liberalization has any impact on
the  terms  of  trade  at  all,  it  can  often  be  positive  rather  than  negative,  particularly  if  the
liberalization removes barriers that raise domestic costs. Thus, there are no benefits from
reciprocity within services, as there are no adverse terms of trade effects to be neutralized
(Dee and Findlay, 2008).
Nor are there likely to be significant benefits from reciprocity across sectors. One
reason is that the most intensive users of services are often other services sectors. So the
domestic benefits of services reform often flow to other services sectors, not to manufacturing
or agriculture (for more details, see Dee and Findlay, 2008).
B. What to liberalize within trade agreements
Trade agreements may nevertheless provide useful venues to lock in certain types of
reforms, despite all the qualifications noted above. A second key question is what types of
reforms are best done within trade agreements.
An important first step, however, is to recognize how trade barriers in services and
investment  may  interact  with  legitimate  domestic  regulation.  This  interaction  can  set
additional limits on the extent of trade liberalization.
1. Limits to liberalization
3
In many services sectors, there are legitimate reasons for domestic regulation. For
example, a key reason for prudential regulation in banking and insurance markets is to guard
against systemic instability of the financial system. A key reason for regulating transport
industries is to ensure passenger safety. A key reason for having regulated access regimes in
telecommunications is to avoid the inefficient duplication of infrastructure components that
have “natural monopoly” characteristics.
3 Parts of this section draw on Dee, 2009.103
In services such as education and health, there are typically at least two key regulatory
objectives. One is to deal with asymmetric information. Almost by definition, the clients of
health firms or education institutions are not sufficiently trained to know whether the services
they are receiving are of high quality. In some markets, this problem is dealt with after the
event, via product liability legislation. In education and health markets, this option is typically
deemed unsatisfactory, so quality is regulated before the event – via training and perhaps
licensing/registration  requirements  for  individual  service  providers,  and  by  licensing  and
quality assurance processes for institutions.
Note, however, that regulated quality assurance processes are not the only solution to
this problem. Reputation also has a role to play. Services providers who plan to be in a market
for the long term cannot afford to offer shoddy service forever, or they will lose clients. They
have an incentive to offer quality, and to establish a reputation for doing so.
A  second  key  regulatory  objective  in  education  and  health  markets  is  to  ensure
equitable and affordable access, either for all, or for particular disadvantaged segments of
society.  Government  provision  is  the  traditional  method  of  meeting  this  objective.
Government  subsidies  to  private  institutions  and  (through  scholarships  and  the  like)  to
consumers, are also ways in which is it achieved. However, few governments can afford to
subsidize everyone. Therefore, typically there are limits on who can get government funding,
simply for budgetary reasons.
In some services sectors such as banking and insurance, there is a relative clear-cut
distinction  between  the  regulatory  instruments  used  for  legitimate  prudential  reasons  and
those that are deemed regulatory impediments to trade. The instruments commonly used for
prudential purposes include minimum capital requirements, capital adequacy ratios, liquidity
reserve ratios, possible coverage by an insolvency guarantee or deposit insurance scheme, and
a required frequency of publication of financial statements.
While there are a few grey areas, in most cases regulatory restrictions affecting trade
in  banking  and  insurance  services  can  be  dismantled  without  jeopardizing  prudential
objectives, which are achieved using other means. Of course, there is still a sequencing issue
– it would be unwise to open financial markets without adequate prudential regulation and
without adequate regulatory capacity to design and enforce it.
In health and education services, the distinction between instruments used to achieve
quality and access objectives and those deemed to be regulatory barriers to trade is less clear-
cut. Entry may be restricted to ensure that low-quality providers do not enter the market, or to
protect incumbent service providers. Similarly, access to subsidies may be limited because
governments cannot afford to subsidize everybody. Or access to subsidies may be limited in
order to disadvantage new entrants.
Achieving quality objectives in health and education will inevitably mean that there
are barriers to the entry and operation of at least some providers. However, a well-designed
quality control framework will ensure that the providers who are locked out are the genuinely104
low-quality  ones.  The  framework  can  afford  to  be  relatively  neutral  in  its  treatment  of
domestic and foreign providers, or incumbents and new entrants.
Similarly,  even  in  the  most  open  health  or  education  system,  not  all providers  or
clients will gain access to government subsidies. If the system is to not unduly constrain
trade, then this denial of subsidies should be the same for domestically owned and foreign
providers.  Ideally,  to  maximize  efficiency,  it  should  also  be  neutral  with  respect  to
incumbents and new entrants, finding some criteria other than incumbency as a mechanism to
ration the subsidies. Governments may chose not to be neutral in their treatment of access to
subsidies by domestic and foreign customers, however. For obvious reasons, they may choose
to deny the right of foreign customers to local subsidies.
Because  there  are  more  targets  than  instruments  in  health  and  education,  trade
liberalization in these services cannot be expected to lead to the compete removal of entry
barriers or restrictions on access to subsidies. What trade negotiations might be expected to
do is to ensure that they are reduced to levels that are “no more burdensome than necessary,
in the language of GATS. Where the rationale for regulation is quality assurance, then the
logical way to put this necessity test into operation is to define minimum acceptable standards
of quality that meet the needs of both sides.
To date, there has been little progress in putting a necessity test into operation for any
services within WTO. Arguably, more progress might be made within a PTA among partners
whose levels of development were not too dissimilar.
2. What to liberalize?
As noted above, trade agreements may provide useful venues to lock in certain types
of reforms, despite all the qualifications noted above. The qualifications now include the fact
that  full  liberalization  might  not  be  possible  in  situations  where  there  is  a “targets  and
instruments”  problem – too  few  regulatory  instruments  available  to  achieve  the  desired
targets.
If countries want to concentrate their trade negotiating efforts in areas that generate
the biggest gains, they need to consider five characteristics of their own regulatory barriers:
(a) The height of the trade barrier – that is, the extent to which regulatory restrictions
have raised costs or created rents;
(b) The impact of the barrier – whether the impact has been on costs or rents;
(c) The  incidence  of  the  barrier – whether  it  applies  only  to  foreign  suppliers,  or
whether it also applies to domestic operators;
(d) The size of the affected sector; and
(e) The nature of its input-output linkages to other sectors.
All these factors will affect the overall economy-wide gains from reform. Dee and
Findlay (2008) surveyed some of the evidence on the first three characteristics (more detailed105
evidence is also available in Dee, 2005).
(a) Height of the trade barrier
In some services sectors, particularly banking and telecommunications, services trade
barriers are typically much higher in developing than in developed countries. In most cases,
the remaining barriers in the developed world are low or negligible.
In  other  services  sectors,  particularly  the  professions,  the  distribution  sector
(wholesale and retail trade) and electricity generation, the barriers still tend to be higher in the
developing than the developed countries, but the barriers in the latter countries are often non-
trivial.  Particular  developed  countries  have  maintained  quite  high  barriers  to  entry  and
operations in the professions, particularly the accounting and legal professions. Some have
maintained  significant  restrictions  on  the  operations  of  large  wholesale  and  retail  chains,
either directly or through restrictions on such things as zoning and hours of operation, in
order to protect local “Mom and Pop” stores. Trade barriers  are  also non-trivial in those
developed  countries  that  have  yet  to  open  their  electricity  generation  sectors  fully  to
competition.
In some sectors, barriers are as high in the developed as in the developing world. On
bilateral  air  transport  routes  still  governed  by  traditional  bilateral  air  services  agreements
rather than open skies agreements, the restrictions are as high for developed as for developing
countries.
Finally, for a few services sectors, the barriers are higher in at least some developed
countries than in some developing countries. Maritime is a prime example. The United States
maintains stringent cabotage restrictions, exempts liner shipping conferences from the normal
disciplines of competition policy and maintains a range of other restrictions, including on
hiring foreign crews and on shipping non-commercial cargoes. Its trade barriers in maritime
have been estimated to be higher than in Latin America and most of Asia (McGuire, Schuele
and Smith, 2000).
(b) Impact of the trade barrier
Whether barriers create  rents or add to resource costs is currently severely under-
researched.  Some  of  the  available  empirical  evidence  and a  priori  argument  on  this  was
summarized above. In some cases, the empirical evidence is suggestive, but not conclusive,
because  only  one  performance  measure has  been  used.  In  other  cases,  a  price  impact  is
estimated,  and  then  it  is  simply  asserted  whether  the  effect  operates  through  price-cost
margins or through real resource costs. This is a key area where more thorough empirical
research is needed.
(c) Incidence of the trade barrier
There is a great deal of variability among both developed and developing countries in
whether  barriers  discriminate  against  foreign  services  providers,  or  also  affect  domestic106
operators.
In particular sectors, some developing countries maintain high barriers that are also
strongly discriminatory against foreign operators – for example, banking in Malaysia and
telecommunications  in Thailand.  In  other  sectors,  barriers  are  lower  but  also  strongly
discriminatory – for example, banking in Thailand. In other countries, barriers tend to be both
lower and less discriminatory – for example, the banking and telecommunications sectors in
the Russian Federation, the Baltic countries and much of south-eastern Europe.
In  the  developed  world,  trade  barriers  in  banking  and  telecommunications  are
sufficiently low on average that any margin of discrimination is also trivial. At the other
extreme, barriers in maritime are both high and discriminatory. In Europe, the trade barriers
in engineering services tend to be non-discriminatory, while those in legal services can be
highly discriminatory.
The one generalization that can be made is that when there are significant barriers to
foreign supply, there are typically also non-trivial barriers to domestic supply. It is very rare
to  have  a  significant  barrier  to  foreign  entry  and/or  operations  with  no  barrier  affecting
domestic new entrants.
(d) Size of the affected sector
The size of the affected sector is sufficiently important that it can sometimes dominate
the height of the barrier. In an economy such as Indonesia, for example, barriers to trade in
telecommunications services are higher than those in the distribution sector (i.e., wholesale
and  retail  trade) while  the  height  of  the  barrier  in  distribution  is,  in  fact,  quite  modest.
However, the distribution sector is bigger, accounting for around 15 per cent of the economy.
Primarily because of this, the estimated gains from further reform in distribution are bigger
than those in telecommunications, even after taking into account the potential productivity
boost that could come from greater business-to-business e-commerce (Dee, 2008).
(e) Intersectoral linkages
Finally,  a  key  consideration  is  which  services  sectors  have  strong  intersectoral
linkages to the sectors where a country’s ultimate comparative advantage lays. Ghani (2009)
draws  a  distinction  between  East  Asia,  where  the  ultimate  comparative  advantage  is  in
manufactures, and South Asia, where the ultimate comparative advantage is in services itself
(e.g., both ICT services and ICT-enabled services such as back-office professional services).
The services that have strong intersectoral linkages with manufacturing are those such
as transport, logistics and energy services. The services that have strong intersectoral linkages
to services are most other services. Therefore, East Asia will get relatively large economy-
wide gains from liberalizing and improving productivity in transport, logistics and energy
(this tends to be confirmed in empirical studies such as Dee, 2008). South Asia will record
relatively large economy-wide gains from liberalizing and improving productivity in most
services sectors.107
3. Sectoral priorities: Principles of piecemeal reform
One important principle for piecemeal reform of services – the services equivalent of
the “top down” principle – is to look for sectors where trade barriers tend to add to costs.
These are typically not the areas where regulatory barriers have created artificial barriers to
entry (although rents can still be converted to real resource costs in a number of ways, for
example, by being capitalized into the cost of land). Instead, they tend to be areas where
regulations create unnecessary procedures and red tape.
In the East Asian region, these services sectors also happen to be sectors with strong
intersectoral  linkages  to  manufacturing.  Thus,  the  sectoral  priorities  in East  Asia  should
include  the  various  links  in  the  logistics  chain – customs,  transport  (road,  rail,  air  and
maritime), distribution and telecommunications – which is vital for e-commerce. They should
also  include  energy  services,  particularly  electricity,  where  poorly  designed  domestic
regulation can add to costs. They should also include some less obvious backbone services,
such as legal and accounting services, where at least some regulatory restrictions also add to
costs.
At least some of these services involve significant physical infrastructure, and it is
also well-recognized that the availability of infrastructure is also critical to economic growth.
Thus, regulatory reforms that can improve the investment climate in these areas will have a
doubly  beneficial  impact – increasing  the  resources  available  as  well  as  improving  the
productivity of the resources that are employed.
In South Asia, services trade reforms do not need to be quite so targeted because of
the relatively dense intersectoral linkages within the services area. However, the transport and
distribution sectors are areas where regulatory trade barriers in South Asia are high, and are
likely to be adding unnecessarily to cost structures.
C. Conclusion
A  second  key  principle  for  piecemeal  reform of  services – arguably  even  more
important than the first – is to look more broadly than just removing discrimination against
foreign providers. This means that trade negotiators and trade ministers should not “let the tail
wag the dog”. This means that:
(a) They should not pursue services trade for its own sake, but rather define their
country’s  overall  domestic  reform  objectives  clearly  and  let  the  trade  policy
initiatives follow on naturally;
(b) They should not get hung up on “negotiating coinage;” and
(c) They should worry primarily about productivity in services and let trade look after
itself.108
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VI. The global crisis: A wake-up call for trade finance
capacity-building in emerging Asia
By Yann Duval and Wei Liu
Introduction
The global economic crisis has attracted renewed attention to the issue of trade
finance  as  exporters in  some  countries,  particularly  SMEs, struggle  to  secure  much-
needed  short-term  financing  and  protection  against  rising  commercial  risks  at  a  time
when demand for their products has fallen dramatically (figure 1). The higher costs and
limited  availability  of  trade  finance  has  prompted  action  by  international  financial
institutions, as the threat it poses to regional economies is significant. A recent empirical
analysis (Liu  and  Duval, 2009) indeed suggested  that  a  10  per  cent  decline  in  trade
finance  could  lead  to  a  drop  in  total  trade  of US$ 129  billion  in  developing  Asia,
representing 3.6 per cent of their total trade.
Figure 1. Sharp drop in trade finance
(Change in the ratio of insured export credit to export)
a
Source: Liu and Duval, 2009, based on Joint BIS-IMF-OECD-World Bank Statistics on External Debt and
CEIC database.
a The ratio is calculated as Berne Union members’ direct insurance or lending in a country to total export value of
that country. The “Change” refers to percentage change from same quarter of previous year.
* The ratios of insured export credit for Q4-08 and Q1-09 are estimated based on an adjusted trend of the last two
quarters for which data are available.
This paper describes the effect of the global crisis on trade finance cost and access
in Asia as well as some of the measures taken at the national, regional and global levels
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reduced  demand  in  developed  country  markets.  It  then  highlights  the  lack  of  trade
finance-related  institutions  in  many  of  the  less  developed  countries  of  Asia,  and
introduces  options  for  regional  cooperation  to  reduce  the  trade  finance  capacity  gap
between countries of the region.
A. Crisis has reduced access to trade finance
Reliable and comprehensive information on trade finance is scarce, but various
surveys  of  financial  institutions  or  exporters  conducted  at  the  national,  global  and
regional levels in late 2008 and during the first half of 2009 have confirmed that there has
been an increase in the price of letters of credit – a trade finance instrument whereby the
bank of the importer guarantees payment to the exporter or its bank upon satisfactory
delivery of a shipment – and export credit insurance (figure 2). Banks surveyed expected
little improvement during 2009.
Figure 2. Rising cost of trade finance
(Average basis point increase over costs)
Source: IMF-BAFT, Trade Finance Survey (March 2009).
1
Countries with high risk ratings have suffered the most from the drying up of
trade finance, as financial institutions have looked for quick ways to reduce the overall
risk of their trade finance portfolios by reducing coverage of transactions considered as
high  risk.  Since  “country  risk”  is  the  basis  for  setting  minimum premium  rates  for
transactions covered by many export credit agencies, a country’s sovereign default risk
directly affects an individual exporter’s ability to get trade financing. Least developed
countries such as Afghanistan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar and Nepal
are  classified  in  the  highest  country  risk  category.
2 Transactions  with those  countries
have traditionally been associated with higher risk premiums, and the recent global crisis
has made this worse.
1 Results  based  on  responses  from  44  banks  in  23  countries.  Accessed  24  July  2009  at
http://baft.org/content_folders/Issues/IMFBAFTSurveyResults20090331.ppt.
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Some countries in the region have attributed the more difficult access and higher
cost of trade finance to a general liquidity shortage in their economy, but many have
pointed to the increased risk aversion of financial institutions towards enterprises and to
the higher perceived counterparty risk of banks as key factors (Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation, 2009). Strong interventions by central banks have markedly improved the
situation in many economies; however, a general lack of information about trade finance
has contributed to uncertainties about the solvency of counterparties in foreign markets
and increased the perceived risk of trade finance products relative to other products.
Increased capital requirements have also become more important factors in the
rising cost of trade finance
3 and there is a clear possibility that national authorities will
impose even tighter controls on banks’ international operations (Koeppen, 2009). Indeed,
cross-border financial flows have declined for the first time in 30 years. The International
Chamber of Commerce  has pointed to the implementation of the  Basel  II charter
4 as
having particularly adverse consequences for trade lending to SMEs and counterparties in
developing economies (International Chamber of Commerce, 2009). A review of these
regulations  may  therefore  be  needed  to  ensure  that  they  do  not  unduly  constrain  the
provision of trade finance, particularly to the less developed countries of the region.
B. Many trade finance facilitation measures taken
Serious concerns that constraints on the supply of trade finance as an essential
trade  enabler  would  further  reduce  the  capacity  of enterprises  to  trade prompted
international  financial  institutions  and  the  G20  to  take  a  number  of  trade  finance
facilitation measures in the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009. At the
global level, the G20 committed to ensuring availability of at least US$ 250 billion over
the following two  years  to  support  trade  finance  through  their  export  credit  and
investment  agencies  and  trade  finance  schemes  of  international  financial  institutions,
including the International Finance Corporation Global Trade Liquidity Pool.
5
At the regional level, the Asian Development Bank has agreed to a significant
expansion of its trade finance programme, which is expected to generate up to US$15
billion in support until 2013 to help counter an export slump that has been exacerbated by
the lending difficulties of commercial banks. At the national level, many countries have
also implemented new or enhanced trade finance schemes in response to the crisis, most
often focusing on providing export credit insurance and guarantees to help enterprises
and banks to manage their risks (figure 3). These global, regional and national initiatives
will certainly contribute to increased availability of trade finance in the near term, and it
3 See IMF-BAFT Survey results (reasons for increased pricing of trade finance).
4 Basel II is a set of banking regulations put forth by the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision, which
regulates finance and banking internationally.
5 The new International Finance Corporation Global Trade Liquidity Pool that should provide up to US$ 50
billion in trade liquidity support over the next three years, with significant co-financing from the private
sector (as part of the global effort to ensure the availability of at least US$ 250 billion of trade finance over
the next two years).113
is heartening to see how quickly they have been agreed upon and implemented across the
region.
Figure 3. New or enhanced trade finance facilitation measures implemented in the
Asia-Pacific region
*
Source: Survey by the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Senior Officials’ Meeting, Chair’s Office (17
July 2009, Singapore).
* This figure indicates the number of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation member economies that have
taken different types of measures in response to the trade financing problem. Schemes under “Others”
included  equity  financing,  bonding  and  surety,  SME  funding  schemes,  rediscount  of  trade  bills,  less
conservative capital adequacy ratio, documentary credit guarantees, trade finance advisory service, multi-
currency trade finance, indirect exporter finance scheme, SME assistance guarantee scheme and industry
restructuring guarantee fund scheme.
C. Less developed countries have limited trade finance capacity
However, many of the smaller and less developed countries in the region have
very limited capacity to address trade finance shortages on their own, and may not fully
benefit from global and regional schemes as they lack the required national trade finance
institutions and infrastructure. Government-backed export credit insurance and guarantee
institutions and/or export-import (EXIM) banks are still inefficient or missing in many
developing countries of the region (Auboin and Meier-Ewert, 2003).
6 These institutions
can  be particularly useful in  times  of  crisis when  financial  markets  may  not  be
functioning efficiently and worthy borrowers are finding it difficult to secure financing























and insurance from commercial institutions. Similarly, they can play an important role in
facilitating South-South trade (box 1).
Box 1. Role of national export-import banks: The case of EXIM Thailand
The success of Thailand’s economic development efforts during the second half of the
1980s prompted many economists to believe that Thailand could extend this success by adopting
an export-led growth strategy that would provide SMEs with an opportunity to participate in
international trade. To support this strategy, Thailand consolidated and/or created a number of
institutions  specializing  in  foreign  trade,  among  them  the  Export-Import  Bank  of  Thailand
(EXIMT).
EXIMT was established in 1993 as a 100 per cent government-owned corporation to
provide financial services to support imports, exports and foreign investment beneficial to the
Thai economy. Its start-up capital of Baht 2.5 trillion (US$ 100 million) came from the Bank of
Thailand (BoT) and the Ministry of Finance, and its Board of Directors comprised high-level
representatives from all the trade-related ministries as well as private sector representatives.
               The Bank was mandated and authorized to provide a wide array of financial services,
ranging from export refinancing to export credit insurance. Packing Credit Facilities (subsidized
pre-shipment  and  post-shipment  financing  facilities  provided  to  exporters  mostly  through
commercial banks) previously provided by BoT were transferred to the newly-formed EXIMT,
which complemented this facility with a standard pre-shipment (unsubsidized) facility directed at
small and new exporters. EXIMT subsequently discontinued its subsidized packing credit facility
in order to comply with World Trade Organization rules as well as because the facility had
become unnecessary due to the high level of market liquidity and falling interest rates.
An Amendment to the Export-Import Bank of Thailand Act promulgated in 1993 further
broadened the mandate of EXIMT to allow it to support export-related domestic investment. As a
result, the Bank added to its product portfolio a credit facility for business expansion. EXIMT’s
number of products and services has increased over time and become more sector-specific with a
focus on SMEs. Foreign investment advisory services as well as export advisory services began
to be offered in 1999. In recent years, the Bank has developed an SME Financial Service Centre
offering streamlined products and services and a faster response time.
The current global crisis has prompted the Bank to further emphasize its development
banking role, providing entrepreneurs with complete business solutions, ranging from loans and
export credit insurance to financial advisory services, with a special focus on three sectors: (a)
logistics services; (b) the energy sector, especially alternative and biomass energy sources and
technology; and (c) infrastructure and public utilities.
As of February 2009, EXIMT was expected to receive a capital injection of Baht 5 billion
from the Ministry of Finance for use in providing additional export credit insurance facilities to
struggling  Thai  exporters.  Its  Buyer/Bank  Risk  Assessment  Service  also became particularly
popular, as exporters were increasingly concerned of the possibility of defaults. The Bank also
adopted a more pro-active role in regional and South-South trade facilitation and promotion,
opening a branch in Moscow and planning to establish specialized country and industry focus
desk units in Cambodia, India, Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Viet Nam.
After more than 15 years of operation, including during the Asian financial crisis of115
1997/98, a review of EXIMT’s experience indicates that:
(a) An EXIM bank can be effective in stimulating the development of trade finance, by
introducing  new  products  and  services  (such  as  export  credit  insurance)  and  by
disseminating relevant information to potential exporters. Once an EXIM bank has
good  experience  in  evaluating  SMEs  export  potential,  the  bank  may  use  this
experience to offer longer-term credits supporting business expansion;
(b) An EXIM bank’s credit rating will typically have sovereign credit rating, because it is
backed by the government. Such a rating may make it easier for the bank to access
international credit markets as compared with domestic banks;
(c) An EXIM bank should focus on complementing the services offered by commercial
banks, and provide credit to small and new exporters, including SMEs with export
potential. It should also provide additional credit lines to large exporters who are
unable to obtain the full credit they require from commercial banks;
(d) An  EXIM  bank  can  help  regulate  the  cost  of  trade  finance  services  offered  by
commercial  banks,  especially  when  there  are  few  commercial  banks  offering
international banking services;
(e) An EXIM bank, while not expected to finance a large share of exports and foreign
investment  under  normal  circumstances,  can  be  an  effective  source  of  backup
financing during major financial crises (EXIMT’s activities doubled during the Asian
crisis); and
(f) An EXIM bank should be managed as a self-sustaining organization, with no subsidies
of interest rates, but with a modern and creative risk assessment and management
programme to support small and new enterprises with export potential. Offering a
wide  array  of  products  and  services  makes  it  easier  for  the  bank  to  market  its
services, satisfy the needs of its clients and be profitable.
___________________
Sources: www.exim.go.th;  ESCAP, Current  Issues  on  Industry,  Trade  and  Investment,  No.  2  (United
Nations publication, Sales No. E.04.II.F.6, ST/ESCAP/2298), 2003; and interviews with EXIMT officials
(April 2009).
Credit rating institutions are also weak or absent in many developing countries in
the  region,  and  the current  crisis  has  shown  how  important  these  institutions  are  in
ensuring the proper functioning of financial markets. One recent study estimated that
improving the quality and availability of credit information in China and India to the
average  level  achieved  in Organization  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development
(OECD)  could  ultimately  increase  their  exports  by  7  per  cent  or  more  (Duval  and
Utoktham, 2009). Reliable information on importers’ or exporters’ creditworthiness is
indeed essential for trade finance providers to accurately assess the risk associated with a
given transaction and offer affordable trade finance products.
Unfortunately, as shown in figure 4, serious deficiencies in credit information are
apparent  in  most of  the least developed  countries,  regardless  of  the  subregion.
Interestingly, North and Central Asian countries, with the exception of Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan, appear to be relatively well equipped in this area, and credit information in
that subregion improved significantly between 2006 and 2008.116
Figure 4. Availability and quality of credit information in selected Asian and
Pacific economies
[0 = no availability; 6 = full availability]
Source: ESCAP based on Doing Business Data (www.doingbusiness.org).
Note: The  credit  information  index  measures  the  scope,  accessibility  and  quality  of  credit
information through either public or private bureaus in a country. The index ranges from 0 to 6,
with  a  higher  value  indicating  that  more  credit  information  is  available  to  facilitate  lending
decisions.
Establishing or strengthening national trade finance institutions should be given
serious consideration, as the absence or ineffectiveness of such institutions puts traders at
a  relative  disadvantage,  particularly  in  times  of  crisis.  The  focus  may  be  placed  on
establishing  government-backed  but  self-sustainable  organizations  that offer  particular
risk assessment and management programmes to support and build the capacity of SMEs
with export potential in this area. In addition, governments may focus on strengthening
the  quality  and  availability  of  credit  information  by  supporting  the  development  of
domestic credit rating services.
In the long term, as the bulk of trade finance is provided by commercial banks
operating in the domestic market – often as part of short-term, multi-purpose loans (non-
trade  specific  working  capital) – a  strong,  credible  and  well-developed  banking  and
insurance sector is the key to ensuring access to a full array of trade finance instruments.117
Good and stable macroeconomic fundamentals, prudential regulations and a pragmatic
approach to financial sector liberalization will be essential in achieving this goal. This is
certainly  a  tall  order  in  many  developing  countries – and  one  that  goes  beyond  the
responsibilities of ministries in charge of trade – but empirical studies have repeatedly
confirmed the significant effect of financial sector regulations and development on trade.
In  addition,  many  of  the  trade  finance  facilitation  schemes  launched  by  regional  and
global development banks rely on domestic financial institutions to channel the funds to
traders  and  SMEs,  making  it  important  to  build  the  capacity  of  these  institutions  to
perform this function efficiently.
D. A role for trade finance cooperation
Given the large gap in the availability of trade finance services between countries
of the region, deepening cross-border cooperation on trade finance and pooling resources
and expertise in this area may be an effective way to tackle bottlenecks in trade financing.
Options  include: (a) strengthening  cooperation  and  networking  among  and  between
export-import banks and Development Finance Institutions; (b) expanding multilateral
clearing arrangements and related international payment services – possibly based on
those offered by the Asian Clearing Union;
7 (3) reviewing the effectiveness and possibly
further strengthening the Asian Development Bank trade finance facilitation programme;
and (d) establishing a multilateral export credit insurance company and/or a new regional
capital market fund for South-South trade and investment finance.
Developing  cooperation  among  banks  and  governments  on  the  collection  and
sharing of credit information could also be explored as it would allow for more accurate
cross-border  transaction  risk  assessment  and,  ultimately,  lower  trade  finance  costs.
Countries with established trade finance expertise and institutions may initially support
the establishment of regional communities of practice on trade finance and credit rating,
which would facilitate the transfer of expertise to countries in need of developing or
upgrading their national trade finance infrastructure.
E. Conclusion
Trade  finance  is  an  essential  enabler  of  international  trade  and  requires  the
continuous attention of trade policy makers. There is a clear dearth of information and
reliable analysis in this area and many questions remain unanswered:
(a) Which models of export credit insurance and guarantee organizations are most
appropriate for developing countries of the region?
(b) How are SMEs financing their imports and exports, and what are their needs
and priorities in this area?
7 The Asian Clearing Union is the simplest form of payment arrangements whereby the members settle
payments for intraregional transactions among the participating central banks on a multilateral basis. The
main  objectives  of  a  clearing  union  are  to  facilitate  payments  among  member  countries  for  eligible
transactions, thereby economizing on the use of foreign exchange reserves and transfer costs as well as
promoting trade among the participating countries. See www.asianclearingunion.org/.118
(c) What are country and regional needs in trade finance statistics? Is there scope
for establishing a trade finance monitoring system?
(d) What kind of regional trade finance cooperation mechanisms would be most
effective in improving trade finance capacity in less developed countries of
the region?
Research  institutions  in  developing  countries  of  Asia  and  the  Pacific,  in
consultation with trade policy makers, may  assist in filling the existing trade finance
knowledge gap. Consideration should be given to the establishment of a regional trade
finance database to facilitate information exchange and share experiences, as this could
support the development of more relevant and effective capacity-building programmes on
trade finance in the region.119
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VII. Geographical trade structure and patterns of international
portfolio investment – the case of Australia
By Kevin Daly and Anil Mishra
Summary
This paper analyses the geography of Australia’s international portfolio investment using
the International Monetary Fund’s coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey dataset. It provides
some answers to the following questions: (a) why does the pattern of Australia’s capital flows
not  match  that  of  its  trade  flows;  (b)  which  bilateral  factors  are  responsible for  explaining
Australia’s  portfolio  equity  investment  holdings;  and  (c)  are  cultural,  informational  factors
important  in  explaining  Australia’s  portfolio  allocations;  and  (d)  how  regulatory  and  legal
variables affect equity portfolio holdings? Preliminary results suggest that Australia’s external
holdings of equity and debt as a percentage of national income almost doubled between 1997
and 2001. However Australia’s international investment position as a percentage of national
income is one of the lowest among the major OECD countries. In 2001, approximately two
thirds of Australia’s total investments were invested in the United States of America and the
United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland.  In  contrast,  Australia’s  trade  share
(exports plus imports as a percentage of Australia’s total world trade) with these countries was
approximately  20  per  cent  in  2001. The  major  determinants  of  Australia’s  geographical
allocation  of  portfolio  investment  indicate  a  broad  correspondence  between  stock  market
capitalization of destination countries and the allocation of Australian financial investments –
although  with some deviations from that baseline, where the deviations are correlated with
Australian  trade  patterns.  Australia’s  disproportionate  investment in  a  few  countries  can  be
attributable to an extension of the home bias puzzle that has been observed by many researchers.
In general, the paper attempts to identify and quantify those determinants that drive
Australia’s overseas financial investments. In the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis it
would appear that information related to those factors that influence investment decisions is now
more urgent than at any time in the history of global funds management. More research into the
determinants of a country’s international investment position would therefore appear desirable,
given that the number of relevant drivers appear to be highly volatile and of a country-specific
nature.
Introduction
The rapid increase in international capital flows (foreign direct investment and portfolio
investment)  is  one  of  the  most  significant  developments  in  the  global  economy  in  recent
decades. The Australian investment environment has been progressively liberalized, beginning
with the removal of foreign exchange controls in 1987 and the movement to a floating exchange
rate  regime;  other  milestones  include  the  opening  up  of  the  banking  sector  to  foreign
competition. Compared to other countries Australia is quite outward looking in its investment121
behaviour,  suggesting  that  Australian  investors  recognize  the  advantages  of  international
diversification.
In general, the benefits to individual investors from investing in international portfolios
come about through the opportunities that local investors are offered to insulate their portfolios
from  a  downturn  in  local  asset  prices  via  investing  in  global  markets.  From  a  country
perspective,  the  benefits  from  international  diversification  may  also  be  captured  via
diversification across trade and investment (debt and equity). For example, when a country’s
major trading partner experiences a decline in demand for traded goods, a corresponding upturn
in the performance of that country’s international investment position (IIP) may compensate for
this situation.
1
Several recent  papers  have  focused  specifically  on  the  patterns  of  bilateral  equity
investment. Davis and others (2001) developed a dynamic model for analyzing international
trade in risky financial assets where there is incomplete information. Ahearne and others (2004)
tested for home bias in United States equity holdings.  Martin and Rey (2000) investigated the
impact of financial integration on asset returns, risk diversification and breadth of financial
markets. Portes and others (2001) tested the relevance of informational barriers by estimating
gravity models for trade in different financial assets. Their results suggest that trading in equities
and corporate bonds requires a deeper knowledge of the host countries’ accounting practices,
corporate culture, political events and current business conditions. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001)
presented a simple theoretical model that highlighted trade as an important potential determinant
for holding a bilateral portfolio that includes equity and debt. In a two-country setting, they
showed that the existence of frictions in product markets would naturally generate a home bias
in equity positions, even if global financial markets were complete.
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) extended the two-country model of Obstfeld and Rogoff
(2001) to N country generalization by incorporating informational and financial frictions. They
found a strong link between bilateral trade in goods and services and bilateral equity holdings.
They  also  found  that  large  bilateral  equity  positions  were  associated  with  proxies  for
informational  proximity.  Absent  is  a  study  related  to  Australia’s  international  investment
patterns.
This paper examines the degree of correspondence between Australia’s trade and IIP.
Australia’s  equity  portfolio  investment  patterns  are  examined,  using  the  newly-released
International Monetary Fund (IMF) Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS)
2 data.
 The paper focuses on understanding the relationship between capital flows and trade
flows based on data sourced from CPIS 1997 and 2001 data. To begin the investigation of the
determinants  of  Australia’s  geographical  allocation  of  portfolio  investment  a  series  of
multivariate regressions have been employed. The broad relationships between capital flows and
trade flows, financial market shares and shares in world gross national income are examined.
Accordingly, variables are used for Australia’s exports and imports as calculated from the IMF
1 The international investment position is a central concept in international macroeconomics, since it lays out the
international balance sheet of foreign assets and liabilities held by Australian residents.
2 The purpose of CPIS is to improve statistics of holdings of portfolio investment assets viz. equity as well as long-
term and short-term debt. CPIS collects comprehensive information, with geographical details on the country of
residence  of  the  issuer,  the  stock  of  cross-border  equities,  long-term  bonds  and  notes,  and  short-term  debt
instruments related to international investment position.122
Direction of Trade Statistics; the value of bond and share trading are calculated from Federation
Internationale des Bourses de Valeurs data; and gross national income (GNI) is calculated from
World Development Indicators (World Bank, 1993 and 2003).
To further the understanding of Australia’s international portfolio investment, this paper
follows a similar methodology to that employed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001), and Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2004), by developing an empirical model that takes into consideration a number
of  variables  which  influence  Australia’s  international  investment  patterns.  In  particular,  the
model includes an array of gravity type variables to proxy information costs and quality of the
regulatory environment in the host country, i.e., telephone cost, common language, rule of law,
efficiency of the judicial system, accounting standards and creditors’ rights variables.
The paper is organized as follows. Section A provides a summary account of Australian
and other major Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member
countries’ external holdings of debt and equity compared to trade flows. It investigates a number
of factors that may explain why so few countries provide a destination for a substantial holding
of Australia’s foreign investment flows. Section B develops an empirical model that examines
factors which encourage/discourage portfolio and foreign direct investment, but not trade flows.
It also explains the investment bias. Section C presents the conclusion.
A. Data and trends
Until recently, data on the level as well as geographical pattern of international portfolio
investment have been inadequate (see below). In recognition of this fact, in the mid-1990s IMF
commenced a pioneering comprehensive survey of the geographic structure of foreign portfolios
(equity and long-term bonds). The data employed in this paper comes from the IMF CPIS for
1997 and 2001. Previously, the balance of payments data employed in economic modelling was
related  to  flows  of  assets  but  not  about  valuation  changes.  The  flow  data  provide  little
information about the determinants of international asset holdings (Lane and Milesi-Ferreti,
2004 and Warnock, 2002). In 1993, the IMF Committee on Balance of Payments decided to
undertake
3 an internationally coordinated benchmark survey of long-term portfolio investment
holdings in order to facilitate cross-country comparisons, permit data exchanges, and encourage
standardization and best practice. The CPIS was conducted at the end of December 1997 with
participation by 29 countries
4 and again in 2001 with the involvement of 64 countries. The
results for both those surveys were published by IMF. The 1997 results were published in 2000
(International Monetary Fund, 2000a) and up-to-date survey results are now published regularly
(International Monetary Fund, 2003).
Preliminary findings
Tables 1 and 2 provide an overall view of external holdings of foreign equity as well as
long-term and short-term debt for Australia and a number of industrial countries. The countries
are  ranked  in  descending  order  in  terms  of  foreign  portfolio  holdings  when  measured  as  a
proportion to GNI. Table 1 shows that Australia’s external holdings of equity and debt were
3 In 1992 an IMF Working Party on the Measurement of International Capital flows found that at the global level
recorded portfolio liabilities outweighed portfolio asserts by as much as US$ 400 billion (International Monetary
Fund, 1992).
4 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bermuda, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Indonesia,
Ireland,  Israel,  Italy,  Japan, Republic  of  Korea,  Malaysia,  the  Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Norway,  Portugal,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States and Venezuela.123
approximately  10.6  per  cent  of  GNI  in  1997;  in  contrast,  table  2  shows  that  by  2001  the
percentage of national income invested abroad had almost doubled to 20.59 per cent of GNI.
However,  it  is  noteworthy  that  Australia’s  international  investment  position  as  a
percentage of national income is one of the lowest among the major OECD countries. In fact,
Australia’s external investment position on the international ladder relative to other countries in
table 2 had not changed by 2001 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
2003). Australia’s increased IIP from 1997 to 2001 was almost entirely attributable to increased
equity investment doubling from 8.7 per cent to 16.6 per cent of GNI over five years.





















United Kingdom 461 553 36.4 483 354 38.10 27 080 1.82 971 987 76.68
Netherlands 127 314 30.1 115 425 27.30 -- -- 242 739 57.43
Sweden 52 367 2.23 16 451 0.70 2 739 1.15 71 557 28.93
Singapore 16 199 15.6 4 527 4.30 2 061 2.36 22 787 21.89
Italy 75 233 6.35 172 239 14.50 10 391 0.92 257 863 21.77
United States 1 197446 14.50 542 898 6.60 -- -- 1 740 344 21.14
Canada 105 920 17.30 17 491 2.90 4 859 0.71 128 270 20.99
Germany 235 648 10.10 255 333 10.90 -- -- 490 981 20.95
France 99 604 6.60 205 938 13.70 -- -- 305 542 20.31
Japan 158 771 3.20 712 161 14.40 31 324 0.69 902 256 18.27
Australia 32 870 8.70 7 449 2.00 1 217 0.32 41 536 10.60
New Zealand 5 002 8.00 1 448 2.00 -- -- 6 450 10.36
Spain 22 308 3.70 24 771 4.10 -- -- 4 707 7.77
Republic of Korea 976 0.19 8 101 1.50 4 428 0.99 13 505 2.58
Hong Kong, China (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c)
Switzerland -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Sources: International Monetary Fund, 2000a; data for Germany are from International Monetary Fund, 2000b; GNI data
are from World Bank, 1997.
Note: Data are for end-1997; -- = data unavailable; (c) = data not disclosed due to reasons of confidentiality.124

















Switzerland 247 409 93.00 227 602 85.56 15 494 5.82 490 505 184.39
Netherlands 235 023 61.00 244 746 63.56 5 900 1.53 485 669 126.12
Singapore 30 020 34.40 42 943 49.27 33 584 38.53 106 547 122.25
Hong Kong, China 94 615 54.57 85 877 49.53 25 108 14.48 205 600 118.58
United Kingdom 558 379 37.50 667 303 44.79 78 362 5.26 1 304 044 87.53
Sweden 103 989 43.71 38 981 16.39 1 526 0.64 144 496 60.74
France 201 752 14.50 462 133 33.16 46 445 3.33 710 330 50.97
Italy 239 472 21.29 307 580 27.35 4 970 0.44 552 022 49.09
Germany 381 184 19.70 401 582 20.72 8 850 0.46 791 616 40.85
Canada 200 674 29.40 17 663 2.59 5 132 0.75 223 469 32.79
Spain 58 698 10.00 103 395 17.56 11 050 1.88 173 143 29.40
Japan 227 351 5.00 1 004 878 22.02 57 525 1.26 1 289 754 28.26
New Zealand 7 618 14.80 4 733 9.18 71 0.14 12 422 24.10
United States 1 612 669 16.30 500 541 5.06 135 309 1.37 2 248 519 22.75
Australia 64 160 16.65 14 396 3.73 796 0.21 79 352 20.59
Republic of Korea 1 300 0.29 5 284 1.18 1 451 0.32 8 035 1.79
Sources: Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey data for 2001; GNI data from World Bank, 2001.
Note: Data are for end-2001.
Turning  to  the  geographical  spread  of  Australia’s  international  portfolio  investment
position, the CPIS data show that Australia’s holdings are primarily concentrated in a handful of
countries. Tables 3 and 4 list the major destination countries for Australia’s portfolio investment
in 1997 and 2001, respectively. In 1997, more than 58 per cent of Australia’s total investment
was invested in the United States (44.31 per cent) and the United Kingdom (14.15 per cent); by
2001, the figure had climbed to almost 66 per cent. In contrast, Australia’s trade share (exports
plus imports as a percentage of Australia’s total world trade) with the United States and the
United Kingdom combined was approximately 19.75 per cent in 1997. By 2001, Australia’s
trade  share  with  those  countries  remained  approximately  the  same.  Reflecting  subdued
investment  conditions  in  Japan,  the  total  equity  investment  position  of  Australia  declined
substantially from 10.7 per cent of total investment in 1997 to 5.8 per cent in 2001. In contrast,
Australia’s trade share with Japan remained constant from 1997 to 2001 at approximately 16 per
cent.
The  geographical  spread  of  Australia’s  equity  investment  as  a  percentage  of  total
portfolio investment overseas is somewhat similar to the spread of total investment abroad as
shown in tables 3 and 4; however, debt is more concentrated in the United States (50 per cent)
while the United Kingdom is the source of approximately 10 per cent of Australia’s debt. What
are the factors that explain why these few countries (the United Kingdom, the United States and
Japan) should be the destination for such a substantial proportion (approx 70 per cent in 1997
and 72 per cent in 2001) of Australia’s overseas investment? First, two of these countries (the
United States and Japan) are Australia’s most significant trading partners with approximately 15
per cent and 16 per cent, respectively, of total trade conducted with each country, as indicated
by the 1997 and 2001 CPIS data. These countries are also the largest economies in the world,
with major shares of the world’s share and bond markets.125





















United States 44.31 43.47 49.31 15.06 47.31 27.72
United
Kingdom
14.15 15.45 9.95 4.69 8.20 4.27
Japan 9.49 10.69 5.40 16.58 6.80 16.63
Netherlands 1.84 2.22 0.46 0.87 1.29 1.42
France 3.63 4.11 2.08 1.70 4.40 5.07
Germany 5.08 4.04 10.44 3.53 7.90 7.89
Switzerland 2.69 3.40 (c) 0.80 1.49 1.05
Hong  Kong,
China
2.17 2.43 1.40 5.17 1.07 0.55
Italy 2.40 2.49 2.36 2.40 1.30 3.99
Canada 1.35 1.21 2.16 1.43 0.84 2.06
Spain 0.95 0.92 1.22 0.54 1.80 2.04
New Zealand 1.18 0.26 2.15 5.77 0.02 0.21
Republic of
Korea
0.42 0.21 1.44 5.59 0.41 1.76
Singapore 0.46 0.58 (c) 3.75 0.18 0.35
Sweden 1.38 1.37 1.62 1.04 0.37 0.83
Sources: Investment shares calculated from IMF survey data; trade share calculated from IMF Direction of
Trade Statistics, GNI share calculated from World Bank 2001 data, world domestic share and bond market data
calculated from Federation Internationale des Bourses de Valeurs data on value of domestic share trading and
value of domestic bond trading.
Note: Data are for 1997; * long-term securities; (c) indicates that a non-zero datum was not disclosed
for reasons of confidentiality.
Table 4. Australia’s foreign investment: Major destination countries, 2001
(Unit: Per cent)



















United States 56.01 58.26 48.28 14.13 53.61 31.29
United Kingdom 9.98 9.05 14.30 4.78 8.59 4.72
Japan 5.82 5.79 5.81 16.03 4.76 14.44
Netherlands 4.59 5.53 0.67 1.10 1.49** 1.22
France 3.66 3.99 2.37 1.61 4.90** 4.41
Germany 3.07 2.60 5.38 3.50 3.93 6.13
Switzerland 1.56 1.87 0.29 0.67 1.66 0.84
Hong  Kong,
China
2.75 2.17 5.49 7.50 0.61 0.55
Italy 1.26 1.10 2.05 2.37 5.90 3.56
Canada 1.12 0.96 1.51 1.47 1.19 2.16
Spain 0.80 0.81 0.78 0.65 2.30 1.86
New Zealand 1.03 0.09 3.67 4.87 0.02 0.16
Republic of
Korea
0.54 0.63 0.15 5.81 1.01 1.42
Singapore 0.98 0.68 2.36 3.86 0.18
t 0.28
Sweden 0.52 0.54 0.44 0.75 0.78 0.75126
Note: Data are for 2001; * long-term securities; ** data for Netherlands and France have been estimated
due to non-availability of data. Total stock and bond value has been taken for Singapore due to non-
availability of domestic stock and bond value.
To  further  investigate  the  factors  responsible  for  certain  countries  holding  such  a
substantial  proportion  of  Australia’s  overseas  investments,  an  empirical  investigation  of
Australia’s international investment and trading position is detailed below.
B. Empirical modelling and results
Investigation  of  the  determinants  of  Australia’s  geographical  allocation  of  portfolio
investment  starts  by  performing  a  multivariate  regression  of  Australia’s  destination  country
portfolio shares on the share of Australia’s trade with each country, financial market share and
share in world GNI, respectively. The following empirical specification is employed in line with
Honohan and Lane (2000):
T S 1 2001 , 1997           (1)
M S 2 2001 , 1997           (2)
M T S 2 1 2001 , 1997             (3)
G M T S 3 2 1 2001 , 1997               (4)
where S = destination  country’s  portfolio  share  in  Australia  (1997,  2001), T =  share  of
Australia’s trade with each country (1997 and 2001) andM = financial market share of each
country in world financial markets (1997 and 2001). (Financial market share is the sum value of
domestic share and bond trading.)G  = country’s share in world GNI (1997 and 2001).
Equation (1) indicates Australia’s portfolio share of the destination country in terms of
the share of Australia’s trade with the destination country; equation (2) represents Australia’s
portfolio share of the destination country in terms of the destination country’s share of the world
financial markets (capitalised value). Equation (3) considers Australia’s portfolio share of the
destination country in terms of the share of Australia’s trade with the destination country and the
destination country’s share of the world financial markets. Finally, equation (4) represents the
Australia’s portfolio share of the destination country in terms of the share of Australia’s trade
with the destination country, the destination country’s share of the world financial markets and
the destination country’s GNP shares as explanatory variables.
Table 5 reports the multivariate regression results
5 for Australia’s destination country
portfolio shares on the share of Australia’s trade with each country, financial market share and
share in world GNI. Column 1 shows that when only trade share is included in the regression,
approximately 46 per cent of the cross-country variations in the share of Australia’s investment
portfolio can be explained by trade patterns alone. Column 2 indicates a broad correspondence
between  the  stock  market  capitalizations  of  destination  countries  and  the  allocation  of
Australian investment.  In particular, the share of the destination country in terms of share of the
world financial markets (capitalized value) explains almost the entire (96 per cent) geographic
5 The results for individual equity and long-term components are similar and can be made available upon request
from the authors, who have only reported the findings for overall portfolio shares in this paper.127
pattern of Australia’ foreign portfolio investment. Column 3 combines the trade share and the
global financial markets’ share variable; together, these two variables explain 97 per cent of
portfolio investment patterns. Adding GNP shares in column 4 to the previous set of explanatory
variables  provides  no  further  explanatory  power  to  the  results.  Table  6  repeats  the  above
exercise for 2001; the results show no appreciable difference over those for 1997.























2 0.46 0.96 0.97 0.97























2 0.35 0.98 0.98 0.98
Note: Dependent variable is portfolio share of each country; ordinary least square regressions; white corrected t-
statistics are in parentheses; R
2 is percentage of total variation explained by independent variables. Significance
level: * 1 per cent; ** 5 per cent; and *** 10 per cent.
Column 2 of tables 5 and 6 shows a very close correspondence between investment
shares and the share of each destination in global market capitalization. Since this overwhelms
everything  else,  a  more  appropriate  specification  is  to  attempt  to  explain  the  deviation  in
investment shares from the benchmark of shares in global market capitalization.
6 To represent
the latter, the following specification is used:
       i i i X CAPSHARE INVSHARE       (6)
6 This formulation was suggested by an anonymous referee.128
where i i i DEVIATION CAPSHARE INVSHARE   i X includes  Australia’s  trade  share  in
destination countries, distance between the capital cities of Australia and destination countries,
language, growth, stock return, and regulatory and accounting variables.
Table 7 shows the regression results. Column (1) represents the trade share variable,
which  appears  positive  (but  not  significant),  implying  that  deviations  from  global  market
capitalization shares are positively associated with trade shares. In column (2) a distance and
language variable is added; here, the trade variable appears positive and significant, the distance
variable  is  significantly  negative  while  the  language  variable  is  significantly  positive.  In
addition,  a  stock  return  variable  is  included  in  column  (3),  which  appears  positive  and
significant,  indicating  that  stock  returns  have  an  important  influence  on  bilateral  equity
investment.    In  line  with  previous  results,  the  legal  and  accounting  standard  variables  in
columns (4) and (5) are also positively related to bilateral equity investment.
Table 7. Deviation regression analysis for 2001
Sources: The independent variable, Trade, is the ratio of the sum of Australian exports and imports by countries to
the total sum of Australia’s exports and imports. Trade – data from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. Stock
markets – the correlation of stock returns of Australia and other countries calculated from Morgan Stanley Capital
International (MSCI) stock indices. EFFI – the efficiency of the judicial system. ACC – accounting standards in
countries as reported by La Porta and others (1998). DIST – the distance calculated from www.indo.com/distance/.
LAN is the common language dummy  variable (dummy = 1 if the official language in countries is English,
otherwise 0). LAN – taken from www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/.
Note: White corrected t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance level: * 0.1 and ** 0.05.
Countries/area: Canada; France; Germany; Hong Kong, China; Italy; Japan; New Zealand, Singapore; Spain;
Sweden; Switzerland; United Kingdom; and United States;. Dependent variable is the deviation in investment
shares from the benchmark of shares in global market capitalization, as in equation 6.
Next, the links between Australia’s bilateral equity holdings and bilateral trade in goods
and  services,  the  relationship  between  Australia’s  bilateral  equity  holdings  and  proxies  for
quality of information and the regulatory environment are investigated. Following Obstfeld and
Rogoff  (2001)  and  Lane  and  Milesi-Ferretti  (2004),  the  following  model  is  employed  for
Australia’s bilateral equity holdings:
    ij ij ij j i ij F IMP x           log log       (5)
where ij x  is the country’s j share of equity holdings in country i; i   and j   denote aggregate
financial frictions that apply at the level of the source and host countries; ij IMP  is the volume of


































2 0.14 0.43 0.44 0.47 0.44129
imports to country j from country i; ij F  denotes a set of factors that generate financial frictions
at the bilateral level.
Table 8 illustrates the regression results of bilateral portfolio equity holdings wherein
Australia is the source country. The dependent variable is log (1+ portfolio equity) of source
country (Australia) in the host country. Included in column (1) are the imports of goods by
source country (Australia) from host country. This variable is positive and significant, implying
a  strong  link  between  bilateral  imports  and  bilateral  investment  holdings.  In  column  (2)
information cost proxies, i.e., telephone cost and common language dummy, are added. The
telephone  cost  variable  is  significantly  negative  while  the  common  language  variable  is
significantly positive. The former result can be explained by the fact that higher telephone costs
are associated with time and distance, which, in turn, have a negative impact on international
equity holdings while speaking a common language has a positive impact on equity holdings.
Overall the adjusted R
2 significance increases from 0.10 to 0.54. In column (3), a proxy is added
for the efficiency of the judicial system. This variable appears with a positive and significant
coefficient,  implying  that  source  country  residents  are  willing  to  hold  equity  portfolios  in
countries where the judicial system is recognized as efficient. In column (4), a legal variable is
added to represent the rule of law. This variable is also positive and significant, implying that
source country residents are willing to hold international shares in their portfolios if the judicial
system there is seen to uphold enforcement of the rule of law. Finally, an accounting standard
variable  also  appears  positive  and  significant  in  column  (5),  implying  that  the  residents  of
source countries are willing to hold equity in countries which have well developed accounting
standards.
Table 8. Portfolio equity investment held by Australians, 2001






































2 0.10 0.54 0.67 0.65 0.67
Source country: Australia.
Host  countries/areas: Austria;  Brazil;  Canada;  Chile;  China;  Czech  Republic;  Denmark;
Finland;  France;  Germany;  Greece;  Hong  Kong,  China;  Hungary;  India;  Indonesia;  Ireland;
Israel; Italy; Japan; Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway;
Peru;  Philippines;  Poland;  Portugal;  Russian  Federation;  Singapore;  South  Africa;  Spain;
Sweden; Switzerland; Thailand; Turkey; the United Kingdom; and the United States.
Note:  Dependent  variable  is  log(1+portfolio  equity)  of  source  country  (Australia)  in  host
country.  Portfolio  equity  investments  issued  by  host  country  residents  and  held  by  source
country (Australia) residents. Independent variable import is the imports of goods by source
country (Australia) from host countries. Efficiency of judicial system, rule of law, accounting
standards  and  creditors  rights  are  the  host  country  variables  (La  Porta  and  others,  1998).
Significance level: * 1 per cent; ** 5 per cent; and *** 10 per cent.
Table 9 illustrates the regression results of bilateral portfolio equity holdings wherein
Australia is the host country. The dependent variable is log (1+ portfolio equity) of source130
country (others) in the host country. In line with the previous results, the import variable is
positive  and  significant  throughout,  the  telephone  cost  variable  is  negative  and  significant
throughout  and  the  language  variable  is  positive.  Furthermore,  the  effects  of  accounting
standards, rule of law and efficiency of judiciary system all have positive and significant effects
on equity holdings by overseas investors. Again, these results imply that source countries equity
holdings will improve if the host country has internationally recognized accounting standards as
well as an efficient and enforceable judicial system.
Table 9. Australia’s portfolio equity investment held by other countries, 2001






































2 0.29 0.46 0.51 0.51 0.51
Host country: Australia.
Source countries/area: Austria; Brazil; Canada; Chile; China; Czech Republic; Denmark; Finland;
France;  Germany;  Greece,  Hong  Kong,  China;  Hungary;  India;  Indonesia;  Ireland;  Israel;  Italy;
Japan; Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; the Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Peru; the
Philippines;  Poland;  Portugal;  Russian  Federation;  Singapore;  South  Africa;  Spain;  Sweden;
Switzerland; Thailand; Turkey; the United Kingdom; and the United States.
Note: Dependent variable is log(1+portfolio equity) of source country in host country (Australia).
Independent variable import is the import of goods by source country from host country (Australia).
Efficiency of judicial system, rule of law, accounting standards and creditors rights are the host
country variables (La Porta and others, 1998). Significance level: * 1 per cent; ** 5 per cent; and
*** 10 per cent. Australia: Reported portfolio investment assets by economy of non-resident, issuer:
Equity Securities.
Explaining the investment bias
One possible explanation is related to the costs of information acquisition. In contrast to
textbook assumptions that perfect information is freely available, learning about international
investment  opportunities  is  a  costly  activity  in  the  real  world.  Perhaps  Australia’s
disproportionate investment in countries that hold the majority of the  world’s stock market
capitalization and with which we are familiar through trading and other links (culture) can be
attributable to lower costs of acquiring information about investment opportunities in those
countries.
7 However, this should not be overemphasized when it comes to explaining the bias in
portfolio investment. The costs of holding a geographically “neutral” world portfolio can be
greatly  reduced  through  the  use  of  global  index  funds  marketed  by  international  financial
intermediaries.
7 See Ghosh and Wolf (1998) and Portes and Rey (1999) regarding the importance of informational variables.131
The bias towards investing in three of the world’s developed capital markets (the United
States, United Kingdom and Japan), with some deviations from that baseline with countries due
to Australian trading patterns, may be interpreted as an extension of the home bias puzzle that
has been observed by many researchers. As pointed out by French and Poterba (1991) and
others, the home bias puzzle is the phenomenon that the disproportionate bulk of investment
portfolios comprise domestic equities and bonds, despite the observable gains to international
diversification. Huberman’s (1997) work on geographical distribution of shareholders in United
States telephone companies indicates familiarity bias even within countries. A propensity to
invest  in  familiar  locations  may  reflect  psychological  factors  in  determining  investment
decisions.
8
Finally,  the  lack  of  a  significant  relationship  between  investment  and  trade  flows
associated with Australia and Asian markets (except Japan) requires some comment. One area
to consider here is that many financial markets in Asia, including that of China, are not well
developed. This lack of development is reflected in the low weights for the region in the global
market indices that drive so much of the allocation of portfolio investment in the world, i.e.,
Asia accounts for less than 4 per cent of  the MSCI global equity index and is even smaller for
that of the global bond market indices. The shares are very much smaller than the region’s 25
per cent share in world GDP. The share of Australia’s outward portfolio investment going to
Asia accounted for only 10.9 per cent of the total portfolio investment in 2002.
9
C. Conclusion
This  paper  makes  a  preliminary  examination  of  Australia’s  data  for  1997  and  2001
reported in the IMF CPIS by providing an analysis of the geography of international portfolio
investment (equity and long-term bonds).
The paper provides some answers to the following questions: (a) why the pattern of
Australia’s capital flows does not match that of its trade flows; (b) which bilateral factors are
responsible for explaining Australia’s portfolio equity investment holdings; (c) whether cultural,
informational factors are important in explaining Australia’s portfolio allocations; and (d) how
do regulatory and legal variables affect equity portfolio holdings. Answers to these questions are
important for several disciplines including economics, international trade, international finance,
portfolio analysis and behavioural finance.
Preliminary results suggest that Australia’s external holdings of equity and debt as a
percentage of national income almost doubled between 1997 and 2001. This increase is almost
entirely attributed to increased equity investment. However, it is noteworthy that Australia’s IIP
as a percentage of national income is one of the lowest among the major OECD countries. In
1997, more than half of Australia’s total investments were invested in the United Kingdom and
United States (combined), with this proportion climbing to approximately two thirds by 2001. In
contrast, Australia’s trade share (exports plus imports as a percentage of Australia’s total world
trade) with the United Kingdom and the United States (combined) was approximately 20 per
cent  in  1997  and  2001,  respectively.  Reflecting  subdued  investment  conditions  in  Japan,
Australia’s  total  equity  investment  position  declined  substantially  from  1997  to  2001.  By
contrast Australia’ trade share with Japan remained constant during 1997-2001.
8 See Shleifer (2000) regarding the study of behavioural finance.
9 Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin, November 2003.132
Next, in order to shed more light on the factors responsible for Australia’s bilateral
equity holdings, a model is developed of the relationship between Australia’s bilateral equity
holdings and proxies for quality of information and the regulatory environment. The results
suggest that source country residents are willing to hold equity portfolios in countries where the
judicial system is recognized as efficient and appears to uphold enforcement of the rule of law.
An accounting standard variable also appears positive and significant, implying that residents of
source countries are willing to hold equity in countries that have well developed accounting
standards.
The bias towards investing in three of the world’s developed capital markets (Japan, the
United Kingdom and the United States), with some deviations from that baseline with countries
due to Australian trading patterns, may be interpreted as an extension of the home bias puzzle
that has been observed by many researchers. However, in the light of the recent global financial
crisis,  which  exposed  significant  loopholes  in  large  financial  corporations’  governance
structures and risk compliance, it is critical for policy makers to be updated on current research
into those factors that appeared to be the drivers of global investment practices.
Finally, the lack of a significant relationship between investment and trade flows for
Australia  and  its  Asian  neighbours  (except  Japan)  requires further  research.    One  area  to
consider here is investigating the relevant strengths and weakness of Asia’s financial markets
relative to developed markets as destinations for international portfolio investments.133
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VIII. Time-zone arbitrage in United States mutual funds:
Damaging to financial integration between
the United States, Asia and Europe?
By Katelyn Rae Donnelly and Edward Tower
Summary
Historically, United States mutual funds have often calculated their asset values for
international mutual funds using stale prices, because some fund components finish trading
before  the  market closes. This resulted  in daily  fund  returns becoming  predictable. This
allows an arbitrage opportunity for investors who move their money at the end of the United
States trading day to profit from the next-day change in Asian and European equities. This
acts as a tax on other investors in mutual funds that hold non-United States assets. This paper
quantitatively traces the history of this phenomenon, known as time-zone arbitrage (TZA), in
various  mutual  funds,  particularly  the  Vanguard  Fund  Family,  before  and  after  the
phenomenon  became well  known.  The  opportunity  for  TZA  has  diminished  but  not
disappeared. This shrinkage together with the advent of Exchange-Traded Funds – which are
not subject to time-zone arbitrage – makes investment in Asia and Europe more profitable for
American mutual fund investors. This should increase United States investment in Asia and
Europe and enhance the integration of these markets.
Introduction
“The soaring use of market timing by the average fund owner – not only the
illegal late trader nor the unethical time-zone trader – indicated that ordinary
investors, using the finest vehicle for long-term investing ever designed, were
engaging in excessive short-term speculation in fund shares. There’s a lot of
money sloshing around the mutual fund system.” – John C. Bogle (2005; p.
152), founder and, for many years, CEO of Vanguard.
In the above passage, John Bogle describes the phenomenon known as market timing
that has shocked many investors. Using market timing, some investors were able to securely
profit,  detracting  value  from  the  average  buy-and-hold  investor. This  paper  shows  that
Vanguard international index funds were not immune to the opportunity to profit from stale
prices and market timing. However, no evidence was found that market timing caused the
returns of these funds or of other fund families to sink below those of their corresponding135
indexes. This  appears  to  be  so  because, investors with  Vanguard  and  other  firms made
limited use of market timing opportunities.
1
In  the  past,  market  timers  were  able  to  capitalize  on  short-term  structural
inefficiencies in the global marketplace. There is no single standard framework for mutual
funds to calculate the value of their assets after markets close. Further, it is still important to
calculate accurate and up-to-date values in a globalized trading system where markets across
the globe open and close at different times. European markets close at various times until 11
a.m. Eastern Time (ET) and Pacific markets close after midnight ET. Information and news
never stop; long after the market in one time-zone closes, events and news are released that
affect  asset  prices. Research  has  shown  that  increases  in  globalization,  improvements  in
technology,  and  liberalized  capital  flows  correspond  to  a  larger  correlation between  all
markets,  particularly United  States market  movement  and  subsequent  next-day  European
movement (Bhargava, Bose and Dubofsky, 1998). When a foreign market closes, the assets
traded on that exchange will artificially freeze in value as they are no longer actively traded;
this value for a mutual fund is called net asset value (NAV). These NAVs, if used hours later,
are termed “stale prices.”
Historically, United States-based mutual funds have calculated their value using stale
prices for the assets that trade in foreign markets. The predictability of change in the stale
prices when the foreign market opens creates an arbitrage opportunity. Consider an example:
an investor stores her money in a United States market mutual fund and waits for a market
signal such as significant increase in the United States market throughout the day. From this
signal, she switches her money close to the end of the United States trading day to a mutual
fund holding a large proportion of European assets, because she expects a similar increase in
the European market when the market opens. The investor gains both the return in the United
States market and the expected corresponding rise in Europe. Similarly, when the United
States market declines, the investor with funds in Europe can switch back at the end of the
day, avoiding the loss in both the United States and European markets. This technique of
exploiting the market discrepancy is a type of “market timing” or, more specifically, “time-
zone arbitrage.” Normally,  once  traders  and  investors  are  aware  of  possible  arbitrage
opportunities, the market reacts quickly and the opportunities disappear. This does not apply
to  the case  of  TZA  with  mutual  funds –  there  is  not  an  efficient  market  mechanism  to
eliminate profitability.
The existence of TZA has been documented in the past. Academics have published
studies about the interrelation of markets for decades, and the specific trading strategies have
been  described  since  1998. In  September  2003  Eliot  Spitzer,  then-New  York  Attorney-
General, publicly announced that he had evidence of mutual funds engaging in illegal trading
arrangements (Houge and Wellman, 2005). Most of these charges were levied against funds
for allowing late trading – which was clearly illegal – but some charges included colluding
with favoured investors to exploit TZA. Ultimately, Spitzer recovered more than US$ 3.1
1 Vanguard, at different times either charged a frequent trading fee (much like all international funds do now) or
restricted frequent trading. Some funds at some times had purchase and redemption fees, and have inhibited
trading by requiring that trades be initiated by mail.136
billion in mutual fund settlements (Houge and Wellman, 2005). In response to time-zone
market timing behaviour, many funds instituted more stringent trade limits, trade fees and
account  monitoring (Houge  and  Wellman,  2005). While  time-zone  market  timing  is  not
explicitly  illegal,  the  practice  clearly  dilutes  shareholder  value (Zitzewitz, 2003. What  is
illegal is allowing favoured investors to engage in market timing while barring others. On the
other hand, it is legal for the general market timers to exploit the arbitrage at the expense of
the buy-and-hold investors – a fact which has shocked the mutual fund industry (Houge and
Wellman, 2005).
The analysis of TZA practices in this paper focuses on the Vanguard mutual fund
family, as it is widely considered among the most reputable funds families and a standard-
setter for fund behaviour. It also is the leader in providing international index funds, so it is
natural to compare the performance of its international index funds with the international
indexes  in  order  to  assess  the  damage  that  TZA  has  done  to  buy-and-hold investors.
Vanguard founder and CEO, John Bogle, has also written extensively about mutual funds
and long-term investment strategy. Bogle (2005) states:
“The shocking truth about time-zone trading is that it went on for so long
without significant defense being erected by managers. It has hardly been a
secret. Academics have been publishing papers about it at least since the late
1990s.”
This paper analyses stale prices and time-zone trading strategies in Vanguard funds. It
compares Vanguard funds to their competitors and the Spitzer-investigated fund families.
The objectives of this paper are to:
(a) Reveal how the opportunities and profitability for time-zone arbitrage differed
between fund families and different funds;
(b) Discover if and when the opportunities for time-zone arbitrage disappeared;
(c) Explore the cost of time-zone arbitrage to Vanguard index fund investors;
(d) Develop an alternative (and better) signalling mechanism for fund transfers;
(e) Use a symmetric criterion for transferring funds back and forth between United
States  and  foreign  mutual  funds. Similar  to some  of  the  previous  studies,  the
profitability calculations are carried out using a strategy in which the investors are
always fully invested in either domestic or foreign equities;
(f) Explore the causes and consequences of Eliot Spitzer’s investigation of certain
mutual  fund families.  Specifically,  did  those  fund  companies  he  investigated
demonstrate  markedly  inferior  performance  prior  to  the investigation,  and  did
they markedly improve behaviour after being identified by his office?
Here  is  how  this  paper  is  organized. Section A reviews  the  existing  literature  on
market timing and stale prices. Sections B to D explain the data and methods used. Section E
asks  whether  there was  an opportunity  for  TZA  in  the  Vanguard  European  Index  fund.
Section F asks how profitable TZA was in the Vanguard European Index Fund while section
G asks how TZA opportunities compared between fund families. Section H provides a brief
history of restrictions on frequent trading. Section I asks how long the opportunities for TZA
lasted. Section J explores the morality of time-zone arbitrage and its analysis while section K137
asks whether, in spite of TZA, international fund returns beat their tracking indexes. Section
L draws conclusions about TZA. Section M considers the implications of the shrinkage of
TZA  opportunities  and  the  advent  of  exchange  traded  funds  for  the  integration  of
international capital markets.
A. State-of-the-art
Market-timing  in  mutual  funds  was  first  documented in an  academic  paper by
Bhargava, Bose and Dubofsky (1998). Zitzewitz (2003) noted that “this arbitrage opportunity
has been understood by the industry for 20 years and exploited since at least 1998…” The
existing  literature  on  market  timing  and  stale  prices  in  mutual  funds  focuses  on  two
segments. The first segment documents various signalling mechanisms and trading strategies
to  prove  that  large  excess  returns  are  possible  with TZA  in  mutual  funds. The  second
segment focuses on documenting the loss in shareholder value caused by market timing and
the possible solutions to prevent time-zone arbitrage. This paper explores both segments of
the literature.
TZA  has  been  documented  by  several  different  academic  studies. The  first
publication to document returns from time-zone arbitrage was produced by Bhargava, Bose,
and  Dubofsky (1998),  who  used  a  1.5  standard  deviation  increase  in  the  S&P  from  the
previous day’s closing price level to signal the investor to transfer from the S&P 500 index to
a basket of five foreign equity funds. The investor returns funds to the United States at the
end of the first day that the S&P declines. They documented the fact that that following this
strategy generated a return of 800 basis points a year above that of the S&P 500.
Chalmers,  Edelen  and  Kadlec (2001)  showed  the  predictability of  foreign  fund
returns, using  a  sample  of  943  mutual  funds  from  February  1998  to  March  2000.  They
regressed foreign fund returns on daily lagged S&P index returns (the previous day close to
3.55 p.m.), and returns over the last two hours that the United States market was open (1.55
p.m. to 3.55 p.m.). They discovered that the former trigger generated a higher return. Their
investment strategy, using cash or a combination of cash and futures markets to reduce risk,
was more complex than the strategy used in this paper of switching back and forth between
domestic and foreign equity mutual funds. Also, they aggregated funds whereas this paper
looks  at  a  set  of  individual  funds. Boudoukh  and  others  (2002)  analysed  stale  prices  in
mutual funds. They focused on excess profits and Sharpe ratios to demonstrate the benefits of
exploiting stale pricing. They examined the 1997-2001 time period using 15 international
mutual funds to track trading strategy performance. The strategy they employed switched
capital between a money market account and the mutual fund based on the movement of the
futures  market,  using  the  S&P  for  the  European  funds  and  Nikkei  225  futures  for  the
Japanese/Pacific funds. For a signal, they used (a) the difference between the closing Nikkei
level  in  Japan  and  the  implied  Nikkei  level  at  4 p.m.  traded  on  the  Chicago  Mercantile
Exchange (CME), (b) the within-day change on the S&P 500 and (c) a combination of the
two. Ultimately, the combination performed the best. Boudoukh and others (2002) used two
thresholds of 0.5 per cent and 1 per cent expected excess returns to signal a switch from the
money market to the mutual fund. On days that the expected excess is less than zero the138
investor moves out of the international fund. They measured returns to the strategy against a
benchmark of buy-and-hold returns of the particular mutual fund.
As in this paper, Boudoukh and others (2002) had a section that focused on Vanguard
funds. They used Vanguard International Growth, Vanguard Pacific Equity Index and the
Vanguard European Equity Index to demonstrate an S&P signal trading strategy that moved
funds  from the Prime  Money  Market  fund  (which  invests  in  high-quality,  short-term
commercial paper) to a basket of international Vanguard funds or the reverse if the signal
was negative. They used the period from January 1997 to November 2000, finding that there
was a large excess return from replacing buy-and-hold with either the 0.5 per cent or the 0.25
per  cent  expected  return  thresholds  over  that  period. Their  trading  strategy,  unlike that
discussed in this paper, has capital in the international funds for less than 10 per cent of the
time.
Bhargava and Dubofsky (2001) also considered TZA in Vanguard international index
funds, calculating the return from TZA and calling for more fair-value pricing.
The Greene and Hodges (2002) study focused primarily on the dilution of value to
buy and hold investors, caused by volatile fund flows from stale prices and market timing.
They used the S&P as an indicator. The trader switches to the international fund if the S&P
daily return is positive and holds cash the next day if the S&P is negative. The authors used
the period from 1 January 1993 to 31 December 1997. They used 84 international funds to
measure  the  average  return  of  each  strategy.  Greene  and  Hodges  also  examined  the
correlation between the movement in a fund’s net fund flow and the following day's return.
The average correlation was found to be 0.0512 for international funds, exhibiting apparent
market timing activity. These results are different from the 2001 findings by Goetzmann,
Ivkovic and Rouwenhorst, who found almost no correlation between fund flows and fund
returns for international mutual funds. This paper examines a longer and more recent period
and does not analyse net fund flow.
Goetzmann, Ivkovic and Rouwenhorst (2001) documented the inflows and outflows
caused by time-zone arbitrage. They used a diverse 391-fund sample to test whether the daily
S&P  500  index  return was a  profitable  indicator  for  short-term  international  investment
decisions. They found, through high  correlations between the return of  the S&P and the
international mutual funds next day returns, that almost every fund was vulnerable to stale
pricing. They also compared the change in the NAV of the funds with the magnitude of the
in/out money flow. This yielded an overall small positive correlation between net fund flows
into international funds and next-day international fund returns. Not all of their correlations
were positive; the spread of the correlations between fund flows and next-day fund returns
was -0.029 to 0.083.
Zitzewitz (2003) documented TZA and suggested possible solutions for protecting the
long-term  buy–and-hold  investors. Zitzewitz  used  the  TrimTabs  database  and  filled  in
missing data with figures from Yahoo to get the daily returns of various mutual funds for
January 1998 to October 2001. Unlike the other studies that compared returns to a buy-and-
hold strategy, Zitzewitz measured excess returns against a mixture of cash and funds that had139
the same daily fund exposure. Zitzewitz also analysed domestic small-cap equities, and high-
yield and convertible bonds that traded infrequently and had wide bid-ask spreads, making
them  susceptible  to  stale  pricing. He  discovered  that  excess  returns were highest  in
international equity funds, a finding consistent with the rest of the literature. Among other
triggers, he used the change in the S&P 500 index from the previous close until 11.30 a.m.
and from 11.30 a.m. until its close. This paper uses a finer grid of times. In analysing time-
zone arbitrage, Zitzewitz wrote:
“These  abnormal  returns  come  at  the  expense  of  long-term  shareholders,
dilution of whom has grown in international funds from 56 basis points in
1998-99  to  114  basis  points  in  2001.  The  speed  and  efficacy  of  a  fund’s
actions to protect shareholders from dilution is negatively correlated with its
expense ratios and the share of insiders on its board, suggesting that agency
problems may be the root cause of the arbitrage problem.”
These considerations led the authors of this paper to expect less dilution in Vanguard
funds.
The  basic  framework  explaining  TZA  has  been  placed. This paper builds  on  this
literature by using a much longer and more recent period (1 January 1997-31 December
2007), and by employing a strategy that is clearer and more feasible for many investors. This
makes it possible to evaluate when the arbitrage opportunity from market-timing ended. The
trading strategy and calculation of the constrained regression is a new methodology that is
accessible to the unsophisticated investor and simple to execute.
B. Futures data
The sample in this paper uses two different sets of data: mutual fund daily closes
adjusted for dividends and five-minute changes in the S&P 500 index. The data used in the
regressions are quotes for the S&P 500 futures index for the next available settlement date
rather than the actual S&P 500 index. But as documented below, the two series are very
similar, so this choice does not significantly affect the results.
Table 1. Correlation between the proportional change










The data track the five-minute movement in S&P 500 futures prices, generally to the
next settlement date. To ensure that the S&P futures accurately measure the actual S&P, the
correlation was calculated between the day-to-day proportional changes in the S&P futures 4
p.m. price and the S&P 500 adjusted close, using daily data from Yahoo. Table 1 shows the
correlations  between  the  two  proportional  changes;  every  year  has  an  extremely  high
correlation,  the  lowest  year  being  a  still  very  high  0.986  in  1997.  The  high  correlations
indicate that the futures data are close  enough to the actual S&P that the indicators and
signalling will be accurate enough for the purpose of this paper.
C. Fund selection
Sixteen mutual funds in three categories are examined: Vanguard Family, Vanguard
Competition and families investigated by Eliot Spitzer. Within the Vanguard family the focus
is  on  its  index  funds: VEURX –  Vanguard  European  Stock  Index; VEIEX – Vanguard
Emerging Market Index; and VPACX – Vanguard Pacific  Index. It also used VINEX –
Vanguard International Explorer, a managed fund of medium-sized company stocks.
For the analysis of non-Vanguard funds, from several of the various fund families a
fund  was  selected  that  existed  for  as  much  of the  11-year  period  from  1997 to 2007  as
possible, with a preference for funds that closely tracked the European index, and had neither
a value nor a growth orientation. As discussed below, TZA opportunities were likely to be
greatest for European funds, so those funds were generally selected. The final part of this
paper compares fund performance with a basket of indexes that mimics fund returns. MSCI
indexes for international value, international growth and international small company stocks
became available from the beginning of 1997, so the international funds that did not focus on
the characteristics of small value, or growth, were generally selected.
For the Vanguard competition, four fund families were selected that closely competed
with Vanguard for business, attracting customers who valued low expenses and investment
expertise DFA, Fidelity, GMO, and T. Rowe Price (the first three of which are discussed by
Tower and Yang (2008), Zheng and Tower (2004 and 2008) and Tower (2008), although
DFA and GMO are appropriate only for high wealth investors. Within each fund family,
generally the fund with the lowest expense ratio and highest proportion of European assets
that were in existence for most of 1 January 1997-31 December 2007 was selected. Those
with  a  high  proportion  of  European  assets  were  chosen  because  the  Vanguard  European
Index  Fund  is  the  largest  of  Vanguard’s international  index  funds;  thus, time-zone
arbitrageurs would be likely to feel that their activity would be least likely to be noticed in
this fund.
European  funds  tend  to  be  relatively  large  for  other  fund  companies  as  well.
However, in the case of Vanguard, the Admiral Class Funds – which had lower expense
ratios than the investment class funds – were not used because some of the Admiral Class
Funds were introduced after the time series used for this paper began. The four funds in the141
Vanguard competition are: DFIVX – DFA International Value I; FIEUX – Fidelity Europe
Fund; GMOFX – the GMO Foreign Fund III; and PRESX – T. Rowe Price Euro Stock.
The  Spitzer  category  consists  of:  AEDBX – AIM  European  Growth;  EUGAX –
Morgan Stanley European Equity F; FIECX – Federated International Equity Fund C; GSIFX
– Goldman Sachs Concentrated International Equity A; JAOSX – Janus Overseas; MGEBX
– Van Kampen Global Value Equity B; MWEFX – MFS Global Equity A; and PEUGX –




The sample of mutual fund data used here for devising and assessing trading strategy
is from Yahoo. The data are easily accessible online. Any unsophisticated investor could
easily obtain the information for the purpose of studying or exploiting time-zone arbitrage. A
time-zone arbitrageur would, however, need to record the data to ascertain patterns, since the
data  disappears  from  Yahoo  after  five  days.  The  S&P  futures  data were available  only
through 2004, so tables 1 and 2 terminate then.
Trading hours in Europe briefly overlap with trading hours in the United States –
about one and a half hours, between 9.30 a.m. and 11 a.m. This leads to the belief that the
European market already reflects the news and information from the early part of the United
States’ trading day, leaving the afternoon hours for the information sets behind values in the
two  markets  to  diverge. Different  European  markets  close  at  different  times,  and  some
foreign  markets  close  before  the United  States  market  opens.  Proportional  changes  in
international mutual fund dividend-adjusted price were regressed on the proportional changes
in the dividend-adjusted price of the S&P 500 index over various previous periods. The logic
of  time-zone arbitrage indicates  that  movements  in  the price  of  the S&P  should  be
accompanied by subsequent movements in the international mutual fund price in the same
direction. Consequently, all regression coefficients were constrained to be positive.
Six distinct time periods were used: 9.35 a.m.-4 p.m., 10 a.m.-4 p.m., 10.30 a.m.-4
p.m., 11 a.m.-4 p.m., 11.30 a.m.-4 p.m. and the previous day’s close at 4 p.m-4 p.m. The
change in each time period was calculated by dividing the change in the S&P over the period
to the 4 p.m. close by the S&P value at the beginning of the period. The mutual fund return
was calculated by using the proportional change of the end-of-day adjusted return, where
“adjusted” means adjusted for dividends.
2 The four original mutual fund companies that the New York Attorney-General focused on were Bank of
America,  Janus  Capital  Group,  Bank  One  and  Strong  Capital  Management. Since  the  investigation  and
settlement, many of those original funds have been shut down, so they are not included in this paper. Spitzer
subsequently investigated eight additional fund families – Van  Kampen, Goldman  Sachs, Morgan  Stanley,
Putnam, Federated, AIM, Janus and MFS. Those fund families have been charged, probed or fined by his office.
The  authors  reviewed  reports  online  from  various  sources  such  as  the Wall  Street  Journal,  CNN/Money,
Business Week and Fortune to get this list of fund families.142
The TZA opportunity model was calculated for each year using daily data. The data
were divided into annual segments to explore whether the opportunity changed as investors
and mutual fund families became aware of the issue. In calculating the profitability of the
strategy, time-zone arbitrageurs were assumed to behave as if the model from the previous
year obtained. Thus time-zone arbitrageurs made decisions using current day (and previous
day’s close) data along with the last year’s coefficients.
The S&P trade indicator was calculated by multiplying the regression coefficients
from the previous year times the corresponding time period proportional change in the S&P
and adding them together. Trades were assumed to occur at the United States market close of
4 p.m. Four threshold levels for predicted changes in the international mutual fund were
tested: 0.1 per cent, 0.5 per cent, 0.7 per cent and 1 per cent. The arbitrageur was assumed to
move from the United States into the foreign mutual fund whenever the indicator exceeds the
threshold level, and move back from Europe into the United States whenever the indicator
exceeds  the  threshold  level  in  the  opposite  direction.  For  example,  for  the  1  per  cent
threshold, the investor buys the European fund whenever she anticipates that the next day’s
return on the European fund will exceed 1 per cent, and sells it when she anticipates that the
next day’s loss on the European fund will exceed 1 per cent. Programming Excel to perform
the calculations is easy.
The profitability of time-zone arbitrage was measured as the annualized excess return
of the trading strategy over an annualized benchmark return. The benchmark return is what
the return would have been from investing a constant fraction, K, of the portfolio in the
foreign mutual fund and the rest of the portfolio in the Vanguard 500 index fund, where K is
the fraction of the portfolio that under the arbitrage strategy is invested in the foreign mutual
fund.  The  Vanguard  500  index  fund  mimics  the  return  of  the  S&P 500  index.  This
benchmark  strategy  assumes  daily  rebalancing.  The  benchmark  return  is  calculated  by
weighting each day’s return in the United States and Europe by the proportion of time in each
market under the arbitrage strategy:
a R K K r B * ) 1 ( R * ) ( e   
where B(r) is the benchmark return, K is the proportion of time in Europe, Re is the return in
Europe and Ra is the return in the United States.
E. Was there vulnerability to TZA in the Vanguard European
Index Fund?
The regression coefficients of the Vanguard European Index Fund from 1997 to 2004
are presented in table 2. The sum of the coefficients demonstrates the strength of the S&P’s
predictive power on Vanguard Europe’s  return  the following day.  Each  year has  a large
coefficient sum, demonstrating a significant ability for market timers to use the S&P signals
to exploit the Vanguard Europe Index.
The  constant  term  in  the  regressions  was  ignored, and  the  analysis  focused  on
predicted changes in the international funds due to changes in the S&P. For 1997, a 1 per143
cent change in the S&P overnight, with no further changes, predicts a 0.170 per cent change
in the same direction for the international fund the following day. A 1 per cent change in the
S&P 500 index fund between 11.30 a.m. and 4 p.m., with no changes before then, results in a
predicted change equal to the sum of the coefficients, 0.462 per cent. Thus, more recent
changes have bigger impacts than earlier changes.
The F statistic of 31.272 indicates that the model is significant at the 0.01 per cent
level.
3 The continuously compounded geometric average return of the Vanguard S&P 500
index,  including  dividends, is  27.5  per  cent  per  year,  and  the  continuously  compounded
return of the Vanguard Europe fund is 23.5 per cent per year.
The years with the lowest sum of the regression coefficients are 2000 and 2001 while
the year with the highest sum is 2003 with 0.527. The F-Test is highly significant in every
year. In efficient markets, one would expect F-Statistics less than 2.067 (the 1 per cent level
of significance).
Last, each of the six time periods indicate varying impacts of the S&P on Vanguard
Europe. The lack of constancy of the distribution of the coefficients from year to year shows
some variation in the predictive power of the S&P returns.
The method of calculation was as follows. Microsoft Excel’s solver add-in was used.
This  easy-to-use  add-in  allows  one  to  select  weights  to  minimize  a  variable  subject  to
constraints. Excel’s solver was programmed to select the weights on the returns of the S&P
and  the  constant  term  that  minimized  the  variance  of  the  return  differential  between  the
international mutual fund and the weighted sum of the previous S&P returns, augmented by
the  constant  term,  such  that  no  weight  is  negative  (signifying  that  the  S&P  moves  the
international fund in the same direction on the following day).
3 The F-test was used to measure the significance of the results. It is used to derive the statistical

























where RSS2 is the residual sum of squares of the dependent variable (the variance not explained by the model,
p2 is the number of parameters in the model, p1 is the number of parameters in the alternative and n is the
number of observations. In the present case, the model has p2 equal to the number of non-zero coefficients
(including the constant term), so p2 is less than, or equal to seven. The alternative model is that the dependent
variable is independent of any explanatory variables except for a constant, so p1 = 1. The authors used daily
data. There are approximately 250 daily observations on the stock market in each year, so n is roughly 250. The
F-test significance table indicates that with these parameters the model is significantly better than the alternative
at the 1 per cent level, if F exceeds 2.067.144
Table 2. TZA predictors for the Vanguard European Index Fund: Does the S&P
predict next-day return?
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 9:35am-4 pm 0.204 0.000 0.306 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000
10:00am-4pm 0.061 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.164 0.000 0.043 0.000
10:30am-4pm 0.028 0.355 0.000 0.000 0.183 0.416 0.000 0.000
11:00am-4pm 0.000 0.000 0.146 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.361 0.000
11:30am-4pm 0.000 0.151 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.124 0.000
Previous Day Close-4pm 0.170 0.000 0.000 0.377 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.379
Sum of Coefficients
1 0.462 0.520 0.452 0.377 0.358 0.437 0.527 0.379
Standard Deviation of
Europe Return




0.0073 0.0125 0.008 0.0107 0.0132 0.0163 0.0104 0.0079
F-Statistic 31.272 10.154 14.910 15.568 4.783 7.352 9.391 7.473
S&P return CC -0.008 0.236 0.178 -0.107 -0.253 -0.266 0.234 0.086
Europe return CC 0.007 0.254 0.155 -0.170 -0.297 -0.198 0.327 0.190
1. Coefficients are sensitivities of next day Europe returns to S&P returns. A change between 11:30 a.m. and 4
p.m. predicts a change equal to the sum of the coefficients.
2. Standard deviations of Europe return are proportions/day. Returns CC are continuously compounded
geometric average returns expressed as proportions/year.
Figure  1 shows  the  reliability  of  the  S&P  indicator  with  the  previous year’s
coefficients for 1999. For the Vanguard Europe Index Fund in 1999 it is apparent that the
indicator  has a  strong  impact  on  the  actual  European  return  the  following  day,  with  a
regression coefficient of 0.86, meaning that a prediction of a 1 percentage point rise results in
a next-day return on average of 0.86 percentage points above the mean value. In 1999, the
sum of the coefficients was 0.452, also reflecting the arbitrage possibility for profiting from
recent changes in the S&P. Had the study used the coefficients obtained for 1999 to evaluate
predictions in that same year, it necessarily would have obtained a slope of 1, when the actual
return is graphed on the predicted return.
4
4 Had the authors chosen to regress the subsequent performance differential of the European fund over that of
the  S&P 500  index  fund,  a  closer  fit  would  have  been  obtained.  However,  using  the  differential  as the
dependent variable would not have changed the analysis so long as movements in the S&P 500 index fund were
not auto-correlated.145
Figure 1. Vanguard Europe 1999: reliability of the predictions
(proportional changes of axes)
F. How profitable was TZA in the Vanguard European Fund?
To  illustrate  the  possibility  of  time-zone  arbitrage  concretely,  a  simple  trading
strategy with the Vanguard European Fund is used. Initially, 100 per cent of the portfolio is
held in an S&P 500 index fund. The calculations use the Vanguard fund (VFINX).  If on a
given day the indicator exceeds the threshold and the assets are not already in the European
index than the funds are transferred at the end of the United States’ day to the European
Index. The capital is switched back to an S&P fund if the predicted Vanguard European
return is more negative than the negative threshold.
Table  3 reports  the  number  of  fund  switches,  the  fraction  of  time  spent  in  the
European mutual fund, and the returns from the benchmark and strategy. As shown by table
3, this trading strategy is highly successful in producing excess returns. Excess returns are
highest using the 0.1 per cent threshold and they then decrease as the threshold increases.
Using a 0.1 per cent indicator, the highest annualized excess return was in 2003 – 106 per
cent per year annualized. This is the return over the entire year of the strategy minus that of
the benchmark. The number of switches stayed in the range of 90 to 120 year-to-year and the
time spent in the European fund hovered around 50 per cent.146
The 0.1 per cent threshold returns the highest excess return. Even at the 0.5 per cent
indicator level, the strategy always made a large excess return over the benchmark. As the
threshold for the signals increases, the excess return decreases. At the 1 per cent level the
strategy is not reliably more profitable than the benchmark.
With  the  0.1  per  cent  threshold,  the  excess  return  (continuously  compounded)  is
greater than 24 per cent per year through 2004. With 0.5 per cent, it exceeds 21 per cent per
year through 2003, but is still over 4 per cent in 2004. With 0.7 per cent, it exceeds 11 per
cent per year through 2001. With 1 per cent, it is positive only in 1999, 2000 and 2001.
Table 3 shows that trading 115 times produced a continuously compounded return of
86.8 per cent in that year. From table 3, the large benchmark return of 27.8 per cent in that
year  helped  generate  the  larger  excess  return  between  the  benchmark  and  0.1  per  cent
strategy when total return is used instead of the continuously compounded excess return (106
per cent as opposed to 58.9 per cent).
Figure 2 charts the natural log of wealth arising from the trade strategy at the 0.1 per
cent threshold, the 0.5 per cent threshold and the benchmark in 2003, starting with US$ 1.00..
A more intuitive name is “cumulative return, continuously compounded.” The intercept of
0.868 for the 0.1 per cent threshold indicates that during 2003 that strategy produced an 86.8
per cent return, continuously compounded. The graph clearly illustrates the consistency of
the excess returns from the market timing strategy. The 0.1 per cent strategy performed the
best with the 0.5 per cent positioned securely between the 0.1 per cent strategy and the
benchmark.147
Table 3. Vanguard Europe: Return from time-zone arbitrage
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
0.1% indicator
  Switches per year 107 120 99 94 109 115 90
  time share in Europe 0.548 0.508 0.488 0.550 0.494 0.608 0.520
  benchmark return CC 0.230 0.158 -0.112 -0.315 -0.262 0.278 0.135
  Strategy Return CC 0.607 0.547 0.130 0.114 0.315 0.868 0.442
  Excess Return CC 0.377 0.390 0.242 0.429 0.576 0.589 0.307
  Excess Return Annualized 0.576 0.558 0.245 0.391 0.600 1.060 0.411
0.5% indicator
  Switches per year 29 33 41 21 33 24 14
  time share in Europe 0.718 0.496 0.512 0.661 0.542 0.608 0.596
  benchmark return CC 0.231 0.158 -0.111 -0.324 -0.258 0.278 0.284
  Strategy Return CC 0.473 0.395 0.115 -0.066 0.043 0.502 0.320
  Excess Return CC 0.241 0.237 0.226 0.259 0.302 0.224 0.036
  Excess Return Annualized 0.344 0.313 0.227 0.213 0.272 0.331 0.048
0.7% indicator
  Switches per year 14 15 26 7 11 7 2
  time share in Europe 0.802 0.448 0.603 0.900 0.482 0.773 0.131
  benchmark return CC 0.231 0.159 -0.109 -0.344 -0.262 0.293 0.094
  Strategy Return CC 0.412 0.330 0.008 -0.182 -0.268 0.348 0.132
  Excess Return CC 0.181 0.171 0.117 0.162 -0.006 0.056 0.038
  Excess Return Annualized 0.250 0.219 0.111 0.125 -0.004 0.077 0.043
1% indicator
  Switches per year 5 2 6 2 3 1 0
  time share in Europe 0.226 0.234 0.825 0.992 0.518 0.259 0.000
  benchmark return CC 0.225 0.161 -0.105 -0.345 -0.260 0.246 0.080
  Strategy Return CC 0.200 0.255 -0.089 -0.255 -0.315 0.211 0.086
  Excess Return CC -0.025 0.094 0.015 0.090 -0.055 -0.035 0.006
  Excess Return Annualized -0.031 0.116 0.014 0.067 -0.041 -0.044 0.007
All returns are proportions per year.148
Figure 2. Cumulative return, continuously compounded for arbitrage between






























































































































G. Were all fund families vulnerable to TZA?
Table 4 displays the regression coefficients of all 16 mutual funds in 1999. From the
grouping  of  mutual  funds,  the  Vanguard  family  funds  on  average  demonstrate  greater
predictive strength than the competitive funds of DFA, Fidelity, GMO and T. Rowe Price. In
1999,  Vanguard  funds  averaged  a  0.398  sum  of  coefficients,  with  competitive  funds
averaging 0.360 and Spitzer’s funds highest at 0.434. One should not over-analyse the results
of the fund group averages, as each fund had distinct load fees, management and investment
strategy  (e.g.,  growth versus  value)  and  country  composition. What  is  important  is  that
market timing opportunities existed for the wide range of funds in all three classes, not only
those formally investigated. All the funds exhibited significant F-tests, exposing them to the
possibility of arbitrage.149
Table 4. Time-zone arbitrage predicators for 1999








  VEURX Europe Index 0.306 0.000 0.000 0.146 0.000 0.000 0.452 14.9
  VINEX Intl Explorer (mid size stocks) 0.099 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.179 0.290 15.1
  VEIEX Emerging Markets 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.395 0.395 13.2
  VPACX Pacific 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.454 0.454 12.8
Competition
  DFIVX DFA International Value I 0.149 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.160 0.309 14.4
  FIEUX Fidelity Europe Fund 0.293 0.000 0.000 0.105 0.000 0.037 0.435 13.4
  GMOFX GMO Foreign Fund III 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.208 0.267 7.0
  PRESX T. Rowe Price Euro Stock 0.292 0.000 0.000 0.138 0.000 0.000 0.430 14.3
Spitzer's Funds[1]
  MGEBX Van Kampen Global Value
Equity B 0.188 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.197 6.3
  GSIFX Goldman Sachs Int’l Equity A 0.235 0.038 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.158 0.458 13.2
  EUGAX Morgan Stanley European Equity
F 0.343 0.011 0.000 0.216 0.000 0.000 0.570 20.0
  PEUGX Putnam European Equity Fund A 0.328 0.000 0.000 0.167 0.000 0.021 0.516 18.4
  FIECX Federated Intl Equity Fund C 0.167 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.335 0.503 20.1
  AEDBX Aim European Growth 0.340 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.091 0.431 17.8
  JAOSX Janus Overseas 0.278 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.257 0.535 20.7
  MWEFX Global Equity A 0.205 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.054 0.259 9.1
Vanguard Average 0.101 0.000 0.003 0.036 0.000 0.257 0.398 14.0
Competitors Average 0.185 0.000 0.000 0.074 0.000 0.101 0.360 12.3
Spitzer Average 0.261 0.006 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.116 0.434 15.7
H. Restrictions on frequent trading: A brief history
During the period covered by this paper, Vanguard had rules that restricted frequent
trading. But Dan Wiener noted in 1999 in The Independent Advisor for Vanguard Investors
that Vanguard permitted frequent small trades for rebalancing purposes, so the restriction of
frequent trading was not complete.
To some degree that is still the case. The redemption fee is currently applied on a
first-in-first-out basis.  If  one  has  purchased  the  bulk  of  his  holdings  in  the  Vanguard
European Stock Index Fund more than 60 days ago, and then purchases 1 per cent more and
the next day sells 2 per cent of his holdings – on those shares that he has held for more than
60 days, he does not pay the 2 per cent redemption fee. An investor who has sold shares in
the European Stock Index Fund in the past 60 days may buy back shares only by mail – not
via the Internet or by telephone. An investor can, however, engage in telephone or online150
rebalancing every day by using two accounts, e.g., an employer account and an IRA, one for
sales and one for purchases.
The existence of opportunities for time-zone arbitrage put financial advisors in an
awkward position. They had a fiduciary duty to their clients to use strategies to maximize
client  returns,  so  those  who were aware  of  opportunities  for  time-zone  arbitrage were
obligated to  time  rebalancing and United  States dollar  cost  averaging  in  order to  take
advantage of it.
In December 2009, the Vanguard Emerging Markets Index Fund had a purchase fee
of 0.5 per cent and a redemption fee of 0.25 per cent, which was paid into the fund. Vanguard
European  Stock  Index  Fund,  Vanguard  International  Explorer  Fund,  Pacific  Stock  Index
Fund all have a redemption fee if held for less than two months, which again is paid into the
fund.
In two 2005 articles, Dale discussed the tightening of restrictions on frequent trading
at that time. Dale (2005a) noted that:
“Vanguard  Group  is  moving  to  clamp  down  on  investors  who
frequently move in and out of its mutual funds.
As  of 30 September, investors will  not be  able  to  buy  shares  of  a
Vanguard fund by phone or online within 60 days of selling shares in the same
fund. The firm will allow the repurchase of shares within 60 days by mailed
check, however.
The  mutual-fund  company  currently  allows  investors  to  make
unlimited round trips between funds, as long as it does not deem the trades
large enough to have an adverse impact on managing the funds.”
…
“Vanguard has long charged fees to investors who redeem shares of its
funds within a given holding period. For many funds, investors are charged 1
per cent if they sell shares within one year. Beginning 30 September, the firm
plans  to  begin  levying  the  1  per  cent  fee  on  fund  shares  sold  through  a
financial advisor during the specified holding period. The fees will apply to
participants  in  employer-sponsored  retirement  plans,  starting 31 December
2005.”
Dale (2005b) also noted that:
“Last month, Vanguard Group became the latest fund company to say
it will levy redemption fees on participants in employer-sponsored retirement
plans that use its funds. Vanguard has long charged the ‘retail’, or individual,
investors in many of its funds a 1 per cent fee if they sell shares within a year
of purchasing them. Beginning 31 December, the company will extend these
fees to retirement plans.
Vanguard does not expect many plan participants to pay the new fees,
because nearly 90 per cent do not make an exchange in a given year, said John
Demming,  a  Vanguard  spokesman. Fees  could  potentially  be  triggered  by151
annual rebalancing of 401(k) portfolios, but many plan participants do not
rebalance within a year, he said.
Employees enrolled in company retirement plans used to fly under the
radar when trading in and out of funds within a short time span. But mutual
funds are clamping down on the activity, largely because of regulatory probes
into rapid trading, also known as market timing.”
…
“T. Rowe Price charges redemption fees only on transactions that it
believes can be used for market-timing activities… T. Rowe began charging
fees on funds in 401(k) plans in January.
Before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposal (that
fund companies assess a mandatory 2 per cent redemption fee on trades within
a five-day period), most funds did not charge redemption fees in 401(k) plans.
Fidelity was the first to require that any custodian using its funds track each
investor’s  position.  Late  in  2003,  the  company  began  notifying  omnibus
account holders that they would be required to assess and collect redemption
fees at the individual investor level in retirement plans – or cease offering
Fidelity funds that carried redemption fees.”
On 11 March 2005, SEC adopted rule 22c-2:
“…to help address abuses associated with short-term trading of fund shares…
Rule 22c-2 provides that (the vast majority of funds) must consider whether to
impose a fee up to 2 per cent of the value of shares redeemed shortly after
their purchases (‘redemption fee’). The rule also requires such a fund to enter
into  agreements  with  its  intermediaries  that  provide  the  fund  management
with the ability to identify investors whose trading violates fund restrictions
on short-term trading.”
Thus, redemption fees are not required.
5
I. Has vulnerability to TZA gone?
Excess returns earned by time-zone trading come at the expense of the long-term
investor. As Bogle (2005) stated: “Long-term fund investors pay a heavy penalty for investor
activity by short-term fund owners. When equity funds hold cash as a redemption reserve,
long-term  returns  are  diluted.” Much  of  the  literature  has  examined  and  measured  fund
dilution from market timing by calculating the profits that arbitrageurs make from buying the
fund when prices are stale and subtracting them from the return of the fund (Zitzewitz, 2003).
5 One reader reported that he used TZA extensively with Vanguard through the 1990s, within the context of his
Vanguard 401-k plan. Since then, fair market pricing and stringent frequent trading rules have made TZA
unprofitable. Another reader reported receiving a letter from Vanguard in late 1999, which threatened to cut off
trading privileges unless he reduced the frequency of his trades. He moved his 401k account to another provider
who never complained about frequent trades. Yet another reader wrote: “I played the game for about 21 months
in my 401k. I was able to grow my portfolio approximately 70 per cent by moving between a stable value fund
and a Berstein international fund (during a period of a down market). Near the end of 2003 I had to end this
strategy due to menacing letters from my 401k provider, and trading restrictions that they started to impose.”152
The available S&P futures data only go up to and include 2004. It is important to
discover as much history as possible of the TZA vulnerability for a number of mutual funds –
the Vanguard index funds, Vanguard’s competitors and the Spitzer prosecuted families.
 Consequently, a simpler but feasible model was estimated. The goal was to find the
benefit from switching  between  a United States mutual fund and a  foreign mutual fund.
Consequently, the proportional return of each mutual fund minus that of the Vanguard 500
index fund was regressed on the S&P 500 adjusted proportional return from the previous day.
The coefficients from these regressions are shown in table 5. All observations from each year
were used, except 2009 data, ending on 5 December. The regression coefficients indicate the
effect of a 1 per cent increase in the S&P 500 index on the next day return as a per cent due
to switching into the foreign fund. The name chosen for the coefficient is “return sensitivity.”
Table 5 shows that for all the 16 funds considered, there is only a single negative
coefficient from 1997 through 2008. In 2009, all but two are positive, the average coefficient
for the three groups – Vanguard, Vanguard’s competitors and the Spitzer funds – are all
positive, but all the averages are less than 0.04. Thus, TZA vulnerability persisted until 5
December  2009. However, all the averages in 2009 were less than one-tenth of what they
were in 1997.
Figure  3 shows the  average  regression  coefficients  for  the  Vanguard  funds,  its
competitors  and  the  Spitzer  funds.  The  averages  include  all  16  funds.  Over  the  period
covered, the average return sensitivity showed a downward trend, but for each group it was
positive  in  every  year.  Thus  the  opportunity  for  TZA  has  still  not  disappeared.  Bogle’s
concern about the issue still had some relevance up to 5 December 2009. In 2009, for the
average Vanguard fund, 4 per cent of movements in the S&P 500 index were reflected in the
next-day differential return to investing abroad, down from 54 per cent in 1997.
Is  TZA  a  problem  for  Vanguard’s  electronically  traded  funds?  In  table  6,  this  is
explored for five of Vanguard’s ETFs. The same calculation as in table 5 and figure 3 is
performed. The average return sensitivity is less than 0.037 in each year and is negative in
2007. The conclusion is that sensitivity to TZA is not present for Vanguard’s ETFs. Since
Vanguard’s ETFs clone its regular index funds, it is puzzling why the susceptibility to TZA
exists for Vanguard’s regular mutual funds. For fair pricing, all a fund manager would need
to do is match the ETF price.
6
6 Braham (2003) identified problems  with fair value pricing. He noted that two  years earlier the SEC had
permitted mutual funds holding non-United States stocks to use fair value. Since then, 75 per cent of fund
managers have done so. Such permission is effective whenever a “significant event” occurs after markets close.
However,  regulators  have  not  defined  “significant  event.”  “Nor  has  the  SEC  delineated  any  specific
methodology for calculating fair value” and “methodologies differ widely across the fund industry. What this
ultimately means is that two foreign funds could own exactly the same stocks and price them differently at the
end of the day, Braham pointed out. “This creates a potential for conflicts of interest. For instance, if a fund
manager has a big shareholder redemption, he could intentionally mark the fund's value down so he has to pay
out less.”153
Table 5. Regression coefficients for the impact of proportional changes in S&P 500
on next-day fund net return – 1997 to 5 December 2009
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0.49 0.44 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.37 0.07 0.20 0.21 0.13 0.12 0.01 0.26
Vanguard
Average
0.54 0.34 0.46 0.36 0.18 0.15 0.36 0.29 0.23 0.25 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.26
Competitors
Average
0.47 0.28 0.30 0.25 0.27 0.34 0.38 0.10 0.23 0.20 0.13 0.09 0.01 0.24
Spitzer
Average
0.48 0.37 0.33 0.34 0.31 0.37 0.38 0.08 0.21 0.21 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.25
Figure 3. Regression coefficients for the impact of proportional changes in the S&P
500 on next-day fund net returns, 1997-5 December 2009.155
Table 6. Vanguard ETFs: Regression coefficients for the impact of S&P return on
next-day fund net return
Name Inception 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Average
VWO Vgd Emerging Markets 03/04/2005 0.063 -0.018 0.185 0.146 0.111 0.0975
VEA Vgd Europe Pacific 07/02/2007 0.020 -0.080 0.063 0.0009
VGK Vgd European 03/04/2005 -0.017 -0.096 0.043 -0.054 0.052 -0.0143
VEU Vgd FTSE All-World ex-
US 03/02/2007 0.040 -0.041 0.072 0.0238
VPL Vgd Pacific 03/04/2005 -0.105 -0.009 -0.070 0.004 0.042 -0.0274
Average net return coefficient -0.019 -0.041 0.044 -0.005 0.068 0.0093
SP500 on SP500 lagged -0.139 0.011 -0.170 -0.153 -0.119 -0.1141
VFINX on SP500 lagged -0.141 0.009 -0.170 -0.152 -0.119 -0.1146
Average gross return coefficient -0.160 -0.032 -0.126 -0.157 -0.051 -0.1052
J. Is this inquiry moral?
Jeffrey Molitor Director of Portfolio Review at The Vanguard Group, in a letter to
the  editor  of The  Financial  Analysts  Journal,  Molitor  (2002), criticized  the  decision  to
publish Boudoukh and others (2002).
“However,  your  decision  to  publish  an  article  that  outlines  how
investors can profit by taking advantage of pricing differences in international
mutual  funds  raises  serious  questions  about the  policies,  oversight  and
judgment applied in selecting articles for the FAJ. Specifically, how could an
organization  whose  motto  is  “Setting  a  Higher  Standard  for  Investment
Professionals Worldwide” publish (and, by inference, endorse) an article on
how to take advantage of the average mutual fund shareholder? (The article
could  have  been  subtitled  “Here’s how  to steal money  from your fellow
shareholders.”)  Obviously,  the  ethical  shortcomings  of  this  article  were
abundantly clear to your editors. The article’s introduction states: “The gains
from  these  strategies  are  matched  by  offsetting  losses  by  buy-and-hold
investors.”
Publishing  such  a  piece  in  a  publication  that  is  aimed  solely  at
financial professionals is a bad idea in the best of times, but is abhorrent in a
period when investor confidence is already shaken by corporate greed and
fraud, bad accounting and a bear market overall. My concern is not with the
accuracy of the article itself (although it should be noted that the use of “fair
value pricing” has effectively closed the arbitrage), but rather with the absence
of  perspective  and  ethical  guidance  applied  in  approving  this  article.
Providing the direction  on what represents scholarship, insight, and proper156
ethics  is  the  responsibility  of  AIMR’s (Association  for  Investment
Management and Research) Board. The FAJ is the most public representation
of AIMR  and should reflect the best, in all dimensions, of what the  CFA
charter is expected to represent. Publishing articles that may be “technically
correct”  but  inconsistent  with  the  concept  of  “setting  a  higher  standard”
reflects an unfortunate lack of oversight by the Board. AIMR has historically
stood for trust, integrity and high ethics. I hope that this focus will be reflected
in future FAJ articles.”
This  criticism  applies  also  to  the  efforts  described  in  this paper.  What  can
economists do to destroy  market distortions? Bhagwati (1988), in a marvelous rhetorical
flourish,  articulated  what  he  called  the  Dracula  effect.  Just  as  Dracula  shrivels  into
nothingness when the morning sunlight hits him, “exposing evil to sunlight helps to destroy
it.” Similarly, it is the role of economists to illuminate the costs and unintended consequences
of various distortions. Figure 3 shows that when the letter was published, fair value pricing
had not eliminated the arbitrage opportunity. Nor had the opportunity entirely disappeared in
2009  according  to table 5.  Is  it  worse  to  expose  a  distortion  or  to  mislead  investors  by
pretending that it does not exist?
It is worth recalling the logic of Tullock (1967). For him, the welfare cost of theft is
not what is stolen, because that is a transfer from the victim to the thief. It is the cost of the
thief’s jimmy, the opportunity cost of his time and the costs of locks to make homes secure.
To this one should add the reluctance to work and accumulate consumer durables for fear of
theft. Similarly, the cost of TZA to the economy is not the profit made from TZA, for that is
a transfer from long term buy and hold investors to time-zone arbitrageurs. Rather, it is the
cost of the extra liquidity held by funds, the extra transactions costs imposed on them by
TZA,  the  opportunity  cost  of  the  time  of  the  authors  and  readers  of  this  study,  and  the
consequences of reduced diversification into international funds: greater portfolio risk and
altered savings and investment behavior.
Additionally  does  the  immorality  lie  with  the regulations  that  perpetuated  the
arbitrage opportunity, the mutual fund company that permited the distortion to be exploitable,
or with the investor who exploited it?
K. Did fund returns beat their indexes in spite of TZA?
Did TZA beat the  returns of international funds down below that of the indexes,
which track them? Tables 7 and 8 as well as figure 4 address this issue.
A technique is employed that was developed by Sharpe (1992) and used recently by
Blanchett (forthcoming), Rodriguez and Tower (2008), Tower and Yang (2008) and Tower
(2009a and 2009b) to find the basket of indexes that best tracks a mutual fund, the tracking
index. The indexes used are MSCI Emerging Markets, Europe, Pacific Ex Japan, Pacific,
World Ex United States, EAFE, EAFE Value, EAFE Growth and EAFE Small Cap. All
indexes are in United States dollars, include reinvested dividends and subtract withholding157
taxes on dividends. The EAFE Value and Growth start at end-1998, while EAFE Small Cap
starts in 2001. The late start of three of these indexes results in gaps in table 8 for funds,
whose tracking index should include these indexes.
Solver is employed to search for the basket of indexes that, when rebalanced monthly,
most closely tracks that of the mutual fund. The criterion for close tracking is the minimum
standard deviation of the differential between the return of the basket and the return of the
mutual fund. Monthly data from Morningstar’s Principia Pro Disks are used.
The technique is to regress the fund monthly return on those of the indexes, while
constraining all the coefficients to be positive and add up to 1. The regression coefficients are
interpreted as the portfolio shares of the various indexes in the tracking index basket. That
they are all positive reflects the assumption of no short sales. That they add up to 1 reflects
the assumption that the index shares in each tracking index must add up to one.
The portfolios are described in table 7. The shares are consistent with intuition. For
example, the Vanguard European Index Fund is best tracked by a tracking index consisting
of 100 per cent of the MSCI Europe Index. The R
2s show how well the tracking indexes track
the fund. The Aim Europe Growth C Fund has an R
2 of only 0.788, so one should have less
faith that the tracking index has captured the investment style of the fund than is the case for
all the other funds.
Table 8 shows the gross performance differentials – that is, gross of expenses. The
annual figures show the average geometric return of the fund minus that of the corresponding
index  basket,  continuously  compounded,  with  the  expense  ratio  subtracted,  to  yield the
differential gross return, expressed in percentage points per year. The bottom four rows show
the averages for four groups of funds (Vanguard, Vanguard competitors, all the Spitzer funds
and the Spitzer funds that exhibited an R
2 of 0.9 or greater when fitted to their tracking
indexes). This last set is included in order to exclude those funds for which good tracking
indexes  could  not  be  found. The  next  two  columns  show  the  average  performance
differentials  for  the  period  prior  to  the  resolution  of  Eliot  Spitzer’s  investigation  of  the
mutual  fund  industry  (1997-2002)  and  post-investigation  (2004-2007);  2003,  when  the
investigation was occurring, was left out.
The  expected  result  was  that  the  Spitzer  funds  performed  better  after  the
investigation. In fact, their average gross return differential dropped by 4.59 per cent – 2.23
per cent = 2.36 per cent per year or 2.35 per cent per year, depending on whether the average,
or the average with high R
2s, is used. Vanguard’s average differential rose (by 0.19 per cent
per year) and the competitor’s dropped (by 0.82 per cent per year).
For the whole period, the average gross performance differential for each group was
positive (0.98 per cent for Vanguard, 1.96 per cent for the competitors, 3.36 per cent for all
Spitzer and 2.06 per cent for high R
2 Spitzer. The Spitzer funds were expected to perform the
worst, relative to other funds in 1997-2003. In fact, they performed better than the other two
groups during that period. For each group, the average gross differential performance was
positive over the whole period, with only one fund showing a negative average differential158
over the entire period, and one fund showing a negative average return in the pre-Spitzer
period.  This  indicates  that  for  the  most  part,  TZA  was  not  severe  enough  to  cause
international mutual fund gross returns to underperform the tracking indexes.
7
Table 7. Tracking indexes
Composition of funds (in percent)


















































































AEBDX Aim Europe Growth C 6 94 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.788
DFEMX DFA Emerging Mkts I 75 12 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.965
EUGAX MS European Equity A 0 96 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0.969
FIECX Federated Intl Equity C 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 94 0 0.899
FIEUX Fidelity Europe 13 87 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.952
GMOFX GMO Foreign Fund III 0 0 14 7 0 43 36 0 0 0.971
GSIFX Goldman Sachs Conctd Intl A 0 32 0 0 61 7 0 0 0 0.968
JAOSX Janus Overseas 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 70 0 0.902
MEMCX MFS Emerging Markets C 85 13 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0.966
MSRCX Van Kampen Emerg Mkts C 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.969
PEUGX Putnam Europe Equity A 1 97 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.975
PRESX T. Rowe Price Euro Stock 1 97 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0.984
VEIEX Vanguard Emerging Mkts
Index 80 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.987
VEURX Vanguard Europe Index 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.999
VINEX Vanguard Intl Explorer 12 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 61 0.975
VPACX Vanguard Pacific Index 0 0 0 98 0 2 0 0 0 0.996
However, since investors are concerned with net returns average, expense ratios over
the 11-year period were subtracted to obtain net return differentials. Again, these are positive
for all three groups. One should not make too much of these net return calculations, since the
7 Expenses  and  transactions  costs  drag  down  the  fund  returns,  and  any  income  made  from  the  lending  of
securities, engaged in by DFA and Vanguard, should raise them. This last effect may explain the positive
differential, but we were unable to quantify it.159
expense ratios depend on the class of fund considered, and front and back end-loads are
ignored.
Figure 4 shows the annual figures for the averages in table 8 for the three groups
(excluding all Spitzer). It dramatizes the fact that for all these fund groups the average gross
differential return is positive over the whole 11-year period and in the two sub-periods.
8
Figure 4. Fund return differentials in per cent per year, continually compounded
8 Schwartz and Potter (2006) found that “equity funds involved in a scandal outperformed their peers during the
pre- and post-scandal period, but significantly underperformed their peers during the scandal period (March
2000-August  2003),  even  after  adjusting  for  market  effects  and  fund  characteristics.  The  dates  reflect  the
implication that several funds engaged in late trading with Canary Capital Partners in March 2000; one could
read of the first investigations on 3 September 2003. Figure 4 does not show such a clear pattern.160














































































































































AEBDX Aim Europe Growth C 14.09 35.93 8.84 -5.48 11.22 4.75 11.27 3.86 5.94 0.74 12.92 5.31 9.12 2.72 6.4
DFEMX DFA Emerging Mkts I -6.94 12.47 11.12 -1.78 0.75 0.22 7.75 6.11 4.07 -0.18 2.84 0.22 4.12 3.47 0.77 2.7
EUGAX M S European Equity A -4.75 -1.62 11.43 5.26 3.95 1.19 -5.73 -5.78 0.27 -1.52 2.83 2.58 -1.99 0.5 1.54 -1.04
FIECX Federated Intl Equity C 32.4 -0.28 -5.65 -8.2 2.45 -0.29 -3.14 -1.36 -5.09 4.57 -1.48 1.2 2.46 -1.26
FIEUX Fidelity Europe 4.97 1.84 -1.59 4.03 3.18 -9.62 5.57 7.27 6.36 -5.16 0.76 0.47 2.96 1.6 1.05 0.55
GMOFX GMO Foreign Fnd III -0.19 5.91 11.17 10.02 -0.1 -0.03 0.23 0.35 -0.45 10.02 0 1.67 0.75 0.92
GSIFX Goldman Sachs
Concentrated Intl Equity A -1.98 -1.31 7.24 -0.52 -0.46 -1.32 -2.02 -4.78 2.19 -3.6 -4.05 0.27 -2.45 -0.97 1.58 -2.55
JAOSX Janus Overseas 29.69 11.43 -4.65 -11.84 0.25 1.34 12.12 17.68 5.25 6.16 7.33 6.81 0.92 5.89
MEMCX MFS Emerg Mkts C 22.74 -13.9 -3.87 8.99 6.81 9.16 3.84 5.61 8.06 2 3.75 4.99 4.65 4.83 0.9 3.94
MSRCX Van Kampen E Mkt C 14.61 4.04 22.96 -7.54 1.68 3.49 4.54 3.57 4.3 7.62 5.04 6.54 5.01 5.85 2.95 2.9
PEUGX Putnam Europe Equity A 1.37 -1.54 6.49 4.75 -2.95 -0.51 -4.06 -0.81 1.66 1.7 -5.14 1.27 -1.33 0.09 1.36 -1.28
PRESX T. Rowe Price Euro
Stock -3.75 -0.24 3.58 3.39 -0.06 0.53 -0.45 -2.71 0.30 -0.43 2.13 0.58 -0.23 0.21 1.06 -0.85
VEIEX Vanguard E Market
Index 1 7.44 1.73 2.21 3.44 0.76 5.17 2.45 4.4 0.1 2.98 2.76 3.02 2.88 0.53 2.35
VEURX Vanguard Europe Index 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.04 -0.02 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.29 -0.26
VINEX Vanguard Intl Explorer -2.71 2.98 4.13 -0.78 5.11 -2.96 -2.71 1.7 0.96 0.61 0.35
VPACX Vanguard Pacific Index -0.38 0.15 0.32 0.18 -0.95 0.48 0.34 0.20 0.40 -0.10 -0.31 -0.03 0.10 0.03 0.36 -0.33
Vanguard average 0.23 2.55 0.71 0.81 0.82 -0.35 2.13 1.70 1.01 1.28 -0.07 0.79 0.98 0.98 0.45 0.53
Competitor Average -1.91 4.69 3.23 2.89 3.76 0.29 3.19 2.66 2.74 -1.36 1.32 2.16 1.34 1.96 0.91 0.83
All Spitzer average 6.40 -0.04 17.78 3.87 -0.84 0.40 0.50 1.27 3.66 3.56 0.42 4.59 2.23 3.36 1.80 1.62
Spitzer avg with R
2>0.95 6.40 -2.87 8.85 2.19 1.81 2.40 -0.69 -0.44 3.30 1.24 0.49 3.13 0.78 2.06 1.67 0.39161
L. Conclusions about time-zone arbitrage
The objective was to examine the ability of an investor to use lagged S&P data to
predict fund returns the following day in Vanguard’s international index mutual funds and
for samples from other fund families. This paper has demonstrated that an unsophisticated
trader had an opportunity to use a time-zone arbitrage strategy to gain large excess returns.
That opportunity had diminished but not completely disappeared even by 5 December 2009.
Time-zone arbitrage opportunities were found to have existed in the Vanguard fund
family – and at levels similar to other families. Vanguard is one of the most reputable mutual
fund families in that it charges low expenses to all classes of investor, keeps transactions
costs low, has stayed free of scandal and was not one of the families investigated by the New
York Attorney General. Despite Vanguard CEO and founder John Bogle’s testimony on the
negative impact of time-zone arbitrage, even Vanguard’s funds were found to be vulnerable
to time-zone arbitrage. However, in no year were the Vanguard international index funds
found  to  underperform  their  corresponding  indexes,  gross  of  expenses.  So  no  evidence
emerges of dilution of buy-and-hold investors’ returns by time-zone arbitrageurs to the point
that Vanguard underperformed the indexes.
By  2003, the SEC  was  under  tremendous  pressure  to  enact  regulations  aimed  at
limiting time-zone arbitrage (Hogue and Wellman, 2005). There are several main solutions
that mutual fund can employ to prevent fund dilution:
(a) Funds can correct for the stale prices in NAVs, as was the case in 2007;
(b) They can discourage short-term trading with fees and trade limits;
(c) They can institute limits on the number of trades one can make a year, as most
funds have done;
(d) Finally, mutual fund families could require that trades involving stocks traded on
foreign exchanges be placed prior to the close of those markets.
The  evidence  for  time-zone  arbitrage  runs  contrary  to  the  “efficient  markets”
hypothesis, which implies that with the exception of long-term trends, future stock prices are
very difficult to impossible to predict. One of the most cited advocates of this proposition is
Malkiel (2005) who wrote:
“Although the preponderance of statistical evidence supports the view that
market  efficiency  is  high,  some  gremlins  are  lurking  about  that  harry  the
efficient-market theory and make it impossible for anyone to state that the
theory is conclusively demonstrated.”
In the case of time-zone arbitrage, the gremlin was institutional complicity with the
arbitrageurs or institutional carelessness. Time-zone arbitrage demonstrates that news does
not travel instantaneously and that institutions did not adjust prices to reflect all relevant
news. In fact, time-zone arbitrage vulnerability, according to the findings detailed in this
paper, existed for at least 10 years.162
This paper demonstrates that time-zone arbitrage opportunity existed in Vanguard and
other international funds long after the market timing strategies became publicly known. This
is an important discovery for both Vanguard and other mutual fund families. The authors do
not know why this arbitrage opportunity has not been eradicated, although one possibility is
the difficulty of implementing fair value pricing. Still, the opportunity now is a shadow of its
former self.
M. Implications for the integration of international capital markets
The  opportunity  for  TZA  has  diminished  but  not  disappeared. This  shrinkage,
together  with  the  advent  of  exchange-traded  funds,  which  are  not  subject  to  time-zone
arbitrage, make investment in Asia and Europe more profitable for American mutual fund
investors.  When  TZA  opportunities  were  huge,  Tower  shrank  his  foreign  investments,
fearing  that  he  was  being  implicitly  taxed. It  is  likely  that  this  was  also  true  of  other
investors,  and  would  have  been  increasingly  true  as  more  investors learnt about  TZA.
Tower’s Duke University Retirement Plan does not permit him to invest in ETFs, so the only
way for him and some others to invest abroad was through mutual funds subject to TZA. The
reduction of the opportunities for TZA should increase United States investment in Asia and
Europe, and enhance the integration of these three markets.
For many investors, ETFs offer a better way to invest abroad than with mutual funds.
In 1996, Barclays Global Investors introduced 17 ETFs which track MSCI (Morgan Stanley
Capital International) indexes. As Wikipedia notes, these funds “gave casual investors easy
access to foreign markets.” Some of these, such as the “MSCI South Korea Index Fund”
(EWY) and the “MSCI Taiwan Index Fund” (EWT). Shares initially charged expense ratios
as high as 0.99 per cent per year. These particular rates have come down to 0.63 per cent and
0.67  per  cent,  respectively.  Barclays Emerging Markets  still  charges  0.72  per  cent.
Vanguard’s Emerging Market fund charges only 0.39 per cent, but due to high transactions
costs  in  developing  countries a  fee  of  0.5  per  cent  must  be  paid when  purchasing  the
emerging market fund and 0.25 per cent when selling it. However, the Vanguard ETF, which
holds the same portfolio of stocks, charges only 0.27 per cent, making it a more attractive
vehicle.  Similarly,  Vanguard’s  European  and  Pacific  mutual  funds  charge  0.29  per  cent,
while Vanguard’s Europe Pacific ETF charges only 0.16 per cent. ETFs are open both to
regular investors and those with independent retirement accounts (IRAs).
From a social standpoint these ETFs are beneficial. A mutual fund must buy or sell
stocks as clients purchase or sell the fund. However, purchases and sales of ETFs by clients
simply move the price of the fund up or down, until the price of the fund deviates from the
value of the securities it holds by enough to make it worth while for authorized participants
to trade shares of the ETFs for the underlying securities. This means that each ETF acts like a
closed-end mutual fund, except its value is kept roughly in line with that of the underlying
securities by arbitrage. This reduces the transactions costs that eat into the efficiency of the
saving  and  investment  process.  The  expense  ratios  quoted  above  are  in  addition  to  any
transactions  cost  a  fund  must  incur  in  transacting  in  its  underlying  securities,  so  ETFs
provide a saving in addition to the savings brought by the lower expense ratio.163
There  is  another  implication  of  ETFs.  Investors  with  foreign  addresses  are  not
allowed to hold accounts with some American brokerage firms. Vanguard is one of these.
Fidelity and Ameriterade are not. Some American mutual funds permit themselves to be held
by non-Americans, e.g., Fidelity funds. Some do not (e.g., Vanguard funds). However, an
investor  with  a  foreign  address  can  purchase  the  low-expense  Vanguard  and  other  ETFs
through a non-Vanguard brokerage account. This is an efficient way for foreigners to access
the United States capital market, facilitating capital market integration.164
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